■ 


Ml 
MOOT 


THE  LIBRARY 
OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 
LOS  ANGELES 


The 

TRANSVAAL 
OUTLOOK 

 WITH  MAPS 

by 

Albert  Stickney 


DODD,  MEAD  ftP  COMPANY 
1900 


NOTE. 


It  is  proper  to  state,  that  the  first  part  of  this  paper, 
that  on  the  Military  Situation,  was  written  prior  to 
January  4th,  1900,  and  is  printed  as  then  written. 


Copyright  1900,  By  Albert  Sticknry. 


or 

133 

CONTENTS. 

0  o  0  T 


PART  I. 

Page. 

The  Mtlttary  Situation   1 

Some  General  Considebationb   5 

The  Impossibility  of  Solving  the  Problem  of  TRANS- 
portation and  supply,  foe  any  large  army  in 
South  Afeioa,  Except  by  Lines  of  Railway   8 

The  Extreme  Ease  of  Destruction  of  Railway  Com- 
munications in  the  Present  South  African 
Field  of  Operations   21 

The  Absence  of  Preparation  on  the  Part  of  the 
British  Army  for  the  Handling  of  the  Present 
Problem  of  Transportation  and  Supply   28 

The  Reason  for  this  Absence  of  Preparation  on 

the  Part  of  the  British  Army   38 

The  Possibility  of  a  Solution  of  the  Problem  of 
Transportation  by  the  British  Army,  Under 
Existing  Conditions   49 

PART  II. 

The  Political  Situation  Between  Boers  and  British.  58 
The  Boers,  and  Their  Rights   62 

part  in. 

The  Present  Outlook   86 

The  Cause  of  the  Boers   105 

PART  IV. 

Postscript   109> 


1201923 


LIST  OF  MAPS. 


Face  Page. 

South  Africa   1 

Field  of  Operations  Around  Ladysmith   8 

Diagram  of  Mileage  and  Altitudes  on  Railway  Line 

from  Durban  to  Charlestown   22 

Field  of  Operations  on  the  Line  of  Lord  Methuen's 

Advance   52 


THE  TKANSYAAL  OUTLOOK. 


i. 


THE  MILITAEY  SITUATION. 

The  thing  of  most  absorbing  public  interest  now  before  the 
civilized  world  is  the  war  between  Great  Britain  and  the  two 
South  African  Republics. 

Its  especial  importance  to  the  American  people  is  to  be  found 
in  the  value  to  the  British  nation  of  American  sympathy.  That 
sympathy,  down  to  the  present  time,  has  been  largely  on  the 
Side  of  our  kinsmen  beyond  the  sea.  It  has  been  assumed,  with 
or  without  reason,  that  we  had,  during  what  has  been  termed 
the  Spanish  War,  a  manifestation  of  sympathy  on  their  part, 
which  went  virtually  to  the  extent  of  active  intervention  and 
support  It  has  also  been  generally  assumed,  that,  although  in 
the  present  contest  the  purely  technical  right  of  the  situation 
<fn  legal  grounds  is  with  the  Boers,  yet  nevertheless,  upon  the 
whole  situation,  the  British  nation  is  entitled  to  the  sym- 
pathies of  the  civilized  world;  that  the  present  contest  is 
really  one  between  progress  and  stagnation;  is  a  question  of 
the  spread  of  the  realm  of  liberty  and  order;  is,  in  fact,  a 
struggle  between  democracy  and  oligarchic  class  rule.  It  has 
been  assumed,  in  effect,  that  the  Boers  are  resisting  the  march 
of  civilization. 

Public  opinion  seems,  however,  on  these  questions,  to  be 
gradually  verging  towards  a  condition  of,  at  least,  doubt.  It 
is  not  now  so  generally  assumed,  as  it  was  a  short  time  ago,  that 
the  Boers  are  an  obstacle  to  progress.  It  is  evident,  that  we 
are  beginning  to  examine  the  facts.  The  indications  are,  that 
the  tide  of  sympathy  is  turning  away  from  our  nearest  kinsmen. 

However  this  may  be,  large  numbers  of  persons  are  of  the 
belief  that,  whichever  of  the  contending  parties  may  hold  the 
meritorious  side  of  the  contest,  yet  there  can  be  no  question  as 
to  its  outcome.  It  is  generally  assumed,  that  victory  is  sure 
finally  to  rest  with  the  British,  and  after  no  very  long  period 


2 


of  time.  Consequently,  it  is  also  assumed,  that  it  is  more  in 
the  interests  of  mankind  that  the  result  should  be  reached 
quickly ;  and  that  the  war  should  come  to  a  speedy  termination, 
by  a  great  British  triumph,  which  is  generally  believed  to  be 
a  practical  certainty. 

It  is,  therefore,  of  prime  importance  to  give  careful  attention 
to  the  military  situation.  If  the  facts  of  that  situation  should 
warrant  the  conclusion,  either  that  the  British  will  not  succeed 
at  all  in  the  conquest  of  the  South  African  Republics,  or  that 
success  will  be  attained  only  at  the  end  of  a  long  and 
costly  war,  the  situation  would  be  essentially  changed.  If  the 
war  must  in  any  event  entail  upon  the  British  people  an  enor- 
mous expenditure  of  money  and  life,  it  will  behoove  them  serious- 
ly to  consider,  whether  they  can,  with  safety  to  themselves,  and 
with  safety  to  their  empire,  afford  to  prolong  the  existing  con- 
test ;  whether  it  is  not  imperatively  demanded,  by  their  own  in- 
terests, and  the  interests  of  the  whole  civilized  world,  that  the 
war  with  the  South  African  Republics  should  be  brought  to  an 
immediate  termination,  even  if  that  termination  should  result 
in  the  abandonment  of  the  contest  by  the  British  Government. 

The  military  situation,  from  this  point  of  view,  becomes  one 
of  principal  interest.  At  all  times  the  operations  of  war  have 
an  absorbing  interest.  At  this  particular  time,  however,  the 
interest  which  they  excite  is  exceptional;  and  arises  from  the 
fact,  that  the  prospect  either  of  a  British  failure,  or  of  a 
British  success  which  would  come  only  at  the  end  of  a  very  long 
period  of  hostilities,  will  have  the  deepest  significance. 

In  the  Army  and  Navy  Gazette,  in  the  issue  of  October  14, 
1899,  there  appeared  an  editorial  entitled  "  War  at  Last." 
That  paper  is  edited  by  the  Honorable  William  Howard  Russell, 
correspondent  of  the  London  Times  during  the  Crimean  War, 
and  during  the  earlier  portion  of  our  own  Civil  War.  The  ed- 
itorial in  question  amounted  to  a  warm  and  hearty  congratula- 
tion, to  Mr.  Chamberlain,  on  the  fact,  that  his  foreign  policy  had 
at  last  attained  the  object  for  which  he  had  so  strenuously 
labored,  a  war  with  the  Transvaal  Republic.  It  would  seem 
natural,  and  even  probable,  that  any  person  who  had  had,  even 
to  a  slight  extent,  a  personal  observation  of  actual  military  op- 
erations would  never  have  had  the  hardihood  to  emit  a  publica- 


3 


tion  of  the  nature  of  the  one  just  mentioned.  However,  Dr. 
Kuesell  was  guilty  of  that  indiscretion.  Its  nature  and  extent 
will  appear  more  fully  upon  the  reading  of  his  language. 

"  War  at  Last. 

"  Mr.  Reitz,  as  Secretary  of  State  of  the  Transvaal  Government,  has 
signed  the  declaration  of  war,  which  is  to  be  effective  if  the  Queen's 
forces  are  not  withdrawn  from  the  frontier  and  if  the  reinforcements  now 
on  their  way  are  allowed  to  land,  but  he  is  only  the  instrument  of  Mr. 
Kruger's  will.  It  is  not  in  our  line  to  interfere  in  the  process,  but  it  seems 
to  us  that  the  severance  of  the  knot  ought  not  to  have  been  effected  at 
this  moment,  yet  it  cannot  be  regarded  by  us  with  dissatisfaction  as  an 
untoward  event  from  the  political  point  of  view.  In  fact,  if  we  could 
read  the  'inwards'  of  Mr.  Chamberlain  we  think  there  would  be  found  in 
characters  of  flame  inscribed  under  his  orchid,  '  Heaven  be  praised  I 
Kruger  has  declared  War  V  From  the  Pretoria  point  of  view  the  declara- 
tion may  have  been  necessary.  From  the  standpoint  of  the  soldier,  the 
politician,  or  the  statesman,  it  must  be  regarded  as  a  grievous  blunder. 
It  was  too  late.  If  the  forces  of  the  two  Republics  could  have  been  set 
in  motion  six  weeks  or  a  month  ago,  there  could  have  been  an  infinity  of 
mischief  to  Natal  and  to  the  Cape  Colony  for  them  to  inflict  and  revel  in — 
an  immense  encouragement  to  the  Boer  Afrikanders — a  great  blow  to  the 
loyal  colonists — and  much  possible  obstruction  to  the  concentration  of  the 
troops  destined  in  case  of  war  to  invade  the  Republics.  We  were  not 
ready  and  we  were  not  strong.  If  there  was  no  threatening  movement 
or  concentration  of  ours  on  the  frontiers  to  justify  the  demands  of  the 
Republics  there  was  ample  evidence  that  the  British  Government  was  pre- 
paring a  great  army  to  operate  if  necessary  against  them.  *  *  * 
It  is  not  too  much  to  say,  that  the  declaration  of  war  by  the  Republics 
must  have  caused  the  utmost  satisfaction  to  the  millions  of  people  who 
have  supported  the  Colonial  Secretary  in*  the  energetic  policy  he  has  pur- 
sued in  dealing  with  the  Transvaal  Government,  and  we  hope  sincerely 
that  the  results  of  the  success  of  our  arms  in  the  field  will  be  productive 
of  the  benefits  which  are  expected  from  the  overthrow  of  the  Boer  Repub- 
lics, confer  honor  on  our  leaders  in  the  council  and  the  field  and  give 
peace  and  prosperity  to  South  Africa.'' 

To  us,  with  our  later  acquired  knowledge  from  actual  events, 
it  seems  almost  impossible  to  realize  anything  more  humorous 
than  the  preceding  utterances,  of  one  who  presumably  has  kept 
in  touch  for  the  last  forty  years  with  military  operations  and 
current  military  literature.  It  is  well,  however,  that  we  bear 
in  mind  the  existence  of  the  frank  avowal  contained  in  the 
foregoing  paper,  which  may  be  deemed  almost  official,  to  the 


4 


effect  that  the  British  troops  at  the  time  of  the  publication  of  that 
editorial  were  near  the  boundaries  of  the  Transvaal,  "destined  in 
case  of  war  to  invade  the  Kepublics."  It  is  also  interesting  to 
observe  the  implied  affirmation,  that,  although  the  British  people 
six  weeks  or  a  month  prior  to  the  time  of  the  Transvaal  declara- 
tion "were  not  ready,  and  were  not  strong,"  nevertheless  at 
the  time  of  the  publication,  to  wit,  on  the  14th  day  of  October, 
1899,  the  British  people  were  "  ready,"  and  were  "  strong." 
It  is  equally  interesting  to  note  the  point  made  in  the  next  suc- 
ceeding sentence :  "  From  the  standpoint  of  the  soldier,  the  poli- 
tician or  the  statesman,  it  must  be  regarded  as  a  grievous 
blunder.  It  was  too  late."  Dr.  Russell's  meaning  is  that  it 
was  the  action  of  the  Transvaal  which  was  "  too  late."  The 
implication  is,  that,  for  the  purposes  of  the  British  Government, 
the  declaration  of  war  by  the  Transvaal  Republic  came  in  the 
very  nick  of  time.  Let  us  note  also  the  further  implication, 
when  Dr.  Russell  says :  "  If  the  forces  of  the  two  Republics 
could  have  been  set  in  motion  six  weeks  or  a  month  ago, 
there  could  have  been  an  infinity  of  mischief  to  Natal  and 
to  the  Cape  Colony  for  them  to  inflict  and  revel  in — an  immense 
encouragement  to  the  Boer  Afrikanders — a  great  blow  to  the 
loyal  colonists,  and  much  possible  obstruction  to  the  concentra- 
tion of  the  troops  destined  in  case  of  war  to  invade  the  Re- 
publics. 

In  view  of  the  fact,  now  apparent,  that  the  South  Af- 
rican Republic  was  in  the  highest  state  of  preparation  for 
the  breaking  out  of  hostilities,  that  this  preparation  had  ex- 
tended over  a  period  of  more  than  four  years,  and  so  far  as 
now  appears,  had  provided  for  almost  every  possible  con- 
tingency, it  becomes  really  ludicrous,  to  consider  the  state 
of  absolute  absence  of  counter  preparation,  at  every  material 
point,  on  the  part  of  the  British  Government,  which,  as  we 
now  know,  was  forcing  a  war,  virtually  at  the  point  of  the 
bayonet,  upon  a  people  whom  they  thought  to  be  much  weaker 
than  themselves,  whom  they  thought  to  coerce  by  a  mere 
demonstration  of  superior  force,  and  who,  as  Mr.  Chamberlain 
fondly  imagined,  would  submit  to  any  extortionate  demands  that 
might  be  conceived,  rather  than  enter  upon  the  prosecution  of 
actual  hostilities. 


5 

Even  under  the  conditions  existing  to-day,  as  to  the  contest 
between  the  British  Empire  on  the  one  hand,  and  that  apparently 
feeble  power,  the  South  African  Republic,  on  the  other,  it  is  a 
fact  that  the  sympathies  of  the  civilized  world  will  be  largely 
influenced  by  their  opinion  of  the  probable  outcome.  It  is  a 
sad  condition  of  affairs,  but  it  is  nevertheless  the  truth,  that  a 
large  portion  of  mankind  is  inclined  in  almost  any  contest 
to  take  the  side  of  the  strongest,  or  of  the  party  which  they 
deem  to  be  the  strongest,  without  very  much  reference  to  the 
justice  or  injustice  of  the  position  of  either  side.  In  view, 
however,  of  this  fact  of  human  nature,  it  becomes  desirable  to 
consider,  with  as  much  accuracy  as  conditions  permit,  the 
prominent  features  of  the  present  military  situation  in  the  war 
between  the  Transvaal  and  Great  Britain,  and  to  figure,  as  far 
as  is  now  possible,  the  probabilities  as  to  the  result  of  this  present 
most  unfortunate  contest 

Especially  will  this  inquiry  be  found  interesting,  if  the  result 
should  be  a  conclusion  that  Great  Britain  is  in  this  present 
contest  somewhat  overmatched,  and  that  it  behooves  her,  with  a 
view  simply  to  the  preservation  of  the  Empire  within  its  present 
limits,  to  put  an  end  to  this  most  unnatural  and  unjustifiable 
struggle  at  the  earliest  possible  moment. 


SOME  GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS. 

It  has  for  a  long  time  been  agreed  by  competent  military 
authorities,  that,  under  ordinary  circumstances,  the  stronger 
position,  in  case  of  invasion,  is  that  of  the  defense.  It  need  not 
be  said,  that,  under  ordinary  circumstances,  the  strongest  de- 
fense is  some  form  of  attack.  Bearing  that  in  mind,  however, 
it  is  quite  well  conceded  among  military  authorities,  that  in  case 
of  an  invasion  the  stronger  position,  generally,  is  that  of  the 
defense. 

In  this  respect  there  has  been  no  essential  change  in  the  prin- 
ciples or  rules  of  military  science  during  the  last  one  hundred 
years.  Yet  the  advantages  on  the  side  of  the  defense  have  been 
steadily  increasing.    They  were  sufficiently  strong  at  the  time 


6 


of  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill,  when  a  handful  of  minute  men, 
without  drill  or  discipline,  posted  behind  earthworks  which  had 
been  hastily  thrown  up  in  a  few  hours,  were  able  to  defeat,  for 
the  time  being,  and  so  long  as  their  ammunition  lasted,  the 
flower  of  the  British  Army.  Even  in  the  days  of  the  old- 
fashioned  smooth-bore  musket,  under  ordinary  conditions,  the 
defense  was  much  stronger  than  the  attack.  Starting  only  from 
that  point  of  time,  the  chief  improvement  has  been  in  the 
range  and  accuracy  of  weapons.  The  change  has  been  one  of 
degree,  and  not  of  kind.  The  principles  applicable  to  prob- 
lems of  that  nature  have  not  been  changed  in  their  essence.  No 
conditions  have  been  introduced  which  are  new  in  kind. 

To  come  down  a  little  later,  to  the  days  of  our  own  Civil 
War,  and  comparing  the  conditions  existing  at  that  point  of 
time  with  those  existing  at  the  present  day,  the  changes  between 
the  relative  positions  of  the  attack  and  the  defense  are  hardly 
worth  mentioning.  In  the  days  of  the  Civil  War  the  Springfield 
rifle  was  a  weapon  of  fairly  long  range  and  accuracy.  The  in- 
crease in  range  and  accuracy  since  that  time  is  one  which  need 
have  very  slight  consideration  in  any  study  of  the  principles  of 
military  science  applicable  to  the  questions  of  attack  and  defense. 
There  has  been,  as  said  before,  merely  an  increase  in  range  and 
accuracy.  The  increase  in  rapidity  of  discharge  is  one  to  which 
military  critics  are  inclined  to  attach  great  weight  But  even 
this  is  less  important  than  is  commonly  supposed.  The  fire  of 
the  old  Springfield  rifle  was  fast  enough — for  practical  purposes 
in  most  cases.  Under  very  exceptional  circumstances,  it  was, 
no  doubt,  desirable  that  the  firing  should  have  greater  rapidity. 
But  the  fire  was  rapid  enough,  to  serve  fairly  well  the  needs  of 
the  men  who  used  it.  With  it  they  accomplished  very  satis- 
factory results,  that  is,  from  a  professional  standpoint  From 
one  point  of  view,  the  increased  rapidity  of  fire  is  almost  a  dis- 
advantage, in  that  it  tends  to  cause  an  enormous  waste  of  ammu- 
nition, with  no  adequate  corresponding  benefit  Smokeless 
powder  is,  no  doubt,  a  thing  of  the  greatest  importance.  But 
many  of  the  advantages  resulting  from  smokeless  powder  can 
often  be  had  from  the  mere  withholding  of  fire,  until  an  enemy 
gets  within  easy  range,  as  the  Boers  always  do,  as  is  always 
done  by  steady  and  skillful  troops.    So  that  these  points  of 


T 


rapidity  of  fire,  and  the  use  of  smokeless  powder,  are  of  less 
importance  than  is  some  times  supposed.  They  introduce  no 
substantial  change  in  the  principles — of  the  military  art 

The  fundamental  features  which  enter  into  the  consideration 
of  any  military  problem  are  to-day  what  they  always  have  been. 
They  are  as  follows: 

1.  Supply  and  Teanspobtation. 

Strictly  speaking,  these  should  come  under  one  heading,  that 
of  supply.  They  concern  ordnance,  ammunition,  clothing,  med- 
ical and  surgical  appliances,  commissary  stores;  together  with 
what  may  be  called  the  furniture  of  transportation,  that  is, 
wagons,  animals  and  railways. 

2.  The  Field  of  Operations. 

Under  this  head  come,  of  course,  all  questions  relating  to  the 
actual  area  of  the  war,  the  mere  surface  distances,  all 
matters  of  topography,  such  as  streams  and  mountains ;  and  all 
features  bearing  on  transportation,  such  as  railways,  wagon- 
roads,  paths,  and  places  where  railways,  wagon-roads,  and  paths 
are  possible  of  construction. 

3.  The  Contending  Foboes, 

Under  this  head  are  comprised,  of  course,  all  facts  as  to  the 
quality  of  the  individual  units  of  an  army;  its  organization; 
its  discipline;  its  drill;  but  above  all  things,  the  quality  of 
its  commanders. 


From  this  short  statement,  it  is  apparent  that,  for  the  solution 
of  any  military  problem,  the  facts  required  are  somewhat  com- 
plex, and  need  very  careful  study.  The  omission  of  any  one 
of  them  may  cause  a  fatal  defect  in  the  conclusion  to  be  deduced. 
The  opinion  of  the  most  competent  expert,  therefore,  on  any 
existing  military  situation,  may,  in  the  event,  be  set  at  naught 
by  the  disclosure  of  essential  features,  which  were  at  the  time 
unknown  to  him,  and  which  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  foresee. 


8 


THE  IMPOSSIBILITY  OF  SOLVING  THE  PKOBLEM 
OF  TRANSPORTATION  AND  SUPPLY,  FOR  ANY 
LARGE  ARMY  IN  SOUTH  AFRICA,  EXCEPT  BY 
LINES  OF  RAILWAY. 


This  Transvaal  situation  is  one  of  the  most  interesting  that 
has  ever  fallen  under  the  observation  of  any  military  critic.  Its 
controlling  features  are  strongly  marked ;  and  although  it  is,  of 
course,  an  impossibility  for  any  man  to  have  a  thorough  knowl- 
edge of  them  all,  yet  many  points  in  the  situation  are  so  clearly 
beyond  dispute,  and  have  such  a  large  military  value,  that  a 
careful  conjecture,  at  least,  can  be  made  as  to  the  probabilities  of 
the  situation,  and  as  to  the  possible  result.  It  need  hardly  be 
said,  that  the  entire  complexion  of  a  battle,  or  a  war,  is  liable 
at  any  moment  to  be  changed  by  the  events  of  the  hour,  or  the 
minute.  A  thunder  storm,  or  the  untimely  illness  of  a  com- 
manding general,  witness  Waterloo,  may  easily  turn  possible 
victory  into  a  crushing  defeat.  Contingencies  of  that  sort  must 
always  be  implied,  in  any  endeavor  to  discuss  any  military  prob- 
lem. Bearing  carefully  in  mind,  however,  the  existence  at  all 
times  of  such  contingencies,  it  will  be  interesting  to  note  some 
of  the  features  of  the  military  situation  in  the  present  war. 

In  the  first  place  let  us  consider  the  question  of  supply  and 
transportation. 

Here  it  is  evident,  that  on  one  side,  that  of  the  Burghers,  the 
question  of  supply  has  received  the  most  careful  attention,  and 
the  provision  made  therefor  has  been  remarkably  complete. 
We  now  know,  that  for  several  years  past  the  Transvaal  author- 
ities have  been  importing  large  quantities  of  the  munitions  of 
war,  of  all  kinds,  comprising  everything  that  could  be  needed 
in  the  prosecution  of  an  aggressive  or  defensive  campaign. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  equally  evident  that  the  absence  of 


-- 


9 


preparation  on  the  part  of  the  British  is  quite  as  marked  as  its 
completeness  on  the  part  of  the  Burghers.  Assuming,  as  is  stated 
to  be  the  fact,  that  the  British  authorities  have  massed  at  Lady- 
smith  a  considerable  quantity  of  military  supplies;  assuming 
also,  that  they  have  large  quantities  of  supplies  at  other 
points,  for  instance,  Pietermaritzburg,  Colenso,  and  Kim- 
berley,  yet  it  is  very  plain  that  Mr.  Chamberlain  did  not 
anticipate  real  hostilities,  but  supposed  that  the  mere  demon- 
stration of  force  on  his  part  would  be  ample  to  prevent  so  much 
as  a  pretense  of  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  Transvaal  Republic ; 
and  consequently,  he  deemed  it  necessary  to  make  no  very 
elaborate  preparation  for  military  operations.  It  is,  therefore, 
fair  to  assume,  that  such  supplies  as  may  have  been  accumulated 
at  the  points  above  mentioned  have  neither  the  order  nor  the 
completeness  necessary  to  make  them  adequate  to  the  prosecu- 
tion of  military  operations  on  a  large  scale. 

In  considering  this  question  of  supply  and  transportation,  it 
will  be  necessary  to  note,  at  no  great  length,  some  features  of  the 
situation  which  more  particularly  belong  to  other  topics,  of 
the  field  of  operations,  and  the  numbers,  and  quality,  of  the 
two  contending  forces. 

Let  us  take  first  the  position  in  and  around  Ladysmith. 
Ladysmith  itself  is  on  the  railroad  leading  from  Durban  through 
Pietermaritzburg,  Newcastle,  Charlestown,  Standerton,  and 
Elandsfontein  to  Pretoria.  The  distance  from  Durban  to  Pieter- 
maritzburg is  seventy  miles ;  from  Durban  to  Ladysmith  is  one 
hundred  and  eighty-nine  miles ;  from  Durban  to  Charlestown  is 
three  hundred  and  four  miles. 

These  distances,  it  is  seen,  are  considerable.  They  are  such 
as  to  make  the  supply  of  any  considerable  armed  force  under 
existing  circumstances  impossible  except  by  line  of  railway. 

The  nature  and  difficulties  of  the  problem  of  supply, 
for  large  bodies  of  men,  is  a  matter  which  has  apparently 
had  no  careful  study  at  the  hands  of  the  English  army 
officers.  However  that  may  be,  the  operations  of  the  two 
contending  armies  during  our  Civil  War  give  us  the  fullest 
information  on  the  points  here  involved.  The  science  of 
transportation  was  developed  during  that  war  to  a  degree  never 
before  approached,  or  conceived  as  a  possibility.     It  received 


10 


its  development  at  the  hand  of  masters.  The  matter  of  supply 
of  large  bodies  of  troops,  as  practiced  by  General  Sherman  in 
the  Atlanta  Campaign,  just  prior  to  the  cross-country  march  to 
Savannah,  is  down  to  the  present  time  the  marvel  in  military 
history.  To  borrow  a  term  from  the  sporting  world,  it  holds 
the  record.  A  few  facts  taken  from  the  history  of  the  military 
operations  of  that  period  will  throw  a  strong  light  on  the  prob- 
lems now  to  be  solved  by  the  British  authorities  in  the  South 
African  campaign. 

In  fact,  one  of  the  chief  reasons  for  the  March  to  the  Sea  was 
this  matter  of  transportation  and  supply.  The  real  reasons  and 
nature  of  that  celebrated  march  have  often  been  overlooked. 
One  of  the  main  moving  considerations,  which  decided  General 
Sherman  to  make  that  movement,  was  the  practical  impossibility 
of  keeping  open  his  existing  line  of  railway  communication  to 
Nashville.  Sherman's  telegram  to  General  Grant  of  October 
9,  1864,  says  on  this  point: 

"  It  will  be  a,  physical  impossibility  to  protect  the  roads,  now  that  Hood, 
Forrest  and  Wheeler  and  the  whole  batch  of  devils  are  turned  loose  with- 
out home  or  habitation." 

On  November  6th  he  again  telegraphs: 

"That  devil  Forrest  was  down  by  Johnson ville  making  havoc  among  the 
gunboats  and  transports." 

In  another  telegram  of  November  6,  Sherman  says,  apropos 
of  Forrest's  ubiquity : 

"Forrest  seems  to  have  scattered  from  Eastport  to  Johnson  ville,  Paris 
and  the  lower  Tennessee.  General  Thomas  reports  a  capture  by  him  of  a 
gun-boat  and  five  transports." 

As  a  consequence  of  what  Sherman  called  the  "  physical  im- 
possibility" of  keeping  open  his  railway  communications,  he 
said  in  one  of  his  despatches  to  General  Grant,  "  I  propose  we 
break  up  the  railroad  from  Chattanooga  and  strike  out  with 
wagons  for  Savannah." 

The  reason  for  this  impossibility  of  keeping  open  railway 
communication  of  so  great  length  as  General  Sherman's  line 
then  was,  will  be  more  apparent  when  we  look  at  a  few  further 


11 


facts.  The  length  of  that  line  was  as  follows :  From  Louisville 
to  Nashville,  185  miles;  from  Nashville  to  Chattanooga,  151 
miles;  from  Chattanooga  to  Atlanta,  137  miles;  in  all,  473 
miles.  The  clearest  evidence  on  this  point  is  to  be  found  in 
General  Sherman's  statement,  which  appears  at  page  398,  Vol- 
ume 2,  of  his  Memoirs,  as  to  the  impossibility  of  supplying  any 
considerable  force  of  men  with  a  line  of  such  length  by  any  other 
means  than  a  railroad.    His  language  is : 

"  Sherman's  Memoirs,"  II,  398: 

"The  value  of  railways  is  also  fully  recognized  in  war  quite  as  much  as 
if  not  more  so,  than  in  peace. 

"The  Atlanta  campaign  would  simply  have  been  impossible  without  the 
use  of  the  railroads  :  from  Louisville  to  Nashville,  185  miles;  from 
Nashville  to  Chattanooga,  151  miles;  from  Chattanooga  to  Atlanta,  187 
miles." 

Every  mile  of  this  '  single  track '  was  so  delicate  that  one  man  could 
in  a  minute  have  broken  or  moved  a  rail.  But  our  trains  usually  carried 
along  the  tools  and  means  to  repair  such  a  break.  We  had,  however,  to 
maintain  strong  guards  and  garrisons  at  each  important  bridge  or 
trestle,  the  destruction  of  which  would  have  necessitated  time  for  re- 
building. 

•  1    *      »      *  *    ********  # 

"  Our  trains  from  Nashville  forward  were  operated  under  military  rules, 
and  ran  about  ten  miles  an  hour  in  gangs  of  four  trains  of  ten  cars  each. 
Four  such  groups  of  trains  daily  made  one  hundred  and  sixty  cars,  of  ten 
tons  each,  carrying  sixteen  hundred  tons,  which  exceeded  the  absolute 
necessities  of  the  army,  and  allowed  for  the  accidents  that  were  common 
and  inevitable.  But,  as  I  have  recorded,  that  single  stem  of  railroad,  four 
hundred  and  seventy-three  miles  long,  supplied  an  army  of  one  hundred 
thousand  men  and  thirty-five  thousand  animals,  for  the  period  of  one 
hundred  and  ninety-six  days,  viz. :  from  May  1  to  November  12,  1864.  To 
have  delivered  regularly  that  amount  of  food  and  forage  by  ordinary 
wagons,  would  have  required  thirty-six  thousand  eight  hundred  wagons 
of  six  mules  each,  allowing  each  wagon  to  have  hauled  two  tons  twenty 
miles  each  day,  a  simple  impossibility  in  roads  such  as  then  existed  in 
that  region  of  country.  Therefore,  I  reiterate  that  the  Atlanta  campaign 
was  an  impossibility  without  these  railroads;  and  only  then,  because  we 
had  the  men  and  the  means  to  maintain  and  defend  them,  in  addition  to 
what  were  necessary  to  overcome  the  enemy.  Habitually,  a  passenger-car 
will  carry  fifty  men  with  their  necessary  baggage.  Box-cars,  and  even 
platform-cars,  answer  the  purpose  well  enough,  but  they  should  always 
have  rough  board  seats.    For  sick  and  wounded  men,  box-cars  filled  with 


12 


straw  or  bushes  were  usually  employed.  Personally,  I  saw  but  little  of 
the  practical  working  of  the  railroads,  for  I  only  turned  back  once  as  far 
as  Resaca;  but  I  had  daily  reports  from  the  engineer  in  charge,  and 
officers  who  came  from  the  rear  often  explained  to  me  the  whole  thing, 
with  a  description  of  the  wrecked  trains  all  the  way  from  Nashville  to 
Atlanta.  I  am  convinced  that  the  risk  to  life  to  the  engineers  and  men  on 
that  railroad  fully  equaled  that  on  the  skirmish  line,  called  for  as  high  an 
order  of  courage,  and  fully  equaled  it  in  importance." 

It  is  also  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  at  that  time  General  Sher- 
man had,  so  long  as  his  communications  were  open,  not  only  a 
line  of  railway,  but  the  two  rivers,  the  Cumberland  and  the  Ten- 
nessee; the  Cumberland  at  parts  of  the  year  being  available 
for  water  transportation  as  high  as  Nashville ;  and  the  Tennessee 
as  high  as  Chattanooga,  So  that,  practically,  General  Sherman, 
at  the  time  that  he  speaks  of  the  impossibility  of  keeping  open 
his  communication  at  Louisville,  had  not  only  a  line  of  railway, 
but  two  navigable  rivers.  No  such  aids  are  possible  for  the 
operations  of  the  British  force  in  South  Africa. 

Let  us  now  see  how  this  line  of  communication  was  handled. 

General  Forrest  started  from  Verona,  Mississippi,  on  the  16th 
of  September,  1864,  on  his  celebrated  march  into  Alabama  and 
Tennessee.  He  left  Cherokee  on  the  morning  of  the  2 1st  of 
September.  He  reached  that  place  on  his  return  on  the  6th  day 
of  October.  During  that  expedition,  according  to  his  official 
report  dated  October  17,  1864,  he  accomplished  the  following 
results: 

"  I  captured  86  commissioned  officers,  67  Government  employees,  1,374 
non-commissioned  officers  and  privates,  and  933  negroes,  besides  killing 
and  wounding  in  the  various  engagements  1,000  more,  making  an  aggre- 
gate of  3,360,  being  an  average  of  one  to  each  man  I  had  in  the  engage- 
ments. In  addition  to  these  I  captured  about  800  horses,  7  pieces  of 
artillery,  2,000  stand  small  arms,  several  hundred  saddles,  50  wagons  and 
ambulances,  with  a  large  amount  of  machinery,  commissary's  and  quarter- 
master's stores,  all  of  which  has  been  distributed  to  the  different  commands. 
The  greatest  damage,  however,  done  to  the  enemy  was  in  the  complete 
destruction  of  the  railroad  from  Decatur  to  Spring  Hill,  with  the  exception 
of  the  Duck  River  Bridge.  It  will  require  months  to  repair  the  injury 
done  to  the  road,  and  may  possibly  be  the  means  of  forcing  the  evacuation 
of  Pulaski  and  Columbia,  and  thus  relieve  the  people  from  further  op- 
pression." 

The  destruction  of  the  railroad  was  very  complete ;  it  covered 


13 


a  long  distance.  General  Forrest's  anticipation  was  that  its 
restoration  would  "  require  months." 

We  will  now  see  how  the  problem  was  handled  upon  the  side 
of  the  United  States  Army.  The  report  of  General  Daniel  S. 
McCallum,  Director  and  Manager  of  Military  Kailroads,  dated 
October  13,  1864  (Official  Record,  Series  1,  Volume  39,  Part  1, 
page  507),  reads  as  follows: 

"  Sir  : — I  have  the  honor  to  transmit  the  following  statement  in  regard  to 
the  effect  of  the  late  raid  by  the  Rebel  General  Forrest  upon  the  military 
railway  lines  in  the  Division  of  the  Mississippi  :  1  engine  and  12  cars, 
burned  on  a  trestle  near  Decatur  Junction,  all  destroyed,  3  cars,  burned 
between  Huntsville  and  Stevenson.  All  the  bridges  and  trestles  between 
Pulaski  and  Athens,  a  distance  of  SO  miles,  destroyed.  This  embraces 
Duck  River  Bridge  and  the  most  formidable  trestle  on  the  Decatur  and 
Stevenson  Line,  1100  feet  long  and  90  feet  high ;  and  about  two  miles  and 
a  half  of  track  partially  destroyed.  Between  Spring  Hill  and  Columbia 
three  bridges  destroyed  and  two  to  three  miles  of  track.  The  Chattanooga 
line  is  uninjured,  excepting  the  tearing  up  of  one  or  two  rails  by  small 
guerrilla  parties.  High  water  on  the  Chattanooga  and  Atlanta  line  has 
carried  away  the  bridges  over  the  Chattahooche  and  Oostenaule  Rivers, 
and  two  or  three  between  Chattanooga  and  Dalton.  The  Rebels  have 
turned  up  several  miles  of  the  track." 

Then  follows  General  McOallum's  statement  of  the  time  re- 
quired for  reconstructing  the  railroads,  rebuilding  the  bridges, 
and  restoring  the  line  of  communication,  a  work  which  General 
Forrest  had  estimated  would  "  require  months."  As  to  that 
point  General  McCallum's  statement  is: 

"  Altogether,  it  will  take  until  the  20th  of  the  present  month  [seven  days 
from  the  date  of  his  report]  to  restore  communication  between  Chatta- 
nooga and  Atlanta.  Many  engines  have  been  thrown  from  the  track  by 
the  removal  of  the  rails,  but  no  very  serious  accidents  have  occurred." 

As  to  the  nature  and  amount  of  this  work  of  construction 
carried  on  by  the  Engineers'  Department  in  Sherman's  army,  we 
have  the  report  of  Captain  Poe,  Chief  Engineer.  The  report 
says: 

"Operations  connected  with  the  march  of  General  Sherman's  Army, 
extending  over  a  great  portion  of  the  Southern  States,  were  of  a  very 
rapid  character.  Such  of  them  as  legitimately  belonged  to  the  Engineer 
Department  were  so  intimately  confounded  with  the  whole  that  it  is  im- 
possible to  separate  them.  In  order  to  explain  clearly  why  bridges  were 
built  and  roads  made  in  the  locations  where  they  were,  it  will  be  neces- 


14 


sary  to  give  the  movements  of  the  army  in  detail,  when  the  reasons  will 
generally  be  evident.  The  Corps  of  the  Engineers  were  directed  to  facili- 
tate these  movements,  and  always  with  a  distinct  idea  of  their  object." 

********** 

"  In  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  each  corps,  division  and  nearly  every 
brigade,  was  provided  with  an  officer  detailed  from  among  the  commis- 
sioned officers  of  the  infantry  regiments,  whose  duty  it  was  to  make  such 
surveys  and  reconnaissances  as  might  be  wanted.  The  other  two  armies 
were  not  so  well  provided,  but  bad  a  single  organization  to  do  all  that  was 
requisite. " 

********** 
"  I  may  make  the  general  remark  here  that  whenever  it  was  deemed 
necessary  to  use  a  bridge  for  a  greater  length  of  time  than  48  hours,  pon- 
toon bridges  were  invariably  replaced  by  wooden  trestle  bridges  con- 
structed by  the  materials  at  hand,  either  by  the  Engineer  troops  or  the 
pioneer  forces.  The  object  of  this  was  to  preserve  the  canvas  covers  of 
the  batteaux,  even  at  the  expense  of  considerable  labor,  since  we  had  the 
latter  in  greater  abundance  than  the  former." 

The  quantity  of  the  work  done  under  Captain  Poe's  directions 
coming  down  only  to  the  date  of  September  2d,  1864,  is  stated 
as  follows : 

"In  describing  these  operations  I  have  gone  somewhat  into  detail  in 
order  that  they  might  be  clearly  understood,  deeming  it  peculiarly  the 
province  of  the  engineer  to  call  attention  to  such  brilliant  manoeuvres  as 
those  which  enabled  a  river  to  be  forded  in  the  very  face  of  the  enemy 
with  the  loss  of  less  than  a  platoon  of  men,  and  those  which  placed  six 
army  corps  upon  the  enemy's  line  of  communication  in  opposition  to  a 
single  corps. 

"  In  accomplishing  these  results  the  Engineer  Department  provided  the 
following  special  labor :  10  pontoon  bridges  built  across  the  Chattahoochee 
River,  averaging  350  feet  in  length,  3,500  feet;  7  trestle  bridges,  built  out 
of  material  cut  from  the  bank,  across  the  same  stream,  of  which  5  were 
double  track  and  two  were  single,  350  feet  long  each,  2,450  feet ;  50  miles, 
estimated,  of  infantry  parapet,  with  a  corresponding  length  of  artillery 
epaulement ;  6  bridges  over  Peach  Tree  Creek,  averaging  80  feet  long  each, 
480  feet;  5  bridges  over  Flint  River,  averaging  80  feet  long  each,  400  feet; 
also  many  smaller  bridges  built  and  many  miles  of  road  repaired.  The 
topographical  branch  of  the  Engineer  Department  worked  efficiently; 
surveys  were  made  of  all  the  routes  passed  over  by  the  infantry  columns, 
together  with  the  lines  prepared  by  the  Bureau,  and  a  map  on  the  scale  of 
four  inches  to  one  mile  illustrating  the  siege,  so-called,  of  Atlanta  has  been 
forwarded  to  the  Engineer  Bureau,  in  which  these  surveys  are  filed,  from 
the  passage  of  Peach  Tree  Creek,  July  19,  to  the  beginning  of  the  move- 
ment upon  tne  enemy's  line  of  communication,  August  25,  and  a  general 
map,  photographic  copy,  illustrating  the  entire  campaign  from  Chat- 


15 


tanooga  to  Atlanta.  I  have  also  forwarded  to  the  Bureau  a  complete 
set  of  photographic  views  illustrating  the  military  operations  about 
Atlanta. 

"  From  the  Map  Department  4,000  copies  of  maps  were  issued  to  the 
proper  officers  to  facilitate  military  operations.  *  *  *  I  can  only 
return  my  thanks  to  those  officers  of  Volunteers  who  did  equally  well  the 
topographical  work.  They  did  their  duty,  and  did  it  well.  I  must  leave 
to  the  Chief  Engineers  of  the  several  armies  to  which  they  belonged  to  do 
them  justice. " 

Is  the  British  Army  organized,  equipped,  and  trained,  for 
work  like  that  2  Is  any  European  continental  army  equal  to  it  ? 
Has  anything  like  it  ever  been  done  by  any  army  in  the  world, 
other  than  our  own,  our  army  of  volunteers,  which  the  European 
critics  have  all  affected  to  despise? 

While  these  engineering  operations  were  going  on,  it  is  to  be 
noted,  that  they  were  carried  on  in  the  face  of  an  active  enemy 
during  a  completely  continuous  period  of  fighting.  Erom  the 
many  evidences  of  this  fact  it  is  necessary  to  make  a  selection 
of  only  one,  which  is  taken  from  the  report  of  General  Thomas, 
dated  September  13,  1864,  as  to  the  operations  of  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland,  one  sentence  of  which  are  merely  specimens 
of  numberless  others: 

"  During  these  four  months  of  active  campaign,  hardly  a  day  has 
passed  that  some  portion  of  this  army  was  not  engaged  either  in  skirmish- 
ing or  in  actual  battles  with  the  enemy." 

In  this  connection  it  will  give  us  some  additional  assistance 
to  consider  the  general  bearings  of  the  question  of  transportation 
to  active  military  operations  as  they  are  stated  by  General  Cox 
in  his  history  of  the  Atlanta  campaign.    At  page  9  he  says : 

"  The  difficulty  of  sustaining  an  army  more  than  200  miles  from  its 
base,  from  which  it  was  separated  from  the  rugged  mountains  over  which 
there  were  only  a  few  roads,  and  these  scarce  better  than  pack  mule 
tracks,  was  fully  felt  by  all  military  men  who  had  studied  the  prob- 
lem." 

At  page  7  he  says: 

"  For  the  experience  of  war  had  demonstrated  that  no  considerable 
army  could  subsist  depending  upon  the  wagons  and  common  country 
roads  for  more  than  a  few  miles  from  the  railway  depots.  A  rapid  march 
could  be  made  living  upon  the  country  if  it  led  to  a  point  where  military 
stores  could  be  reached  or  captured  ;  but  protracted  operations  are  indis- 


16 


solubly  tied  to  the  railway  and  water  lines  which  can  be  depended  on  in 
all  weather  and  to  any  extent. " 

As  to  these  same  matters  General  Sherman  states  in  his  report 
of  September  15,  1864: 

"I  must  bear  full  and  liberal  testimony  to  the  energetic  and  success- 
ful management  of  our  railroads  during  the  campaign.  No  matter  when 
or  where  a  break  has  been  made  the  repair  train  seemed  on  the  spot  and 
the  damage  was  repaired,  generally  before  I  knew  of  the  break.  Bridges 
have  been  built  with  surprising  rapidity,  and  the  locomotive  whistle  was 
heard  in  our  advance  camps  almost  before  the  echo  of  the  skirmish  fire 
had  ceased.  Some  of  these  bridges — those  of  the  Oostenaula,  the  Etowah 
and  Chattahoochee — were  fine  substantial  structures,  and  were  built  in  an 
inconceivably  short  time,  almost  out  of  the  material  improvised  on  the 
spot. 

"  Colonel  W.  W.  Wright,  who  has  charge  of  the  construction  and  re- 
pairs, is  not  only  a  most  skillful  but  a  wonderfully  ingenious  and  indus- 
trious and  zealous  officer  and  I  can  hardly  do  him  justice.  In  like  man- 
ner the  officers  charged  with  running  trains  have  succeeded  to  my  entire 
satisfaction,  and  have  worked  in  perfect  harmony  with  the  Quartermas- 
ters and  Commissaries  bringing  forward  abundant  supplies  with  such 
regularity  that  at  no  one  time  have  we  wanted  for  provisions,  forage, 
ammunition  or  stores  of  any  essential  kind, 

"Colonel  L.  C.  Easton,  Chief  Quartermaster,  and  Colonel'A.  Beckwith, 
Chief  Commissary,  have  also  succeeded  in  a  manner  surprising  to  all  of 
us  in  getting  forward  supplies.  I  doubt  if  ever  an  army  was  better  sup- 
plied than  this,  and  I  commend  them  most  highly  for  it,  because  I  know 
that  more  solicitude  was  felt  by  the  Lieutenant-General  commanding  and 
by  the  military  at  large  on  this  than  any  other  one  problem  involved  in 
the  success  of  the  campaign.  Captain  C.  G.  Baylor,  Chief  Ordnance  Of- 
ficer, has  in  like  manner  kept  the  army  supplied  at  all  times  with  every 
kind  of  ammunition.  To  Captain  O.  M.  Poe,  Chief  Engineer,  I  am  more 
than  ordinarily  indebted  for  keeping  me  supplied  with  maps  and  informa- 
tion of  roads  and  topography,  as  well  as  in  the  more  important  branch  of 
his  duties  in  selecting  lines  and  military  positions." 

"  My  own  personal  staff  has  been  small  but  select.  Brigadier  General 
W.  F.  Barry,  an  officer  of  undoubted  capacity  and  great  experience,  has 
filled  the  position  of  Chief  of  Artillery  to  perfection,  and  Lieutenant  E. 
D.  Kittoe,  Chief  Medical  Inspector,  has  done  everything  possible  to  give 
proper  aid  and  direction  to  the  operations  of  that  important  department. 
I  have  never  seen  a  wounded  man  removed  from  the  fields  of  battle,  cared 
for  and  afterwards  sent  to  the  hospitals  in  the  rear  with  more  promptness, 
system,  care  and  success  than  during  this  whole  campaign,  covering  more 
than  100  days  of  actual  battle  and  skkmishing.  My  Aides  de  Camp,  Ma- 
jor J.  C.  McCoy,  Captain  L.  M.  Dayton  and  Captain  J.  C.  Audenried,  have 
been  very  zealous  and  most  efficient,  carrying  my  orders,  day  and  night, 


17 


to  distant  parts  of  our  extended  lines,  with  an  intelligence  and  zeal  that 
ensured  the  proper  working  of  machinery  covering  from  10  to  25  miles  of 
ground,  when  the  least  error  in  delivery  and  explanation  of  an  order 
would  have  produced  confusion  ;  whereas,  in  a  great  measure  owing  to 
the  intelligence  of  these  officers,  orders  have  been  made  so  clear  that  these 
vast  armies  have  moved  side  by  side,  sometimes  crossing  each  other's 
tracks  through  a  difficult  country  of  over  138  miles  in  length,  without 
confusion  or  trouble.    *  *  * 

"  My  three  armies  in  the  field  were  commanded  by  able  officers,  my 
equals  in  rank  and  experience — Major  General  George  H.  Thomas,  Major 
General  J.  M.  Schofield  and  Major  General  O.  O.  Howard.  With  such 
commanders,  I  had  only  to  indicate  the  object  desired,  and  they  accom- 
plished it.  I  cannot  over-estimate  their  services  to  the  country,  and  must 
express  my  deep  and  grateful  thanks  that,  coming  together  from  different 
fields,  with  different  interests,  they  have  co-operated  with  a  harmony  that 
has  been  productive  of  the  greatest  amount  of  success  and  good  feeling. 
A  more  harmonious  army  does  not  exist." 

The  difficulty  of  the  operations  covered  by  these  statements 
will  perhaps  appear  with  some  additional  clearness  if  we  con- 
sider the  casualties  of  that  army  during  the  months  of  May, 
June,  July  and  August,  1864.    The  total  is: 

"  Killed,  officers,  352;  men,  4,636; 
Wounded,  officers,  1,145;  men,  22,682; 
Missing,  officers,  123;  men,  4,585; 
Aggregate,  84,514. 
To  which  should  be  added  the  causualties  for  September  1st  to  15th  in 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  2,567,  making  the  aggregate  37,081." 

The  result  of  these  operations  is  stated  by  General  Sherman 
as  follows: 

"  We  must  concede  to  our  enemy  that  he  made  these  efforts  patiently 
and  skillfully,  but  at  last  he  made  the  mistake  that  we  had  waited  for  so 
long,  and  sent  his  cavalry  to  our  rear,  far  beyond  the  reach  of  recall.  In- 
stantly our  cavalry  was  on  his  only  remaining  road,  and  we  followed 
quickly  with  our  principal  army,  and  Atlanta  fell  into  our  possession  as  the 
fruit  of  well  concerted  measures,  backed  by  a  brave  and  confident  army. 
This  completed  the  grand  task  which  had  been  assigned  us  by  our  Gov- 
ernment, and  your  General  again  repeats  his  personal  and  official  thanks 
to  all  the  officers  and  men  composing  this  army  for  the  indomitable  cour- 
age and  perseverance  which  alone  could  give  success.  We  have  beaten  our 
enemy  on  every  ground  that  he  has  chosen,  and  have  wrested  from  him 
bis  own  Gate  City,  where  were  located  his  founderies,  arsenals  and  work- 
shops, deemed  secure  on  account  of  their  distance  from  the  base  and  the 
seemingly  insurmountable  obstacles  intervening. 

"  Nothing  is  impossible  to  an  army  like  this." 


18 


General  Cox  states  in  his  history,  at  page  83 : 

"  Foreign  officers  visiting  the  army  often  expressed  their  amazement  at 
seeing  the  troops  of  the  line  doing  the  incidental  work,  and  without  engi- 
neering assistance,  what  was  earlier  done  by  a  corps  of  sappers  under  the 
direction  of  a  scientific  staff." 

The  ease,  even  at  that  time,  of  destroying  railroad  tracks  is 
made  evident  by  a  despatch  of  General  Sherman  to  General 
Rousseau  of  July  7,  1864 : 

"  When  you  reach  the  road,  do  your  work  well.  Burn  the  ties  in  piles  ; 
heat  the  iron  in  the  middle,  and,  when  red  hot,  let  the  men  pull  the  ends 
so  as  to  give  a  twist  to  the  rails.  If  simply  bent,  the  rails  may  be  used, 
but  if  they  are  twisted  or  wrenched,  they  cannot  be  used  again." 

The  speed  with  which  the  work  of  reconstruction  was  carried 
on  in  Sherman's  army,  where  lines  of  railway  had  been  de- 
stroyed, will  appear  by  the  following  quotations  from  original 
documents.  On  the  10th  of  July,  1864,  in  his  despatch  from 
Eoswell  of  that  date,  General  G.  M.  Dodge  advised  Sherman 
as  follows:  i 

' '  My  troops  are  arriving  and  crossing.  I  have  been  here  three  hours 
and  in  company  with  General  Newton  have  thoroughly  examined  the 
country.  I  will  occupy  and  fortify  to-night  a  tete-de  pont  half  a  mile 
from  the  river  and  extending  on  and  down  one  mile,  covering  the 
entire  ford,  bridge  and  roads  leading  to  them  ;  the  ford  is  for  a  mile  or 
two  in  extent  very  rough  and  impracticable  except  for  troops.  To  bridge 
the  stream  I  will  have  to  build  over  650  feet  in  length.  I  shall  use  the  old 
piers  and  trestle.  We  have  a  strong  picket  out  three  miles  covering  the 
forks  of  road  leading  to  McAfee's  Bridge,  8  miles  up  the  river  and  cov- 
ering the  forks  of  road  that  leads  to  Atlanta.  It  is  too  far  out  to  take 
the  command  until  the  river  is  easily  passed  by  the  artillery  and  trains." 

That  despatch  was  sent  by  telegraph  at  1.30  P.  M.  July  10th. 
At  8  P.  M.  General  Dodge  telegraphs  as  follows : 

"  Major  General  Sherman  :  Forces  are  all  over  river.  Start  at  work  for- 
tifying. Have  got  batteries  over  also.  Have  built  a  floating  bridge.  Road 
bridge  is  a  pretty  big  job  but  will  work  away  on  it.  No  forces  in  my  front 
that  we  can  hear  of.   G.  M.  Dodge,  Major  General. " 

General  Sherman  answers  in  part  as  follows : 

"I  have  been  out  all  day.  Am  just  back  Have  received  General 
Garrard's  and  your  despatches.  I  design  that  General  McPherson's  whole 
army  shall  go  to  that  flank,  and  you  are  to  prepare  the  way.  General 


19 


Newton  will  stay  with  you  till  you  feel  all  safe,  when  he  will  rejoin  his 
corps,  now  in  support  of  General  Schofield  eight  miles  below  you.  General 
Garrard  will  picket  the  roads,  and  I  want  you  to  fortify  a  tete-de-pont 
and  bridge.  *  *  *  Keep  me  well  advised  by  courier  to  Marietta  and 
telegraph." 

Some  light  is  thrown  upon  the  general  nature  of  the  situa- 
tion by  General  Sherman's  telegram  to  General  Garrard  of  the 
same  date,  July  10: 

"Signal  officer  reports  railroad  and  wagon  road  bridges  burning.  If 
this  be  so,  of  course  the  enemy  is  on  the  other  side.  The  truth  will  be 
ascertained  at  once ;  in  the  meantime  be  watchful. " 

Further  light  as  to  the  nature  of  the  construction  work  then 
on  hand  appears  from  General  Dodge's  despatch  of  July  11, 
to  General  McPherson,  in  which  he  says: 

"I  will  work  hard  on  the  bridge  here  and  finish  it  as  soon  as  possible. 
It  is  a  big  job,  as  you  will  perceive  from  the  length.  Everything  was 
burned  up  here  that  we  could  see— houses,  mills,  lumber  and  all. " 

On  the  same  date,  July  11,  General  Sherman  says  in  Ms 
despatch  to  General  Dodge: 

"I  know  that  you  have  a  big  job,  but  that  is  nothing  new  for  you. 
*  *  *  I  know  the  bridge  at  Roswell  is  important,  and  you  may  destroy 
all  Georgia  to  make  it  good  and  strong. " 

On  the  same  date,  July  11,  General  Dodge  telegraphs  to 
General  Sherman: 

"All  quiet  this  morning.  I  had  no  fear  about  being  able  to  build  the 
bridge,  but  thought  you  might  expect  it  finished  sooner  than  possible.  As 
it  was  twice  as  long  as  I  expected  to  find  it.  and  twice  as  long  as  the  river 
is  wide,  down  at  Santown,  I  have  over  1,000  men  at  work  on  it  day  and 
night.  It  is  already  well  under  way.  I  have  planking  for  floors  now  on 
the  ground,  and  not  one  minute  shall  be  lost  in  pushing  it  forward.  Every 
man  that  can  work  on  it  shall  be  kept  at  it. " 

General  Sherman  answers  on  the  same  day: 
"I  have  no  doubt  you  will  have  the  bridge  done  in  time." 

On  July  12,  General  Dodge  telegraphs: 

"I  pushed  my  mounted  infantry  down  five  miles  to-day  to  the  crossing 
of  Nancy's  Creek,  where  we  found  the  enemy's  cavalry  in  force,  and  they 
followed  us  back  one-half  mile.  The  bridge  at  this  place  is  a  ferry,  and 
will  be  a  good  place  to  put  in  a  pontoon.   We  will  if  you  should  desire. 


20 


The  river  is  about  300  feet  wide.  I  urill  have  the  bridge  at  this  place 
finished  to-morrow.  All  the  bents  are  up  to-night,  stringers  on  and 
planked  one-third  the  distance  across.  When  done  it  will  take  safely  over 
any  number  of  troops  and  their  trains.    All  quiet  here.    River  6lowly 

rising." 

The  next  day,  July  13,  at  9  P.  M.,  General  Dodge  tele- 
graphs :  "  Bridge  is  built ;  is  double  track." 

No  further  notice  was  taken  of  the  matter  in  despatches  on 
either  side.    It  was  a  mere  everyday  affair. 

But  has  any  other  army  than  ours  ever  done  such  work  ?  Yet 
that  is  the  kind  of  work  now  before  the  British  Army.  Have 
they  ever  given  any  indication  that  they  are  equal  to  it  ? 

Even  laymen  are  well  aware,  that  the  matter  of  supply, 
in  other  words,  of  transportation,  is  the  vital  and  essential 
one,  in  the  conduct  of  active  military  operations  by  any 
large  body  of  troops.  Troops  must  be  well  fed,  if  they  are  to 
do  good  work.  Ammunition,  in  all  cases,  must  come  from  the 
rear.  In  order  to  have  military  operations  efficient,  the  supply 
of  food,  clothing,  ammunition,  and  all  other  things  needed  by 
troops  in  the  field,  must  have  complete  regularity,  and  great 
speed.  It  is  obvious,  then,  that  the  matter  of  supplying  the 
wants  of  a  large  army  depends  on  having  the  Quartermaster 
and  Commissary  Departments  very  perfect,  in  their  personnel 
and  organization.  In  fact,  the  mere  term  "  organization,"  if 
used  with  accuracy,  implies  the  existence  of  a  sufficient  number 
of  men,  especially  of  officers,  who  have  the  requisite  ability,  and 
experience,  for  the  discharge  of  their  duties,  together  with  such 
an  arrangement  and  adjustment  of  those  men  and  officers  as 
will  make  them  a  harmonious  working  force.  Assuming,  then, 
that  it  is  possible  for  a  government  to  command  the  services  of 
a  sufficient  number  of  experienced  men  and  officers  in  the  quar- 
termaster's and  commissary  departments,  even  after  that,  in 
order  to  convert  those  men  and  officers  into  a  smoothly  working 
body,  requires  time.  If,  however,  there  is  no  such  previous  sup- 
ply of  men  of  training  and  experience,  if  the  men  for  the  quar- 
termaster and  commissary  service  must  not  only  be  found,  but 
must  be  educated,  it  is  quite  plain  that  the  time  required  for 
organizing  those  most  essential  departments  of  an  effective  army 
must  be  considerable. 


21 


THE  EXTKEME  EASE  OF  DESTRUCTION  OF  RAIL- 
WAY COMMUNICATIONS  IN  THE  PRESENT 
SOUTH  AFRICAN  FIELD  OF  OPERATIONS. 


The  field  of  operations  is  most  remarkable.  Especially  so, 
when  considered  with  reference  to  the  military  purposes  of  the 
South  African  Republic,  and  the  most  admirable  choice  of 
military  positions  which  has  been  made  by  the  commanding 
officers  of  their  forces.  This  choice  was,  of  course,  to  a  great 
extent  dictated  by  the  positions  and  movements  of  the  British 
troops.  Taken  in  connection  with  those  positions  and  move- 
ments, it  is  difficult  to  see  how  anything  better  could  have  been 
devised  on  the  part  of  General  Joubert. 

The  South  African  Republic  itself  has  within  its  limits  a 
large  area  of  open  country,  fitted  at  some  times  of  the  year  to 
Ihe  movements  of  cavalry  and  the  easy  handling  of  considerable 
bodies  of  troops.  The  movements  of  a  modern  army  would,  in 
some  respects,  be  easier  within  the  limits  of  the  Republic  itself 
than  at  almost  any  other  point  in  South  Africa  which  can  be- 
come the  field  of  active  operations. 

It  was,  therefore,  wise,  for  that  reason,  if  for  no  other,  that 
General  Joubert  decided  to  conduct  his  operations  on  the 
enemy's  territory,  that  is,  in  Natal  and  the  Cape  Colony,  rather 
than  to  allow  the  British  troops  to  have  the  comparatively  open 
country  of  the  Republic  itself,  whereon  to  move  and  operate. 
Another  reason  for  his  course  is  doubtless  to  be  found,  that  the 
British  authorities  had  accumulated  a  considerable  supply  of 
military  stores  at  Ladysmith,  which  it  would  be  desirable  for 
fhe  Burghers  to  capture  and  apply  to  their  own  use.  Another 
point  to  be  noticed  is,  that,  for  the  sake  of  protecting  Mr. 
Rhodes'  diamond  mines,  a  considerable  British  force  had  been 
posted  at  Kimberley,  and  another  at  Mafeking.  It  was,  of 
course,  desirable  that  these  two  bodies  of  troops  should  be 


22 

isolated,  and  that  their  capture  at  no  distant  date  should  bo 
made  as  certain  as  possible.  Moreover,  the  nature  of  the  coun- 
try south  of  the  Transvaal  frontier,  its  mountains,  its  streams, 
its  lack  of  available  wagon  roads,  furnished  other  conclusive 
reasons,  why  the  Republics  should  make  their  first  line  of  de- 
fense south  of  their  own  frontiers.  For  these  reasons,  taken  in 
combination,  General  Joubert  evidently  decided  to  make  his 
objective  points  in  the  first  instance  the  three  bodies  of  British 
troops  at  Ladysmith,  Kimberley,  and  Mafeking.  The  move- 
ments of  Lord  Methuen  and  General  French  also  made  it 
necessary  for  him  to  concentrate  forces  of  Burghers  to  the 
south  of  Kimberley ;  between  Kimberley  and  Orange  River,  to 
meet  Lord  Methuen;  and  in  and  around  Naauwport,  Steyns- 
burg,  and  Molteno,  to  meet  the  advance  of  General  French. 

Bearing  these  facts  in  mind,  we  have  next  to  note  that  the 
country  around  Ladysmith,  and  along  the  line  of  the  railroad  to 
the  north  as  far  as  Charlestown,  is  very  mountainous,  and  that 
the  road,  for  all  practical  purposes,  runs  through  one  continuous 
defile.  Such  a  position  is  the  strongest  known  for  the  purposes 
of  the  defense.  At  the  same  time,  the  roads  available  for  the 
passage  of  any  considerable  number  of  troops  are  very  few,  and 
almost  follow  the  line  of  the  railway  itself.  From  Ladysmith  to 
Dundee,  a  station  on  the  railroad  forty-seven  miles  northeast  of 
Ladysmith,  there  is  a  road  which  follows  substantially  the  line  of 
the  railroad,  crossing  it  at  one  point  or  another,  and  having  a 
length  not  very  different  from  that  of  the  railroad  line  itself. 
From  Dundee  to  Newcastle  the  wagon  road  continues  to  follow 
the  line  of  the  railroad,  crossing  it  at  different  points.  Between 
Ladysmith  and  Newcastle  a  wagon  road  goes  with  comparative 
directness,  forming  roughly  the  diameter  of  a  semicircle,  the 
semicircle  itself  being  the  railway  track.  On  the  other  hand, 
to  the  east  and  right  of  the  railway  is  another  road  making  a 
considerable  circuit  from  Ladysmith  to  Dundee.  A  very  few 
small  and  inferior  wagon  roads  go  between  these  main  roads  just 
mentioned  at  a  few  points;  but  they  hardly  deserve  considera- 
tion from  the  military  standpoint.  From  Newcastle  to  Charles- 
town  there  is  for  all  practical  purposes  only  one  wagon  road, 
which  follows  irregularly  the  line  of  the  railroad  for  a  distance, 
and  then  strikes  off  to  the  northeast  to  Wakkerstroom. 


DIAGRAM 

Showing  mileage  and  altitudes  of  Stations 
on  Main  Line  between 
I      DURBAN  AND  CHARLESTOWN. 


23 

We  will  next  look  at  the  altitudes.  These  are  especially  im- 
portant, for  the  reason  that  they  give  us  some  idea  of  the  heavy 
grades  upon  the  railway,  which  constitute  a  very  important  fea- 
ture in  the  question  of  transportation.  At  the  same  time  they 
show  the  extreme  ease  of  destruction  to  the  railway  line.  At 
Pinetown,  not  over  20  miles  from  Durban,  the  railroad  already 
reaches  an  altitude  of  1,125  feet.  At  Camperdown  the  altitude 
is  2,297  feet.  Thornville  Junction  has  an  altitude  of  3,006  feet. 
Pietermaritzburg,  only  70  miles  from  Durban,  has  an  altitude 
of  2,218  feet  At  this  point  it  is  to  be  noted,  that  from  Thorn- 
ville Junction,  the  station  last  mentioned,  to  Pietermaritzburg, 
a  distance  of  less  than  20  miles  by  rail,  the  fall  in  the  altitude 
is  about  800  feet  Prom  Pietermaritzburg  to  Howick,  a  dis- 
tance of  17£  miles,  we  have  a  rise  which  brings  us  at  Howick 
to  the  altitude  of  3,439  feet.  At  Balgowan,  only  a  few  miles 
further  on,  we  have  an  altitude  of  4,183  feet.  At  Weston  we 
reach  4,506  feet.  At  Estcourt  we  are  down  again  to  3,833  feet 
At  Frere  station,  less  than  20  miles  further,  we  have  a  further 
descent  of  400  feet,  taking  us  down  to  an  altitude  of  3,436  feet. 
At  Chieveley  the  altitude  is  3,520  feet  At  Colenso,  3,106; 
at  Ladysmith,  3,285  feet;  at  Dundee,  4,100  feet;  at  Dannhauser, 
4,430  feet;  at  Ingagane  we  reach  3,900  feet;  at  Newcastle, 
3,892  feet,  and  at  Charlestown,  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of 
Majuba  Hill  and  Laing's  ISTeck,  we  have  the  altitude  of  5,385 
feet.  From  these  figures  it  is  easy  to  see  how  severe  must  be 
the  grades  on  the  railroad,  what  a  high  degree  of  power  must 
be  required  in  the  locomotives,  how  narrow  will  be  the  limits  of 
weight  possible  for  transportation  by  steam  power,  and  how 
easy  it  will  be  to  interfere  with  the  movements  of  trains. 

Another  feature  which  will  be  apparent  from  a  glance  at  the 
map  has  almost  greater  importance;  it  is  the  large  number  of 
streams,  and  of  rivers  of  considerable  size,  which  the  railway 
crosses  by  bridges.  This  point  would  be  one  that  we  could 
infer,  from  the  mere  fact  that  the  railway  line  runs  through  a 
very  mountainous  region,  even  if  we  had  no  assistance  on  the 
point  from  the  map.  An  examination  of  the  map,  however, 
makes  the  fact  much  more  apparent  Taking  no  point  nearer 
Durban  than  Pietermaritzburg,  at  that  point  the  railroad  crosses 
the  TJmsundizi  River.  At  Howick  it  crosses  the  TFmgeni.  Kear 


24 


Balgowan  station  it  crosses  the  Lion  River.  Near  Weston  it 
crosses  the  Mooi  River;  at  Estcourt,  Bushman's  River;  at 
Erere  Station,  the  Blaauwkraas  River ;  at  Colenso,  the  Tugela 
River;  at  Ladysmith  the  Sand  River;  just  north  of  Elands 
Laagte  we  have  the  Sundazi  River ;  at  Waschbank  Station,  the 
Waschbank  River;  at  Ingagaxie,  the  Ingagane  River;  at  New- 
castle, a  branch  of  the  Buffalo  River.  In  addition  to  these 
rivers  that  have  been  mentioned,  the  railroad,  according  to  the 
maps,  crosses  a  considerable  number  of  smaller  streams. 

Each  one  of  these  rivers  and  streams,  of  course,  has  a  bridge. 
Each  bridge  is  a  point  of  easy  destruction.  In  the  days  of  our 
Civil  War  the  destruction  of  bridges,  nearly  all  of  them  being 
trestle  bridges  made  of  wood,  was  ordinarily  accomplished  by 
burning.  To-day  the  destruction  of  a  bridge  is  a  thing  of  much 
greater  ease  and  speed.  Two  or  three  cartridges  of  dynamite  ap- 
plied to  the  embankment  or  masonry  at  either  end,  will  do  in  a 
second  the  work  of  destruction  that  under  the  methods  used  in 
our  Civil  War  would  require  perhaps  several  hours.  At  the 
same  time  it  is  to  be  noted,  that  a  few  dynamite  cartridges  can 
be  carried  by  a  single  man,  with  no  addition  to  his  burden,  and 
with  no  decrease  in  his  ease  of  movement.  A  party  of  four  or 
five  men,  or  even  a  single  man,  can  destroy  any  bridge  on  that 
line  of  railway  with  entire  ease. 

Destruction  of  the  British  communications,  therefore,  is  for 
the  Burghers  a  matter  of  the  greatest  ease.  The  derailing  of 
trains,  where  the  line  of  railway  has  heavy  grades,  and  many 
curves,  is  a  matter  of  comparative  ease.  If  no  other  means 
were  available,  it  is  not  a  very  difficult  matter  to  roll  down  large 
masses  of  rock  at  opportune  times.  But  in  a  region  like  South 
Africa  the  methods  of  destruction  are  many  and  simple. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  work  of  construction,  or  rather  re-con- 
struction, by  the  British  troops,  in  cases  of  interruption  of 
the  railway  line,  will  be  one  of  extreme  difficulty,  and  is  in  all 
human  probability  one  for  which  they  have  thus  far  made  not 
a  particle  of  preparation. 

Even  in  our  Civil  War,  destruction  was  comparatively  easy. 
In  our  Civil  War  the  method  in  use  was  the  one  described  in 
General  Sherman's  report  of  September  15,  1864,  in  the  follow- 
ing language :  "  I  then  ordered  one  day's  work  to  be  expended 


25 


in  destroying  that  road,  and  it  was  done  with  a  will.  Twelve 
and  one-half  miles  were  destroyed,  the  ties  burned  and  the  iron 
rails  heated  and  twisted  by  the  utmost  ingenuity  of  old  hands 
at  the  work.  Several  cuts  were  filled  up  with  trunks  of  trees, 
logs,  rocks  and  earth  intermingled,  with  loaded  shells  prepared 
as  torpedoes  to  explode  in  case  of  an  attempt  to  clear  them  out." 

Further  light  on  this  point  is  thrown  by  a  few  words  from 
the  report  of  a  field  officer,  Col.  Ario  Pardee,  Jr.,  which  reads 
as  follows :  "  I  have  the  honor  to  report  that  in  compliance  with 
instructions  received  yesterday  I  destroyed  the  railroad  from 
the  City  of  Atlanta  to  a  point  250  yards  beyond  the  fourth 
mile  post,  in  all  about  two  miles  and  three-quarters  of  track. 
The  ties  have  been  burned  and  the  rails  bent  and  twisted  so  as 
to  render  them  useless." 

But  the  means  available  to-day  for  the  destruction  of  rail- 
roads are  vastly  more  efficacious  and  speedy  than  those  which 
were  used  by  our  troops  in  the  Civil  War.  This  is  due  mainly 
to  the  recent  development  of  the  science  of  explosives.  With 
the  modern  explosives,  of  superior  power  and  greater  compact- 
ness, it  is  now  a  comparatively  simple  and  easy  matter  to 
destroy  many  miles  of  railroad  with  a  comparatively  small  num- 
ber of  men,  moving  and  operating  in  very  small  parties.  A 
few  cartridges  of  dynamite,  judiciously  applied. at  the  end  of 
any  bridge,  will  wreck  it  so  as  to  make  its  reconstruction  a 
matter  of  great  difficulty  and  delay  The  mere  moving  of 
the  spikes  from  the  outer  rail  on  any  curve,  leaving  the  rail 
undisturbed,  will  be  pretty  certain  to  run  a  train  off  the  track, 
destroying  the  train,  and  rendering  the  road  impassable  for  a 
considerable  period  of  time.  Especially  is  this  the  case,  in  any 
mountainous  region,  where  grades  are  heavy  and  curves  are 
numerous.  The  ease  and  facility  of  the  destruction  of  lines 
of  railroad  under  such  conditions  is  easily  apparent 

On  the  other  hand,  this  increase  in  ease  and  rapidity  of  de- 
struction makes  an  immense  increase  in  the  burden  resting  upon 
any  force  which  must  depend  for  its  daily  supply  on  a  railway 
line. 

Taking  then  into  consideration  the  long  line  of  railway  upon 
which  the  British  forces  must  depend  for  their  supplies  of 
rations,  forage,  and  ammunition,  it  is  quite  plain,  that  if  the 


26 


Burghers  are  handled  with  reasonable  skill  and  alertness,  if 
they  make  reasonably  good  use  of  the  immense  advantages  of 
their  position,  they  will  be  able  to  cut  the  British  lines  of 
communications  almost  at  will,  and  without  any  great  expendi- 
ture of  life  or  material.  They  will  be  able  to  make  the  problem 
of  supply  almost  an  impossible  one. 

The  statements  already  made  as  to  the  difficulty  of  maintain- 
ing long  lines  of  railway  communication  in  a  hostile  country 
have  been  somewhat  general  in  their  character.  In  South 
Africa,  however,  that  is,  in  the  portion  of  it  which  is  for  the 
present  to  be  the  field  of  military  operations,  the  difficulties 
are  exceptional.  Their  nature  and  extent  will  appear  from  the 
following  consideration  of  existing  conditions. 

The  field  of  operations  in  South  Africa  is  decidedly  different 
from  any  that  has  ever  been  heretofore  used  in  the  handling  of 
large  bodies  of  troops.  The  European  Continent,  during  the 
last  few  centuries  during  which  it  has  been  the  scene  of  so  many 
wars,  has  been  a  country  thickly  settled,  having  a  large  number 
of  roads  available  for  the  movements  of  large  bodies  of  troops. 
It  has  also  had  a  sufficiently  dense  population,  to  make  it 
possible  for  armies  of  considerable  numbers  to  live  on  the 
country.  Requisitions  upon  large  towns  and  cities  can  be 
easily  made  to  supply  a  reasonably  large  force  for  a  consider- 
able period  of  time. 

So,  too,  in  our  Civil  War,  although  the  country  was  rough, 
and  the  roads  difficult,  yet  the  roads  available  for  wheel  trans- 
portation were  sufficient  to  allow  the  movement  over  them  of 
large  bodies  of  troops.  For  instance,  General  Sherman  had 
no  serious  difficulty  in  supplying  his  army  of  60,000  men 
during  his  march  to  the  sea,  mainly  by  foraging  on  the 
country. 

As  General  Howard  stated  in  his  despatch  to  General  Sher- 
man of  November  1,  1864:  "  We  marched  to  this  place  by  two 
good  roads  from  Cave  Spring.  Hood  took  much.  But  there 
is  -plenty  of  corn  and  some  pigs."  As  General  Sherman  him- 
self put  it,  in  his  despatch  to  his  Commissary,  Colonel  Beck- 
with,  on  November  10,  1864,  just  before  the  beginning  of  the 
march  to  Savannah :  "  When  I  start  I  propose  to  move  with 
great  rapidity.    Faster  than  cattle  can  possibly  gain  on  us.. 


27 


They  are  now  five  days  behind,  and  could  not  possibly  catch 
np,  as  I  will  break  the  Etowah  and  Chattahooche  bridges  in 
passing,  and  those  streams  are  now  too  high  to  cross  without 
bridges.  We  can  safely  rely  on  the  country  for  half  rations 
of  meat.  Where  a  million  of  people  live  I  have  no  fear  of 
getting  a  share.*' 

He  further  said,  in  his  despatch  to  General  Thomas  of  No- 
vember 11 :  "  You  may  act,  however,  on  the  certainty  that  I 
sally  from  Atlanta  on  the  1 6th  inst.  with  about  60,000  men,  well 
provisioned,  but  expecting  to  live  chiefly  on  the  country." 

But  this  matter  of  supplying  a  large  army  from  the  country 
through  which  it  moves  has  its  limitations.  In  the  first  place 
it  must  be  used  with  great  caution  in  a  friendly  country,  or  in 
a  country  where  it  is  desired  to  keep  the  inhabitants  on  friendly 
terms.  In  the  second  place,  it  is  limited  in  point  of  time.  In 
an  ordinary  agricultural  region,  the  amount  of  supplies  that 
can  be  collected  from  any  available  area  is  soon  exhausted.  No 
dependence  therefore  can  be  put  upon  it  as  the  means  of  sup- 
plying the  subsistence  needs  of  a  large  force  for  any  consider- 
able period. 

We  are  thrown  back,  therefore,  on  this  question  of  the  sub- 
sistence of  large  bodies  of  troops,  to  the  impossibility  of  depend- 
ing upon  anything  other  than  transportation  by  railroads. 

But,  as  stated  before,  the  question  of  supply  lies  at  the  foun- 
dation of  all  military  movements.  The  matter  of  transporta- 
tion lies  at  the  foundation  of  the  question  of  supply.  This 
fact  is  now  at  last  becoming  understood  in  England.  An  ex- 
tract from  the  London  Times  reads  as  follows : 

"Limitation  upon  England's  Campaign 

"  Col.  Hanna,  who  is  an  eminent  military  authority,  has  published  what 
seems  to  me  to  be  a  very  sensible  letter  in  TheTimes.  Our  military  authorities 
meet  any  check  in  South  Africa  by  sending  out  an  additional  division.  The 
Colonel  points  out  that  in  all  countries,  and  especially  in  South  Africa, 
where  the  distances  are  enormous  and  the  country  that  we  propose  to  con- 
quer so  devoid  of  any  supplies  on  which  an  invading  army  can  count,  we 
ought  to  deprecate  any  large  increase  on  the  present  number  of  our  soldiers. 
In  support  of  this  he  quotes  the  Duke  of  Wellington's  dictum  that  war 
is  a  question  of  commissariat,  and  that  commissariat  is  one  of  transport. 
Where  everything  has  to  be  transported  from  a  distance  the  Colonel  holds 


28 


that  we  cannot  trust  to  railroads,  as  they  may  at  any  time  be  cut  by  mo- 
bile forces  like  those  of  the  Boers,  in  which  case  we  should  have  to  fall 
back  on  pack  animals,  bullock  carts,  &c.  The  number  that  we  can  employ 
in  active  war,  therefore,  is  limited  by  the  number  that  we  can  feed. 

"I  am  not  a  military  man,  but  what  Col.  Hanna  says  had  occurred  to 
me.  Napoleon's  expedition  to  Moscow  broke  down,  not  so  much  from  the 
inclemency  of  the  climate  as  from  the  impossibility  of  feeding  such  a  mass 
of  men  as  he  threw  into  the  country ;  and,  up  to  a  certain  point,  our 
advance  on  Pretoria  is  analogous  to  that  of  Napoleon  on  Moscow.  Pre- 
toria, according  to  all  accounts,  is  so  strongly  fortified  that  it  could  not  be 
taken  without  a  regular  siege,  It  is  not  likely  that  the  Boers  would  resist 
our  advance  by  a  battle  of  Borodino.  They  would  be  more  likely,  after 
occupying,  after  their  wont,  successive  positions  from  which  they  can  kill 
or  wound  many  of  our  men,  to  fall  back  into  the  veldt  on  either  side,  and 
then  to  harass  our  communications.  These  we  should  have  to  defend  along 
a  line  as  long  as  the  road  from  London  to  Newcastle.  Even  if  the  railroad 
were  not  cut,  it  is  laid  down  in  the  German  military  works  that  a  railroad 
with  two  lines  of  rail  can  only  supply  40,000  men,  and  no  South  Afiican 
railroad  beyond  the  Orange  River  has  more  than  one  line." 


THE  ABSENCE  OF  PREPARATION  ON  THE  PAKT 
OF  THE  BRITISH  ARMY  FOR  THE  HANDLING 
OF  THE  PRESENT  PROBLEM  OF  TRANSPORTA- 
TION AND  SUPPLY. 

We  have  seen  how  vital  to  the  operations  of  any  army  is  the 
problem  of  transportation  and  supply,  and  how  impossible  it  is 
to  handle  this  problem,  for  any  large  body  of  troops,  especially 
in  such  a  region  as  the  one  which  is  now  the  field  of  operations, 
except  by  lines  of  railway.  We  have  also  seen  how  easy  it  ii 
in  that  region  to  destroy  any  line  of  railway,  and  how  over- 
whelmingly difficult  will  be  the  work  of  rebuilding  destroyed 
railway  lines,  and  consequently,  of  keeping  open  any  line  of 
communications  for  the  supply  of  any  large  armies. 

Such  being  the  situation,  it  is  easily  seen  that  the  only  possi- 
bility of  the  British  Army  conducting  successfully  any  cam- 
paign of  invasion  depends  on  the  efficiency  of  their  commissary 
and  quartermaster  service,  and  of  their  engineer  service. 

Now  it  happens  to  be  the  fact,  that  Great  Britain  to-day  is 
practically  destitute  of  men  of  experience  for  service  in  the 


29 


Quartermaster  and  Commissary  Departments,  for  any  new 
troops  which  may  be  now  raised  for  service  in  South  Africa. 
Upon  this  point  the  evidence  is  very  explicit,  and  is  contained 
in  the  following  article  from  the  Army  and  Navy  Gazette  of 
October  7,  1899.  That  article  may  be  deemed,  for  all  practical 
purposes,  to  be  almost  equivalent  to  an  official  declaration. 
Moreover,  it  is  an  admission  against  interest,  and  consequently 
entitled  to  the  highest  weight  as  evidence.    It  reads  as  follows : 

"  Transport  in  South  Africa. 

11  The  mobilization  of  the  Army  Service  Corps  for  supplying  one  army 
corps  for  South  Africa  will,  it  is  to  be  hoped,  clearly  demonstrate  how 
disgracefully  under-manned  this  important  branch  of  the  Service  is. 
That  the  authorities  should  have  permitted  such  a  state  of  things  is  to  be 
deplored,  for  it  is  culpable  neglect,  and  might  involve  the  country  in  some 
dire  national  disaster.  The  stations  have  been  drained  to  the  dregs  of 
officers,  warrant  officers,  non  commissioned  officers  and  men.  The  dis- 
trict staff  offices  have  been  denuded  of  clerks,  and  companies  of  the  corps 
left  without  officers  or  warrant  officers,  and  all  this  to  supply  merely  one 
army  corps.  What  would  be  done  if  a  second  or  a  third  army  corps  were 
required,  or  if  mobilization  for  home  defense  became  suddenly  necessary  ? 
Even  to  secure  enough  Army  Service  Corps  of  varying  grades  to  proceed 
to  South  Africa,  a  special  increase  to  the  establishment  has  had  to  be  re- 
sorted to. 

"At  the  commencement  of  last  session,  Parliament  decided  that  an 
augmentation  of  some  forty  officers  was  required,  with  an  increase  of  a 
certain  number  of  transport  companies.  We  find,  however,  that  only  a 
few  quartermasters  have  as  yet  been  added,  and  but  four  new  companies, 
without  the  addition  of  any  of  the  forty  officers  required.  From  the 
Army  List  it  seems  that  over  seventy  subalterns  are  still  wanted  to  com- 
plete the  corps.  What  is  being  done  to  secure  and  train  them  ?  Is  it  that 
candidates  are  shy  of  coming  forward  to  fill  the  vacancies  ?  And,  if  so, 
why  ?  If  the  rate  of  pay  is  inadequate  it  should  be  increased.  Candi- 
dates, and  of  the  right  sort,  must  be  found  as  rapidly  as  possible,  in  order 
to  fill  the  depleted  cadres.  Surely,  by  distributing  young  officers  amongst 
the  companies  of  the  corps  left  at  home,  they  could  commence  to  learn 
the  rudiments  of  their  duties,  and  their  training  could  be  completed  as 
opportunity  offers  at  the  technical  school  of  instruction  at  Aldershot. 

"  When  the  seventy  or  so  officers  are  found  the  existing  establishment  of 
the  Army  Service  Corps  will  require  to  be  gradually  raised.  More  com- 
panies must  be  created,  and  each  company  should  always  have  within  its 
ranks  two  officers  and  a  warrant  officer.  For  years  past  the  Army  Service 
Corps  companies  have  been  starved ;  rarely  have  they  had  even  their  full 
complement  of  officers.  The  number  of  captains  has  been  dangerously 
weak,  and  the  number  of  subalterns  and  warrant  officers  wholly  inade- 


30 


quate  to  meet  even  peace  requirements.  The  4  establishment '  of  clerks, 
bakers,  and  butchers  is  in  the  same  lamentable  condition;  practically  the 
whole  of  the  clerks  in  the  home  offices  have  been  drained  for  South  Africa, 
and  promotions  to  higher  ranks  suddenly  made  at  the  moment  of  mobili- 
sation. 

"In  Indian  campaigns  good  service  in  supply  and  transport  is  done  by 
regimental  officers,  and  seeing  that  the  existing  strength  of  the  Army 
Service  Corps  is  so  lamentably  weak  it  would  seem  desirable  to  take  regi- 
mental subalterns  to  serve  in  South  Africa  with  the  transport  companies, 
setting  free  those  of  the  corps  for  duties  at  home,  where  they  are  much 
needed.  The  administration  of  the  corps  is  evidently  faulty,  otherwise 
such  calls  as  are  now  made  might  have  been  foreseen  and  provided  for. 
It  is  far  better  to  spend  a  certain  sum  annually  in  preparation  for  contin- 
gencies than  for  the  War  Office  to  be  '  found  wanting '  at  a  critical 
moment,  for  then  money  is  recklessly  spent  and  no  really  tangible 
good  results  to  anybody.  The  supply  and  transport  bears  so  important  a 
part  in  warfare  that,  cost  what  it  may  to  maintain  it  efficiently  in  peace, 
a  sufficiency  of  officers  should  always  be  available  so  that  they  may  be 
able  to  fall  into  their  places  when  war  comes.  To  leave  companies  with- 
out officers,  and  stations  and  districts  without  either  officers  or  clerks,  is 
reprehensible  to  a  degree,  and  a  department  which  allows  such  things  to  be 
can  scarcely  be  defended.  "We  object  strongly  to  the  '  we  told  you  so ' 
form  of  journalism,  but  in  this  particular  detail  of  administration  there  is 
literally  no  excuse  for  the  War  Office,  as  the  officials  in  Pall- Mall  have  for 
years  past  been  warned  of  what  would  happen  if  war  suddenly  came. 
The  difficulty  in  the  Transvaal  can  scarcely  be  said  to  have  arisen  sud- 
denly, yet  the  unpreparedness  of  our  supply  and  transport  arrangements 
is  beyond  dispute,  admirable  as  the  system  is  which  we  owe  to  the 
organizing  capacity  of  Sir  Redvers  Buller.  The  system,  in  fact,  is  so  per- 
fect that  the  existing  breakdown  is  the  less  to  be  excused.  We  trust,  how- 
ever, that  the  new  quartermaster-general  will  take  steps  immediately  to 
represent  in  the  strongest  terms  the  seriousness  of  our  position  and  obtain 
permission  to  fill  with  all  possible  despatch  the  full  cadre  of  officers,  so 
that  there  may  be  no  repetition  of  the  existing  scandal. " 

The  only  force  in  the  entire  British  Army  at  present  exist- 
ing, for  the  purpose  of  transportation  and  supply,  consists  of  the 
Royal  Engineers,  the  Departmental  Corps,  and  the  Army  Ser- 
vice Corps.  The  figures  of  those  different  branches  of  the 
service,  according  to  the  latest  reports,  are  as  follows : 


Non-Commis- 
Officers.    sioned  Officers, 
Drummers,  &c. 


Rank  and 


file. 
5,834 
3,166 
2,807 


Royal  Engineers. ... 
Departmental  Corps. 
Army  Service  Corps. 


601  1,312 
195  1,426 
245  751 


31 


But  here  we  come  on  another  fact  of  even  greater  significance. 

Not  only  is  there  this  total  dearth  in  the  British  army  of 
men  of  experience  for  the  branches  of  the  service  just  mentioned, 
but,  in  addition  to  that,  it  is  a  strictly  accurate  statement,  that 
no  officer  in  the  British  Army  has  had  any  practical  experience 
in  handling  any  difficult  problem  of  transportation  in  opposition 
to  a  modern  civilised  army. 

The  two  men,  who  come  nearest  to  meeting  the  requirements 
of  the  situation,  are  Lord  Roberts  and  Lord  Kitchener. 

Let  us  see  what  their  experience  in  actual  active  service  has 
been. 

Lord  Roberts'  experience  in  handling  any  difficult  question 
of  transportation  may  be  summed  up  as  consisting  in  the  com- 
mand of  a  single  small  expeditionary  force  on  the  Kabul-Kan- 
dahar march.  That  march  occupied  twenty-two  days.  It  was 
not  interrupted  by  active  fighting.  He  had  no  opposition. 
There  was  no  interference  whatever  with  his  communications. 
His  entire  moving  body,  including  both  troops  and  camp  fol- 
lowers, amounted  only  to  about  21,000  men,  including  8,000 
camp  followers,  with  8,000  animals.  They  lived  on  the  country 
during  the  whole  of  the  march.  There  was  no  practical  dif- 
ficulty in  the  matter  of  rations  or  forage.  The  distance  covered 
was  only  313  miles.  At  the  end  of  the  march  Lord  Roberts  had 
what  has  been  euphemistically  termed  a  battle,  which  lasted  a 
few  hours,  and  in  which  Lord  Roberts'  force,  numbering 
14,800  men,  suffered  a  loss  of  40  killed  and  210  wounded. 

From  these  facts  it  is  easily  apparent,  that  the  famous  Kabul- 
Kandahar  march,  of  which  so  much  has  been  made  by  English 
writers,  can  hardly  call  for  serious  consideration  as  a  military 
operation.  It  can  scarcely  be  considered  as  the  march  of  an 
army  in  the  face  of  a  real  enemy,  and  should  be  graded  almost  as 
the  movement  of  a  small  body  of  troops  in  a  friendly  country. 
The  experience  of  Lord  Roberts,  when  we  consider  the  actual 
problems  that  confront  any  commander  who  has  resting  upon 
him  the  burden  of  supplying  a  large  army,  amounts  to  practi- 
cally nothing. 

Lord  Kitchener's  experience,  so  far  as  concerns  the  question 
now  under  consideration,  is  limited  to  his  expedition  up  the 
Nile.    His  experience,  too,  is  virtually  the  only  one  that  hasj 


32 


been  had  in  recent  times  by  any  English.  Army  officer  in  the 
handling  of  a  line  of  communications  of  any  considerable  length. 
From  this  experience  considerable  light  will  be  thrown  upon  the 
problem  now  before  the  British  forces  in  South  Africa. 

The  essential  fundamental  feature  of  his  situation,  moreover, 
is  to  be  found  in  the  entire  absence  of  an  enemy  capable  of  caus- 
ing any  serious  interruption  to  the  work  of  construction  which 
is  hereafter  detailed. 

In  a  book  lately  published  entitled  "  The  Sudan  Campaign, 
1896  to  1899,  by  An  Officer,"  (London,  Chapman  &  Hall,  Ld., 
1899),  there  is  the  following  statement  of  the  problem  of  trans- 
portation and  supply  which  Lord  Kitchener  had  to  solve: 

"  How  was  the  force  to  be  supplied  on  the  march  to  the  battle,  and 
more  especially  after  it?  Behind  there  would  be  100  miles  of  con- 
tinuous cataract,  preventing  the  supplies  being  brought  by  river.  To 
bring  them  by  camel  over  100  miles  of  bad  road  through  the  Sahara 
Desert,  where  not  an  ounce  of  food  would  be  got,  would  mean  a 
stupendous  number  of  camels  for  even  a  small  force.  A  baggage 
camel  will  carry  300  pounds  20  miles  a  day.  He  eats  10  pounds  of 
food  a  day;  he  occupies  10  days  in  going  100  miles  and  back,  in  which 
time  he  eats  100  pounds.  So  he  only  brings  but  200  pounds  for  the 
force.  He  must  have  rest  every  now  and  again,  and  he  will  die  on 
the  least  provocation.  To  take  a  month's  supply  100  miles  for  10,000 
men,  about  15,000  camels  are  required.  And  then  when  a  further  ad- 
vance of  1,200  miles  is  made  to  Dongola  and  Merowi,  what  is  to  be 
done  then? 

"  The  Sirdar  hit  on  exactly  the  right  solution.  He-  determined  to 
take  every  advantage  possible  of  the  river,  to  carry  supplies  on  it 
wherever  it  could  be  done,  to  supplement  it  with  camel  transportation 
where  it  could  not  be  done,  and  to  make  a  railway.  This  meant 
gradual  advance  at  first,  an  advance  to  the  furthest  limit  that  alter- 
aate  boat  and  camel  service  would  supply,  and  as  the  railway  advanced 
push  on  the  boats  and  camels." 

It  will  readily  occur  to  the  reader  that  the  problem  of  original 
construction  of  a  railway  differs  in  no  essential  feature  from  the 
problem  of  re-building  a  railway  that  has  been  destroyed. 

"We  proceed  with  the  further  statement  of  Lord  Kitchener's 
method  of  railway  construction: 

"  The  Sirdar's  plan,  therefore,  was  to  advance  to  Akasheh  a  small 
force  and  entrench  it  there  to  cover  the  railway  construction.  This 
small  force  could  be  supplied  by  camel  convoys,  which  marched  every 
night  and  entrenched  days,  and  were  convoyed  by  a  guard.   When  the 


33 


railway  had  proceeded  as  far  as  safety  permitted,  he  would  rapidly 
bring  up  his  whole  force  and  drive  the  dervishes  out  of  Ferket  and 
Suarda.  As  they  were  just  as  much  governed  by  the  questions  of 
supply,  they  would  then  be  unable  to  keep  any  permanent  force  north 
of  Hannek,  and  he  could  safely  continue  the  construction  of  his  rail- 
way to  Falket,  while  in  the  meantime  camels  worked  between  rail- 
head and  the  force.  When  the  railway  reached  Ferket,  he  would  bring 
up  a  big  reserve  of  supplies,  wait  till  high  Nile,  then  put  it  into  boats 
which  could  sail  right  up  to  Dongola,  Merowi  and  Kassinger,  thus 
supplying  the  force. 

"  To  carry  his  force  across  the  river,  to  tow  barges  on  the  calm  days 
and  scout  up  the  river,  to  bombard  river  forts  preliminary  to  landing, 
to  enfilade  fortifications,  to  make  life  in  the  river-bank  unbearable  for 
the  enemy;  to  do  all  these  things,  he  would  have  gunboats  drawing 
two  feet  of  water.  When  the  river  rose  gunboats  lying  at  Haifa  were 
to  be  pulled  up  cataracts  to  Ferket,  and  three  new  ones  should  be  taken 
in  sections  by  rail  to  Ferket  and  launched.  Thus  he  would  have  com- 
plete command  of  the  river,  and  could  supply  a  big  force,  and  when 
the  time  came  he  would  move  swiftly  to  the  destruction  of  the  Der- 
vishes. 

"  It  looks  a  simple  plan,  but  it  needed  a  man  who  knew  the  country 
and  the  enemy  to  make  it,  and  a  mistake  in  the  scheme  would  be 
heavily  paid  for.  Anyone  who  has  seen  the  inhospitable,  barren,  grill- 
ing Batn  el  Haggar  will  understand  what  a  mistake  in  the  supplying 
of  a  force  would  mean.  It  stopped  the  Romans,  Greeks  and  Persians. 
Simple  as  the  plan  looks,  it  was  not  so  simple  to  execute,  but  luckily 
Sir  Herbert  Kitchener  was  as  capable  to  execute  as  he  was  to  plan." 

From  what  has  been  said  it  is  apparent  that  the  possibility  of 
interference  with  the  work  of  construction  on  the  part  of  the 
Dervishes  was  within  the  contemplation  of  Lord  Kitchener. 
Moreover,  if  the  Dervishes  had  been  at  all  conversant  with  the 
methods  of  modern  warfare,  such  interference  would  no  doubt 
have  taken  place.  It  turned  out  to  be  the  fact,  however,  that  no 
such  interference  was  had.  This  appears  from  a  further  state- 
ment contained  in  the  work  from  which  quotation  has  just  been 
made,  at  page  14,  which  reads  as  follows : 

"  It  was  considered  certain  that  the  Dervishes  would  attack  the  con- 
voys, and  if  they  had,  they  certainly  would  have  done  considerable 
damage.  There  was  no  road  for  the  convoys;  they  had  to  clamber  in 
long  straggling  line  up  and  down  steep  and  rocky  hills,  and  it  would 
have  been  quite  possible  for  the  Dervishes  to  get  at  one  end  or  other 
of  the  convoys  before  the  escort  could  interfere.  The  escort  could  not 
be  scattered  too  much  or  they  would  be  beaten  if  attacked.  There 


34 


were  some  splendid  opportunities  for  the  Dervishes,  but  they  never 
took  them.  No  doubt  they  found  it  hard  to  get  unobserved  through 
our  cavalry  and  camel  screen.  Daily  the  cavalry  used  a  scout  from 
Akasheh  towards  Ferket,  and  were  in  constant  touch  with  the  Dervish 
cavalry  scouts.  A  cavalry  officer  told  me  he  never  had  such  a  good 
time  as  during  this  outpost  duty.  He  said  it  was  like  going  out  hunt- 
ing every  day.  One  never  knew  what  would  turn  up;  one  day  they 
would  be  trying  to  outride  and  catch  a  weaker  patrol;  the  next  they 
would  be  dodging  and  watching  a  stronger  one." 

It  is  easy  to  see  what  the  difficulties  would  have  been  in  the 
face  of  an  alert  and  active  enemy,  conversant  with  the  methods 
of  serious  warfare. 

A  further  quotation  from  the  same  book,  page  17,  shows  the 
difficulty  of  the  work  of  construction  under  the  comparatively 
easy  conditions  which  existed  at  the  time: 

"  It  was  necessary,  therefore  to  utilize  the  railway  material  on  the 
spot  at  once,  and  to  supplement  it  as  quickly  as  possible  with  the  many 
things  that  it  wanted.  Measures  were  taken  to  procure  engines,  trucks, 
sleepers,  rails,  machinery  for  shops,  fitters  and  workmen,  foremen, 
platelayers,  and  all  the  various  accessories  for  a  railway.  The  gauge 
of  the  existing  thirty-three  miles  was  three  feet  six  inches,  so  this  de- 
termined the  gauge  of  the  railway — in  many  ways  a  convenient  one, 
but  inconvenient  for  a  military  railway,  because  since  the  railway  at 
the  Cape  is  the  only  other  one  in  the  world,  I  believe,  of  the  same  gauge 
there  is  no  ready-made  supply  of  locomotives  and  rolling  stock;  every- 
thing had  to  be  made  to  order,  shipped  to  Alexandria,  and  then  taken 
1,000  miles  up  river,  the  greater  part  of  the  way  by  sailing  boats,  with 
three  trans-shipments  between  Alexandria  and  Haifa.  Naturally  this 
took  time.  In  fact  the  new  engines  only  came  into  use  during  the  last 
month  of  the  expedition  in  September,  and  then  they  were  very  dis- 
appointing. The  new  trucks  arrived  quickly,  but  in  the  meantime  all 
the  old  engines  and  rolling  stock  long  since  condemned  were  patched 
up  and  made  to  struggle  on,  to  the  imminent  danger  of  all  concerned. 
A  railway  batallion  was  formed  by  enlisting  under  the  Conscription 
Act  several  hundred  of  the  Fellaheen,  who  had  no  more  idea  of  how  to 
lay  a  railway  than  to  fly.  To  superintend  them  several  so-called  plate- 
layers were  sent  up  from  lower  Egypt.  Naturally  they  proved,  with 
few  exceptions,  to  be  all  the  useless  scoundrels  discharged  from  the 
lower  Egypt  railways;  the  same  with  the  engine  drivers,  they  were 
nearly  all  native  stokers  with  the  most  limited  knowledge  of  how  to 
drive  or  look  after  an  engine,  and  with  the  most  reckless  disregard  of 
consequences.  "When  one  puts  an  ignorant  but  reckless  native  engine 
driver  on  a  patched  up  condemned  locomotive,  with  no  brakes,  to  drive 
a  train  of  worn  out  trucks  along  a  track  laid  by  men  who  have  never 


35 


seen  a  rail  and  don't  understand  a  straight  line  or  the  necessity  for 
exactitude;  and  when  this  track  climbs  up  and  down  and  in  and  out 
among  switchback  gradients  and  sharp  corners,  then  you  get  all  the 
elements  required  to  produce  the  most  exciting  and  exhilarating  rail- 
way travelling." 

This  is  a  fair  specimen  of  the  kind  of  difficulties  which  will 
exist  in  the  re-construction  of  the  South  African  railways,  when- 
ever they  shall  be  destroyed  at  any  point  by  the  Burghers  at  such 
time  as  may  suit  their  military  necessities. 

The  statement  continues,  page  18 : 

"  To  lick  this  mob  into  shape,  to  teach  them  to  lay  a  proper  track, 
and  to  lay  it  fast;  to  make  good  the  accidents  caused  by  these  sporting 
native  engine  drivers;  to  put  order  and  organization  into  the  railway, 
the  Sirdar  got  five  Royal  Engineer  Subalterns,  and  the  one  he  put  in 
charge  of  the  whole  happened  to  be,  with  the  'Sirdar's  usual  luck,  the 
very  man  for  the  post  Lieutenant  Girouard,  R.  B.,  knew  exactly  what 
was  wanted,  and  had  the  head  and  energy  and  the  pluck  to  do  it.  He 
was  here,  there  and  everywhere,  instructing,  swearing,  shoving  things 
along,  gradually  getting  organization  and  system  to  take  the  place  of 
vhaos,  and  under  his  able  guidance  everyone  became  slowly  but  notice- 
ably more  proficient  at  the  work;  but  it  was  real  hard  work  for  him, 
and  the  officers  and  men  under  him." 

The  statement  then  continues  as  to  the  matter  of  transporta- 
tion during  the  construction  of  the  railway.    It  is  as  follows : 

"  While  the  railway  is  hammering  steadily  forward,  we  will  turn  to 
the  organization  of  transport  service.  As  soon  as  the  campaign  began, 
veterinary  surgeons  were  sent  to  the  camel  districts  to  buy  camels. 
The  natives  soon  heard  that  camels  were  wanted.  It  was  a  bad  time  of 
the  year  to  buy,  because  camels  were  in  great  requisition  to  carry  the 
crops  to  the  railways,  but  still  sufficient  were  produced,  and  all  day 
long  the  veterinary  officers  were  examining  and  passing  camels.  They 
were  marched  up  to  Wady  Haifa.  The  personnel  of  the  transport 
corps  was,  like  the  railway  battalion,  raised  by  using  the  Conscription 
Act  to  enlist  the  required  number  of  Fellaheen." 

Then  follows  a  statement  of  the  difficulties  of  transport  ser- 
vice by  means  of  camels,  from  which  it  is  here  unnecessary  to 
quote. 

The  following  paragraph  gives  a  statement  as  to  the  line  of 
communications  of  Sir  Herbert  Kitchener  from  Cairo  to  Ferket : 
"  It  will  be  interesting  to  examine  the  line  of  communications  at  the 
time  that  we  had  advanced  to  Ferket  from  the  base  at  Cairo.  Stores 


36 


were  forwarded  for  390  miles  by  rail  to  Naghamadi.  There  an  English 
officer  was  in  charge  of  a  gang  of  men  who  took  them  off  the  railway 
and  put  them  into  boats,  which  sailed  145  miles  to  Assouan.  There 
another  English  officer  was  in  charge,  who  had  the  stores  loaded  on  to 
a  train,  which  took  them  four  miles  around  the  cataract  to  Shellal, 
where  they  were  again  put  into  boats.  This  work  was  entirely  done 
by  convicts.  At  Shellal  some  of  the  boats  were  lashed  alongside  the 
stern-wheel  steamers  thus  loaded,  and  towed  240  miles  to  Haifa,  while 
the  remaining  boats  sailed.  From  Haifa  the  railway  carried  them  68 
miles  to  Ambigol  Wells,  where  they  were  loaded  on  camels  and  carried 
about  35  miles  to  Ferket." 

Prom  this  statement  it  is  seen  that  the  maintenance  of  com- 
munications had  difficulties,  even  under  the  comparatively  easy 
conditions  which  actually  existed.  Those  difficulties,  however, 
once  surmounted,  ceased  to  be  serious,  unless  there  was  artive 
interference  with  the  communications  by  an  active  enemy. 
Throughout  the  whole  of  Kitchener's  advance,  and  this  is  the 
fundamental  fact  underlying  the  nature  and  difficulty  of  his 
entire  operations,  there  was  virtually  no  interference  with  the 
work  of  construction  on  the  part  of  any  hostile  force.  From 
the  statements  already  quoted  it  is  quite  apparent  that  the  entire 
situation  would  have  been  essentially  changed,  if  the  work  of 
construction  had  been  interrupted  by  any  active  alert  force  of 
men  supplied  with  modern  explosives,  and  at  the  same  time  pos- 
sessing knowledge  as  to  their  use. 

~No  doubt  Sir  Herbert  Kitchener  showed  remarkable  capacity 
and  energy,  and  fertility  of  resource  in  surmounting  the  dif- 
ficulties of  transportation  and  supply  which  were  the  prelimin- 
aries to  his  final  engagement  with  the  Dervishes.  He  evidently 
has  the  capacity  for  organization,  untiring  energy,  combined 
with  great  skill  in  the  selection  and  handling  of  men.  Never- 
theless, it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  work  which  he  prose- 
cuted to  its  successful  termination  was  not  seriously  interfered 
with  at  any  point  of  time.  No  one  knows  better  than  he,  how 
essentially  different  would  be  the  conditions  in  case  of  opposi- 
tion on  the  part  of  an  alert  and  skillful  foe. 

Taking  the  conditions  as  they  existed,  however,  with  the  river 
at  his  command,  which  made  the  problem  of  construction  and 
supply  comparatively  simple  and  easy,  Kitchener  required  from 
March,  1896,  to  June,  1898,  for  the  construction  of  550  miles 


37 


of  railway  to  Atbara.  At  that  point  a  flotilla  of  steamers  and 
sailing  boats  was  collected;  the  Nile  was  nearly  high,  and  no- 
thing more  was  wanted  to  complete  the  preparation  for  the  ad- 
vance on  Khartum.  The  line  of  communications  from  Cairo 
at  this  point  was  as  follows:  From  Cairo  by  rail  to  Assouan, 
535  miles  (36  hours) ;  from  Assouan  to  Haifa,  220  miles,  in 
barges  towed  by  steamers,  (4  days)  ;  from  Haifa  to  Adbara,  by 
rail,  385  miles  (36  hours)  ;  that  is  to  say,  from  Cairo  to  Adbara, 
seven  days,  sometimes  eight  or  even  nine. 

At  the  end  of  the  British  advance  came  the  battle  of  Omdur- 
man,  in  which  the  Dervishes  were  so  obliging  as  to  attempt  a 
direct  front  attack  on  a  well-drilled  and  well-disciplined  force 
of  men  supplied  with  all  the  modern  weapons  of  precision.  The 
description  of  the  situation  on  the  front,  given  by  the  officer  from 
whom  quotations  have  already  been  made,  is  as  follows : 

"  The  fire  discipline  of  the  British  throughout  the  action  was  a  treat 
to  watch;  exactly  as  on  parade  they  changed  from  volley  firing  to  in- 
dependent, and  back  to  volley  firing,  as  might  be  ordered,  coolly  and 
without  any  hurry.  Their  shooting,  too,  was  admirable;  they  handily 
knocked  them  over  at  900  yards,  and  within  300  nothing  could  live. 
The  Egyptian  troops  were  as  steady,  but  they  cannot  shoot  so  well. 
Although  the  Dervishes  were  falling  in  hundreds,  their  advance  seemed 
at  first  to  be  unchecked;  numbers  dropped,  but  others  were  rushing  on 
and  coming  nearer  and  nearer,  till  it  almost  seemed  as  if  they  would 
reach  us;  but  within  300  yards  of  the  British,  and  within  200  of  the 
Egyptian  Brigade,  scarcely  a  Dervish  could  live,  and  few  camels 
escaped  till  within  50  yards  or  so,  and  then  one  or  two  daring  horse- 
men calmly  stood  within  100  yards  imploring  their  men  to  come  on. 
*  *  *  Now  and  again  the  enemy  would  try  to  rush  forward  from 
their  cover,  always  with  the  same  result." 

The  officer  continues: 

"  So  rapid  was  our  fire  that  above  the  sound  of  the  explosions  could 
be  heard  the  swish  of  our  bullets  going  through  the  air,  just  like  the 
swish  of  water;  it  literally  swept  away  the  line  of  charging  Dervishes. 
One  or  two  horsemen  got  within  100  yards,  and  it  really  looked  as  if 
they  would  reach  us." 

The  real  nature  of  the  battle  of  Omdurman  is  easily  seen 
from  the  statements  already  quoted,  and  from  the  following 
figures  of  the  losses  on  either  side.  The  entire  casualties  of  the 
British  side  were: 


38 


"About  500,  of  which  about  150  were  killed."  *  *  *  "  Of  the 
Dervishes  quite  15,000  were  killed.  Officers  sent  out  next  day  counted 
11,800  dead  on  the  battle  field;  to  these  must  be  added  those  killed  by 
the  bombardment  in  Omdurman  and  in  the  Desert  during  pursuit. 
Several  thousand  more  were  wounded  and  taken  prisoners."  *  *  * 
"  The  smallness  of  our  loss  was  due  to  the  facts  that  the  Dervish  fire 
was  extraordinarily  inaccurate,  and  that  the  openness  of  the  ground 
enabled  us  to  keep  the  greater  part  of  the  enemy  at  a  distance.  Had 
the  Dervish  stayed  in  entrenchment  and  fought  there  as  pluckily  as 
they  fought  in  the  open,  or  had  they  made  a  night  attack,  the  casualty 
list  would  have  been  very  different." 

In  the  operations  in  South  Africa  thus  far,  it  will  be  noted 
the  conditions  have  been  reversed.  The  selection  of  position  has 
been  assigned  to  the  Burghers.  The  making  of  a  front  attack 
on  a  force  admirably  posted,  fully  equipped  with  modern  arms 
and  ammunition,  has  been  allotted  to  the  British.  The  result 
has  been  what  might  have  been  expected — heavy  loss  to  the  at- 
tacking forces,  with  comparatively  slight  loss  on  the  part  of  the 
defense. 

But  the  point  of  principal  interest  in  the  story  of  the  Soudan 
expedition  is  to  be  found  in  the  fundamental  problem  already 
so  many  times  mentioned — that  of  transportation  and  supply. 
That  is  the  problem  which  the  British  forces  in  South  Africa 
have  now  to  encounter.  But  the  conditions  will  be  essentially 
different  from  any  that  they  have  heretofore  encountered.  The 
reason  is  the  difference  in  the  character  of  the  country,  and  the 
character  of  the  enemy. 


THE  REASON  FOB,  THIS  ABSENCE  OF  PREPARA- 
TION ON  THE  PART  OF  THE  BRITISH  ARMY. 


The  reason  for  this  most  astounding  absence  of  preparation 
on  the  part  of  the  British  Army  is  to  be  found  in  the  ignorance, 
and  the  incompetence,  of  the  British  War  Office. 

But  that  statement  only  takes  us  back  one  step. 

What  is  the  reason  for  the  ignorance,  and  the  incompetence, 
of  the  British  War  Office? 


39 


The  answer  to  that  question  is  somewhat  complex.  It  is  to 
be  found  in  a  number  of  facts,  taken  in  combination.  It  is  an 
old  story.  At  its  foundation  lies  the  principal  fact  of  the  in- 
capacity of  hereditary  kings,  and  hereditary  classes,  to  do  the 
severe  steady  hard  work,  which  is  absolutely  essential  to  the 
proper  handling  of  affairs  of  state  in  general,  and  of  army  affairs 
in  particular.  To  that  fact  is  to  be  added  the  further  one,  that 
efficient  army  administration  is  an  absolute  impossibility,  when 
it  rests  in  the  hands  of  an  ever-shifting  group  of  ignorant  lay- 
men, selected  at  uncertain  times,  for  uncertain  periods,  from  a 
legislature,  whose  time  and  labor  must  always  be  given  in  the 
main  to  the  manipulation  of  a  majority  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons. These  last  are  the  conditions  which  exist  under  what  is 
termed  "  parliamentary  government." 

Let  us  consider  some  of  the  historical  facts,  as  to  the  conduct 
of  the  British  War  Office,  under  the  royal  and  parliamentary 
regimes.  For  it  will  be  found  that  they  have  both  been  charac- 
terized by  the  same  essential  features. 

From  that  most  interesting  book  u  England  at  War,"  by  W. 
H.  Davenport  Adams,  the  following  quotation  is  made : 

"The  military  history  of  the  reign  of  Charles  I  begins  as  that  of 
James  I  closed,  with  a  record  of  a  failure. 

"  Charles  and  his  confederate,  the  Duke  of  Buckingham,  had  com- 
mitted themselves  to  a  war  with  Spain;  but  Parliament  showed  little 
inclination  to  support  it,  and  refused  to  grant  the  necessary  subsidies 
until  at  all  events  the  just  grievances  of  the  people  had  been  redressed. 
After  much  wrangling  it  was  induced  to  grant  a  subsidy,  and  Charles 
in  a  burst  of  sudden  anger  dissolved  it,  declaring  that  he  knew  how  to 
govern  without  its  assistance.  He  proceeded  to  make  good  his  words. 
Orders  were  issued  to  the  Lord  Lieutenants  of  the  country  to  raise  by 
way  of  loan  the  money  of  which  he  stood  in  need.  They  were  to  apply 
to  the  wealthy  for  contributions  and  to  transmit  to  the  Court  the 
names  of  those  who  refused  or  delayed  compliance.  The  response, 
nevertheless,  was  reluctant  and  limited;  but  Charles  and  Buckingham 
pushed  forward  their  military  preparations,  and  a  fleet  of  90  sailed 
carrying  5,000  seamen  and  10,000  soldiers,  which  under  Sir  Edward 
Cecil  (created  Viscount  Wimbledon)  as  General  and  Admiral,  and  the 
Karl  of  Essex  as  Vice-Admiral — neither  of  whom  had  had  any  experi- 
ence of  naval  warfare, — was  despatched  to  intercept  the  Spanish  treas- 
ure ships  and  to  attack  Cadiz. 

"  Ill-officered,  ill-manned,  ill-provisioned,  the  expedition  brought  dis- 
grace upon  the  English  flag.   The  men  *  raised  by  press,'  half  starved, 


40 


badly  paid  and  without  training,  had  no  stomach  for  fighting,  and  dis- 
regarded the  orders  of  their  officers;  while  the  officers,  though  not 
wanting  in  bravery,  were  absolutely  devoid  of  military  knowledge." 

The  conditions  do  not  at  present  seem  to  have  been  essentially 
changed. 

Mr.  Adams  continues: 

"  On  the  22d  of  October  the  fleet  arrived  in  Cadiz  Bay.  A  counsel  of 
war  was  held  at  which  some  gallant  spirits  proposed  an  immediate 
attack  on  the  great  Spanish  seaport;  but  the  majority  were  frightened 
at  so  daring  a  venture,  and  resolved  to  take  the  fort  of  Putnal,  which 
guarded  the  entrance  to  the  main  Harbor  where  lay  the  Spanish  mer- 
chantmen, twelve  tall  ships  and  fifteen  or  sixteen  galleys.  The  fort 
quickly  surrendered,  but  meanwhile  the  garrison  of  Cadiz  had  been 
largely  reinforced.  Wimbledon,  however,  landed  his  troops  and  began 
his  march  upon  Cadiz;  but  in  his  haste  no  thought  had  been  given  to 
the  army's  supplies,  and  his  men  tramping  forward  under  a  hot  sun 
began  to  grow  faint  with  thirst  and  hunger.  Wimbledon  good  nat- 
uredly  ordered  a  cask  of  wine  to  be  brought  out  of  a  neighboring  house 
for  their  refreshment.  '  Even  a  little  drop  would  have  been  too  much 
for  their  empty  stomachs,  but  the  houses  about  were  stored  with  sweet 
wines  for  the  use  of  the  West  India  fleets.  In  a  few  minutes  casks 
were  broached  in  every  direction,  and  well  nigh  the  whole  army  was 
reduced  to  a  state  of  raving  drunkenness.'  Next  morning  as  the  men 
could  not  be  kept  longer  without  food,  Wimbledon  marched  them  back 
to  Ponto,  and  on  the  27th  re-embarked." 

Mr.  Adams  gives  a  short  narration  of  the  next  adventure  of 
the  King  and  his  Minister.    It  is  as  follows : 

"  Untaught  by  this  deplorable  failure,  King  and  Minister  next  turned 
their  inglorious  arms  against  France.  They  found  a  pretext  in  the 
persecution  which  the  Hugenots  were  undergoing."  (The  close  re- 
semblance between  that  feature  of  the  situation  and  the  pretense  now 
put  forward  for  a  wholly  unprovoked  active  aggression  on  the  Burgh- 
ers will  appear  more  clearly  from  the  facts  hereafter  given.)  "  Whose 
last  stronghold  Rochelle,  was  besieged  by  the  Royal  Army,  and  its 
downfall  would  consummate  the  ruin  of  the  French.  It  was  hoped 
that  a  religious  war  would  be  popular  with  the  Nation,  and  a  general 
loan  was  therefore  ordered.  But  the  anticipated  enthusiasm  did  not 
show  itself;  in  every  county  Charles'  Commissioners  met  with  refus- 
als. The  refusants  were  harshly  dealt  with;  but  the  refusals  contin- 
ued. *  *  *  At  length  a  fleet  and  an  army  were  got  together,  and 
Buckingham  took  the  chief  command.  His  instructions  were  to  main- 
tain the  English  dominion  of  the  seas  and  relieve  Rochelle.  With  100 
ships,  carrying  6,000  foot  and  100  horse  he  sailed  from  Stokes  Bay  on 
the  27th  of  June.    No  enemy  appeared,  and  Buckingham  could  not  ful- 


41 


fill  the  first  part  of  his  instructions  to  sweep  the  French  and  the  Span- 
ish from  the  seas,  for  the  same  reason  that  the  audience  in  Sheridan's 
Critic  could  not  see  the  Spanish  fleet — because  they  were  not  in  sight. 
*  *  *  On  the  evening  of  July  10th  Buckingham  cast  anchor  off  St. 
Martins,  the  principal  town  of  the  Isle  of  Rhe,  the  forts  of  which  hold 
in  check  the  commerce  of  Rochelle.  He  landed  his  troops  on  the  12th, 
though  not  without  loss,  and  on  the  17th  laid  siege  to  St.  Martins. 
About  the  middle  of  August  the  work  of  investment  had  been  com- 
pleted; but  the  French  garrison  maintained  a  sturdy  resistance,  and 
Buckingham  soon  discovered  that  he  had  undertaken  a  task  beyond 
the  means  of  his  rapidly  wasting  little  army.  He  was  wanting  neither 
in  courage  nor  intelligence;  but  he  had  no  military  capability,  and 
could  not  cope  with  the  difficulties  of  his  position.  In  fairness  it  must 
be  said  that  with  some  of  these  a  greater  commander  might  not  have 
coped  successfully.  He  asked  for  re-enforcement,  but  none  were  sent. 
His  men  were  deplorably  straightened  for  provisions,  and  he  had  no 
money  with  which  to  purchase  supplies.  His  officers  were  disaffected 
and  insubordinate.  The  condition  of  affairs  was  thus  combining  about 
Sir  Edward  Conway,  with  mid-September;  ■  the  army  grows  every  day 
weaker;  our  victuals  waste,  our  purses  are  empty,  ammunition  con- 
sumes, winter  grows,  our  enemies  increase  in  number  and  power;  we 
have  nothing  from  England.'  A  month  later  and  things  had  gone  from 
bad  to  worse;  the  weather  was  cold  and  wet;  the  men  half  starved, 
and  in  rags  suffered  grievously  in  the  trenches.  The  officers  were 
4  looking  themselves  blind '  by  sweeping  the  horizon  with  their  tele- 
scopes for  the  first  signs  of  re-enforcement  from  England,  as  in  the 
old  days  of  the  Crete  Republics  the  soldiers  of  Nicias  gazed  across  the 
Sicilian  Sea  for  the  expected  Trirenes  of  Demosthenes;  but  the  re- 
enforcement  came  not,  and  on  the  27th  of  October  Buckingham  gave 
orders  that  the  citadel  should  be  stormed.  After  suffering  a  heavy 
carnage  he  was  compelled  to  recall  his  men;  and  on  the  8th  of  No- 
vember he  re-embarked  his  army,  though  not  without  a  sharp  attack 
of  the  French,  in  which  he  sustained  cruel  loss.  The  siege  had  prob- 
ably cost  the  lives  of  nearly  4,000  men.  At  all  events  on  the  20th  of 
October  the  muster-roll  showed  6,884  soldiers  drawing  pay;  when  the 
fleet  arrived  at  Portsmouth  and  Plymouth  their  numbers  had  sunk  to 
2,989." 

It  is  interesting  to  note  the  close  resemblance  between  the 
history  of  that  expedition  and  that  of  the  operations  in  the 
Crimea  two  centuries  later. 

"  The  English  public,  with  grim  humor,  called  the  Isle  of  Rhe,  which 
had  swallowed  up  so  many  lives,  the  *  Isle  of  Rue.'  '  Every  man 
knows,'  wrote  Denzil  Holies,  '  that  since  England  was  England  it  re- 
ceived not  so  dishonorable  a  blow;  four  Colonels  slain,  besides  the 
colors  lost;  thirty-two  taken  by  the  enemy.' " 


42 


In  one  of  his  next  chapters  Mr.  Adams  gives  the  story  of  a 
foreign  expedition  by  a  British  armed  force  of  a  very  different 
quality,  which  gave  very  different  results.  It  is  needless  to  say 
that  the  narration  which  follows  concerns  a  small  force  of  6,000 
auxiliary,  "  the  immortal  6,000,"  as  Sir  William  Temple  calls 
them,  sent  out  by  the  Lord  Protector,  who  were  engaged  in  the 
battle  of  the  Dunes  on  the  14th  of  June,  1657.  Just  before  the 
engagement  began  the  Prince  of  Conde,  who  was  on  the  other 
side,  turned  to  the  young  Duke  of  Gloucester,  who  was  serving 
with  him,  and  asked  the  Duke  if  he  had  ever  seen  a  battle. 
"  No,"  replied  the  Duke.  "  Well,  then,"  continued  Conde,  "  in 
half  an  hour  you  will  see  one  lost."  Mr.  Adams'  narrative  is 
this: 

*'  The  action  was  begun  by  the  English,  who  led  by  Major-General 
Morgan — for  Lockhart  was  too  ill  to  leave  his  carriage — advanced  eag- 
erly against  the  Spanish  right,  and  climbing  the  dunes  with  push  of 
pike  swept  the  foemen  clear  of  the  very  summits  and  down  their 
crumbling  slopes,  exhibiting  such  a  combination  of  fire  and  coolness 
that  Don  John  exclaimed — 'the  French  fight  like  men;  these  English 
like  devils.'  *  *  *  The  Spaniards  ran,  andTurenne's  victory  was 
complete.  In  no  small  measure  was  it  due  to  the  steady  courage  and 
fierce  attack  of  the  English  soldiers." 

From  that  time  to  this  the  record  of  the  achievements  of 
British  valor  has  been  unvaried.  There  has  been  at  the  same 
time  complete  lack  of  variety  in  the  record  of  the  incompetence 
and  ignorance  of  the  British  War  Office. 

Coming  down  to  the  time  of  the  Crimean  war,  we  find  the 
following  conditions,  according  to  Lord  Wolseley.  He  has 
written  of  it  as  follows  (Nineteenth  Century,  March,  1878,  p. 
436,  et  seq.) : 

"The  history  of  the  Crimean  war  is  still  fresh  in  the  memory  of  those 
who  took  part  in  it.  Never  was  any  expedition  planned  by  a  home  gov- 
ernment with  more  reckless  ignorance  of  war  and  its  requirements  than 
that  which  landed  at  Eupatoria.  At  the  beginning  of  the  campaign  our 
Treasury  was  as  parsimonious  as  it  was  subsequently  lavish  in  expendi- 
ture. About  twenty-four  thousand  British  soldiers— no  finer  body  of  men 
have  ever  worn  Her  Majesty's  uniform — were  hurled  ashore  without  the 
means  of  carrying  their  wounded,  and  even  without  sufficient  tools  to  bury 
their  dead.  British  discipline  in  two  or  three  hard-fought  battles  won  for 
England  a  brilliant  but  a  short-lived  success  ;  and  when,  through  the  mili- 
tary ignorance  of  those  in  Downing  street,  who  planned  the  campaign, 


43 


that  devoted  little  army  dwindled  down  almost  to  a  handful  of  half- 
starved  scarecrows,  those  who  had  starved  us  through  their  ignorant 
parsimony  sent  out  commissioners,  whose  avowed  business  it  was  to  select 
a  victim  from  among  our  generals  on  whom  to  cast  the  blame.  They 
selected  the  ablest  of  them  as  their  scape-goat,  and  held  him  up  to  public 
opprobrium  because  he  had  not  made  a  road  from  Balaklava  to  the  camp, 
although  they  knew  full  well  he  had  neither  the  tools  nor  the  labor  at  his 
disposal  for  such  an  undertaking. '' 

»  *  *  *  # 

"  I  have  alluded  to  the  military  ignorance  of  our  ministers  in  the  Cri- 
mean war  ;  here  is  an  example  of  it.  A  letter  was  read  in  the  House  of 
Parliament  one  evening  from  an  officer  in  the  field,  in  which  he  referred 
to  the  want  of  all  means  for  conveying  our  sick  and  wounded  to  the  ships 
for  embarkation,  adding  that  our  army  had  to  depend  upon  the  French 
•acolets  lent  to  us  for  that  purpose.  The  English  minister  who  was  re- 
sponsible for  army  affairs  at  once  got  up  and  indignantly  denied  the  state- 
ment, adding  that  he  knew  it  to  be  untrue,  because  he  had  the  best  au- 
thority for  asserting  positively  that  there  were  a  hundred  hospital  pan- 
niers at  that  moment  in  the  Crimea.  He  might  just  as  well  have  said 
there  were  so  many  toothpicks  there— as  a  hospital  pannier,  which  he 
evidently  thought  was  a  conveyance  of  some  sort,  is  nothing  more  than  a 
wicker-work  basket,  made  in  a  peculiar  manner,  for  the  reception  of  medi- 
cines, operating  instruments,  and  other  medical  appliances.  The  page  of 
Hansard  which  records  that  reply  is  the  gravest  of  all  possible  satires 
upon  our  war  administration  of  that  time." 

***** 

"  Curious  stories  without  end  might  be  told  to  illustrate  my  statement 
as  to  the  inefficiency  of  many  of  those  who  composed  the  staff  which  origin- 
ally embarked  in  1854.  Here  is  one  as  it  was  told  me  by  an  eye-witness  : 
While  the  army  was  in  Turkey,  before  it  left  for  the  Crimea,  an  important 
military  operation  had  to  be  undertaken.  A  few  days  before  that  named 
for  the  operation  my  friend  went  to  a  staff  officer  in  high  position,  who 
was  his  immediate  superior,  and  whose  duty  it  was  to  make  all  the  neces 
sary  arrangements,  and  to  draw  up  instructions  for  all  the  departments 
and  general  officers  concerned,  and  asked  if  he  had  any  orders  to  give. 
The  reply  was  :  '  No,  I  have  not  yet  thought  over  the  matter,  but  I  will 
see  to  it  by-and-by.'  The  next  day  the  question  was  repeated  with  a 
similar  result,  and  upon  the  third  day — the  day  before  this  very  compli- 
cated and  difficult  operation  was  to  have  taken  place — as  my  friend  re- 
peated his  question  he  saw  that  his  superior  was  whittling  a  piece  of  stick. 
That  superior  was  an  amiable  old  gentleman  and  an  excellent  carpenter. 
He  listened  calmly  to  my  friend,  who  was  rather  excited,  seeing  that 
nothing  was  ready  for  the  move,  and  that  no  attempt  had  as  yet  been 
made  to  prepare  for  it.  After  a  pause,  the  man  on  whom  for  the  moment 
a  great  national  responsibility  rested,  looked  up  and  said  :  'Perhaps,  Cap- 


44 


tain  ,  you  do  not  know  what  I  am  doing.'    'No,  sir,'  replied  my 

friend.  'Well/  said  the  old  gentleman,  'upon  strolling  about  here  this 
morning  I  perceived  that  there  was  no  latch  or  bolt  to  Lord  Raglan's  cup- 
board, and  I  am  making  one  as  an  agreeable  surprise  for  him. '  Here  was 
an  army  about  to  begin  a  most  serious  undertaking,  the  preparations  and 
arrangements  for  which  could  only  be  made  by  this  high  official ;  but  so 
utterly  was  he  incapable  of  taking  in  the  serious  responsibility  that  rested 
on  him,  so  ignorant  was  he  of  the  duties  attached  to  his  position  that  he 
employed  his  time  in  carpentering  when  all  his  intellect,  all  his  energies, 
should  have  been  devoted  to  the  great  duty  which  devolved  upon  him." 

Lord  Wolseley  says  further: 

"  During  the  epoch  I  have  referred  to  (the  period  before  the  Crimean 
war),  the  army  of  England  was  unworthy  of  being  classed  as  a  fighting 
implement  fit  to  be  employed  against  an  enemy  more  formidable  than  a 
Kaffir  or  an  Asiatic,  and,  even  when  so  engaged,  gained  its  ends  always 
with  difficulty,  and  not  always  without  discredit  and  disaster.  It  was  a 
police  force  dressed  in  the  guise  of  soldiers.  It  was  a  body— a  fine  muscu- 
lar body  certainly — without  a  soul.  All  ranks  were  full  cf  courage — with- 
out doubt  the  first  and  greatest  factor  in  military  excellence — but  all  other 
warlike  instincts  were  wanting.  Its  generals,  men  of  Peninsular  experi- 
ence, were  old  in  body  and  old  fashioned  in  mind,  while  its  regimental 
officers  were  entirely  ignorant  of  their  prof  ession.  They  would  have  made 
the  finest  private  soldiers  in  the  world,  but  they  were  as  little  acquainted 
with  the  art  and  science  of  war  as  the  rank  and  file  they  were  commissioned 
to  lead." 

It  is  quite  apparent  from  the  events  thus  far  in  the  South 
African  war,  that  there  has  been  no  substantial  change  in  this 
respect. 

The  British  transportation  service  in  the  Crimea  broke  down 
under  a  line  of  communications  of  the  length  of  seven  miles. 
The  reason  was,  as  is  very  apparent  from  the  quotation  from  Lord 
Wolseley  already  made,  the  absolute  incompetency  and  ignor- 
ance of  the  British  War  Office,  and  of  British  officers.  Some 
further  facts  will  throw  light  on  the  condition  of  things  at  that 
time.  The  English  commanding  general,  as  events  proved, 
had  practically  no  knowledge  or  information  as  to  the  numbers 
of  the  opposing  forces,  or  the  field  of  operations.  After  he 
had  been  in  the  Crimea  for  several  months,  it  was  learned  that 
the  fortress  of  Sevastopol,  which  he  was  expected  to  invest  and 
capture,  still  had  regular  communications  open  from  the 


45 


Crimea  to  the  main  land,  by  a  bridge.  This  bridge  had  been 
built  for  at  least  four  or  five  years.  But  no  one  in  the  British 
army,  or  the  War  Office,  had  learned  of  its  existence,  until  it 
was  found  on  a  map  "  sent  home  by  the  captain  of  a  vessel,  who 
obtained  the  information  from  some  of  the  Tartars." 

The  dearth  of  maps  in  the  British  Army  was  the  same  then 
as  to-day.    They  have  learned  nothing. 

Men  were  dying  in  the  British  army  from  cold  and  starva- 
tion, when  abundant  supplies  of  food  and  clothing  lay  in  the 
Harbor  of  Balaklava,  less  than  ten  miles  away.  The  road  from 
Balaklava  to  the  British  camp,  on  which  the  army  depended 
for  all  its  supplies,  had  completely  broken  down.  It  was  quite 
apparent  to  an  officer  of  ordinary  intelligence  that  that  condi- 
tion of  affairs  was  practically  certain  to  come.  The  result  was 
a  degree  of  suffering  and  deprivation,  which  for  the  time  being 
largely  destroyed  the  efficiency  of  the  British  troops  as  a  fight- 
ing organization.  Strange  to  say,  this  condition  of  affairs  was 
officially  unknown  to  the  head  of  the  War  Office.  Such  a  state- 
ment would  appear  incredible,  if  it  were  not  supported  by  the 
most  conclusive  testimony.  Such  testimony  is  to  be  found  in 
the  evidence  of  the  Duke  of  Newcastle  himself,  who  was  at  the 
time  the  head  of  the  British  War  Office. 

The  Duke  of  Newcastle  testified  before  the  Koebuck  Com- 
mittee : 

"Qu.  14,426.  And  I  am  bound  to  say  that  some  four  or  five  months  after- 
ward we  ascertained  what  was  not  before  known  in  this  country  or  else- 
where before  that  time,  that  the  Russians  had  another  means  of  access 
into  the  Crimea,  some  miles  to  the  eastward  of  Perekop,  by  a  bridge 
*  *  *  a  bridge  which  was  commenced  by  the  Russians  some  four 
or  five  years  ago,  by  which  they  had  obtained  a  good  road  *  *  * 
I  have  seen  apian  which  was  sent  home  by  the  captain  of  a  vessel  who  ob- 
tained the  information  from  some  of  the  Tartars.  *  *  * 
*  *  *  "Is  there  no  other  information  ?  A.  No." 
****  *  *  *** 

"  Qu.  14,588.  Were  you  ever  informed  that  the  troops  were  ill-fed,  and 
that  the  horses  had  little  or  insufficient  forage  ?  A.  Of  course,  I  received 
that  information.  As  I  said  before,  in  common  with  the  rest  of  the  world. 
I  was  painfully  aware  of  it. 

"  Qu.  14,589.  I  mean  officially  ?  A.  No,  I  think  not. 

"  Qu.  14,590.  You  obtained  all  that  information  from  the  newspapers, 
did  you  ?  A.  No  ;  from  complaints  principally  from  persons  that  had 
suffered. 


46 


"  Qu.  14,591.  You  were  not  informed  that  the  failure  on  the  part  of  the 
commissariat  to  feed  the  troops  was  occasionedby  the  failure  of  other  de- 
partments in  their  duties?   A.  Not  officially . 

"  Qu.  14,592.  "When  did  you  first  receive  information  of  the  breakup  of 
the  road  from  Balaklava  to  the  camp?  A  I  do  not  remember  the  exact 
date  ;  it  was  one  of  those  facts  that  unfortunately  grow  upon  one  as  events 
follow  one  another ;  and  it  was  seen  by  its  consequences  that  things  were 
not  carried  to  the  front. 

"  Qu.  14,593.  Can  you  tell  whether  any  information  was  given  you  of 
the  probable  failure  of  the  road  before  the  failure  took  place?  A.  Cer- 
tainly not. 

'*  Qu.  14,594.  So  that  you  remained  altogether  in  the  dark  as  to  the 
chance  of  the  non-supply  of  the  troops  arising  from  the  failure  of  the  road? 
A.  Tes. 

"  Qu.  14,595.  So  soon  as  you  heard  of  the  failure  of  the  road  you  took 
steps,  did  you  not,  to  have  a  road  made  of  some  sort  or  another  ?  A  No, 
I  cannot  say  that  I  did  ;  because  it  was  impossible  for  me  to  be  able  to 
judge  whether  the  thing  was  practicable  then.  There  are  things  which  it 
is  absolutely  necessary  to  leave  to  officers  on  the  spot." 

Lord  Roberts  also  gives  us  in  his  autobiographical  "  Eorty- 
One  Years  in  India,"  an  account  of  the  difficulties  which  have 
always  surrounded  this  problem  of  transportation  in  India. 
The  first  incident,  which  he  narrates,  concerns  the  expedition 
under  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Robert  Napier,  to  Abyssinia. 
The  expeditionary  force  numbered  a  little  less  than  14,000 
men.* 

"  Profiting  by  the  experience  of  the  Crimean  War  the  Government 
was  determined  that  the  mobility  of  the  force  should  not  be  hampered  by 
want  of  food  and  clothing.  Stores  of  all  descriptions  were  dispatched 
in  unstinted  quantities  from  England,  and  three  of  the  steamers  in  which 
they  were  conveyed  were  fitted  up  as  hospital  ships.  But  food,  clothing 
and  stores  however  liberally  supplied  would  not  take  the  army  to  Mag- 
dala  without  transport. 

"The  question  as  to  the  most  suitable  organization  for  the  Land  Trans- 
port Corps  occupied  a  good  deal  of  Sir  Robert  Napier's  attention  while  the 
expedition  was  being  fitted  out,  and  caused  a  considerable  amount  of  cor- 
respondence between  him  and  the  Bombay  Government.  The  Commis- 
sary-General wished  to  keep  the  corps  under  his  own  orders,  and  ob- 
jected to  its  being  given  an  entirely  military  organization.  Sir  Robert 
Napier  preferred  to  establish  the  corps  on  an  independent  basis  but  was  at 


*  The  numbers  actually  despatched  from  India  were  13,548,  of  whom 
3,786  were  Europeans.  In  addition  a  company  of  Royal  Engineers  was 
sent  from  England. 


47 


first  overruled  by  the  Bombay  Government.  While  acting  in  accordance 
with  their  orders,  the  Commander-in-Chief  wrote  :  '  I  believe  that  the 
success  of  systems  depends  more  on  the  men  who  work  them  than  on 
the  systems  themselves ;  but  I  cannot  accept  without  protest  a  decision  to 
throw  such  a  body  of  men  as  the  drivers  of  our  transport  animals  will  be 
(if  we  get  them)  on  an  expedition  in  a  foreign  country  without  a  very  com- 
plete organization  to  secure  order  and  discipline.'  Eventually  Sir  Robert 
got  his  own  way,  but  much  valuable  time  had  been  lost,  and  the  corps  was 
organized  on  too  small  a  scale  ;  *  the  officers  and  non-commissioned 
officers  were  not  sent  to  -Zula  in  sufficient  time  to  take  charge  of  the  trans- 
port animals  as  they  arrived. 

"  A  compact,  properly  supervised  train  of  2,600  mules,  with  serviceable, 
well-fitting  pack-saddles,  was  sent  from  the  Punjab,  and  from  Bombay 
came  1,400  mules  and  ponies,  and  5,600  bullocks,  but,  these  numbers  prov- 
ing altogether  inadequate  to  the  needs  of  the  expedition,  they  were  supple- 
mented by  animals  purchased  in  Persia,  Egypt,  and  on  the  shores  of  the 
Mediterranean.  The  men  to  look  after  them  were  supplied  from  the  same 
sources,  but  their  number,  even  if  they  had  been  efficient,  was  insufficient, 
and  they  were  a  most  unruly  and  unmanageable  lot.  They  demanded 
double  the  pay  for  which  they  had  enlisted,  and  struck  work  in  a  body 
because  their  demand  was  not  at  once  complied  with.  They  refused  to 
take  charge  of  the  five  mules  each  man  was  hired  to  look  after,  and  when 
that  number  was  reduced  to  three,  they  insisted  that  one  should  be  used  as 
a  mount  for  the  driver.  But  the  worst  part  of  the  whole  organization, 
or,  rather,  want  of  organization,  was  that  there  had  been  no  attempt  to 
fit  the  animals  with  pack-saddles,  some  of  which  were  sent  from  England, 
some  from  India,  and  had  to  be  adjusted  to  the  mules  after  they  had  been 
landed  in  Abyssinia,  where  there  was  not  an  establishment  to  make  the 
necessary  alterations.  The  consequence  was  that  the  wretched  animals 
became  cruelly  galled,  and  in  a  few  weeks  a  large  percentage  were  unfit  for 
work,  and  had  to  be  sent  to  the  sick  depot. 

"  Other  results  of  having  no  properly  arranged  transport  train  and  no 
supervision  or  discipline,  were  that  mules  were  lost  or  stolen,  starved  for 
want  of  food,  or  famished  from  want  of  water.  The  condition  of  the 
unfortunate  animals  was  such  that,  though  they  had  been  but  a,  few  weeks 
in  the  country,  when  they  were  required  to  proceed  to  Senafe,  only  sixty- 
seven  miles,  a  very  small  proportion  were  able  to  accomplish  the  march ; 
hundreds  died  on  the  way,  and  their  carcases,  quickly  decomposing  in  the 
hot  sun,  became  a  fruitful  source  of  dangerous  disease  to  the  force." 
*  *  *  *  * 

It  was  the  same  old  story — the  thing  which  almost  invariably 
happens,  the  inevitable  breakdown  in  transportation,  that  regu- 


*  At  first  it  was  thought  that  10,000  mules  with  a  Coolie  corps 
3,000  strong  would  suffice,  but  before  the  expedition  was  over  it  was  found 
necessary  to  purchase  18,000  mules,  1,500  ponies,  1,800  donkeys,  12,000 
camels  and  8,400  bullocks. 


48 


larly  takes  place  with,  a  British  foreign  expeditionary  force.  It 
arises  always  from  the  same  cause — the  ignorance  and  the  in- 
competence of  the  British  War  Office. 

We  come  next  to  Lord  Boberts'  account  of  the  conditions 
when  he  took  command  of  the  Kuram  field  force : 

"It  was  a  proud,  albeit  a  most  anxious,  moment  for  me  when  I  assumed 
command  of  the  Kuram  Field  Force  ;  though  a  local  Major-General,  I 
was  only  a  Major  in  my  regiment,  and,  save  for  a  short  experience  on  one 
occasion  in  Lushai,  I  had  never  had  an  opportunity  of  commanding  troops 
in  the  field.  Earnestly  longing  for  success,  I  was  intensely  interested  in 
ascertaining  the  qualities  of  those  who  were  to  aid  me  in  achieving  it. 
To  this  end,  I  lost  no  time  in  taking  stock  of  the  several  officers  and  corps 
who  were  to  be  associated  with  me,  some  of  whom  were  personally  known 
to  me,  while  others  I  had  never  met  before  ;  and  in  endeavoring  to  satisfy 
myself  as  to  their  qualifications  and  fitness  for  their  several  posts,  I  could 
not  help  feeling  that  they  must  be  equally  anxious  as  to  my  capability  for 
command,  and  that  the  inspection  must  be  of  nearly  as  great  moment  to 
them  as  to  me. 

cc  The  results  of  a  very  close  investigation  were  tolerably  satisfactory, 
but  there  were  weak  points  in  my  armour  which  gave  me  grave  cause  for 
anxiety. 

"I  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  force  was  not  numerically 
strong  for  the  heavy  difficult  task  before  it — in  the  first  instance,  the 
occupation  of  the  Kuram  valley  and  the  expulsion  of  all  Afghan  garri- 
sons south  of  the  Shutargardan  Pass,  and  in  the  second,  as  opportunity 
might  offer,  the  pushing  my  reconnaissances  into  the  Khost  valley,  and,  if 
military  considerations  wouldadmit,  the  dislodging  the  Amir's  adminis- 
tration from  that  tract  of  country,  so  as  to  prevent  the  Kobul  govern- 
ment drawing  supplies  from  it.  Finally,  I  was  directed  to  explore  the 
roads  leading  to  the  unknown  region  beyond  Khost. 

"The  Shutargarden  was  not  less  than  180  miles  from  Khost,  the  garri- 
son of  which  station  would,  on  my  departure,  be  reduced  to  a  minimum, 
and  Eawal  Pindi,  the  nearest  place  from  which  aid  could  be  procured, 
was  130  miles  still  further  off,  separated  from  Khost  by  an  execrable  road 
and  the  swiftly  flowing  river  Indus,  crossed  by  a  precarious  bridge  of 
boats.  It  had  to  be  taken  into  account  also  that  the  various  Afridi  tribes 
were  watching  their  opportunity,  and  at  the  first  favourable  moment,  in 
common  with  the  tribesmen  nearer  Kuram,  they  might  be  expected  to 
take  advantage  of  our  weakness  and  attack  our  convoys  and  the  small 
posts  which  had  necessarily  to  be  established  along  our  line  of  communi- 
cation. 

"The  attitude  of  the  Mahometan  sepoys,  of  whom  there  were  large 
numbers  in  four  out  of  my  six  Native  Infantry  regiments,  was  also  a 
cause  of  considerable  anxiety,  for  I  was  aware  that  they  were  not  alto- 
gether happy  at  the  prospect  of  taking  part  in  a  war  against  their  co- 


49 


religionist,  the  Ruler  of  Afghanistan,  and  that  the  mullas  were  already 
urging  them  to  desert  our  cause. 

"  Furthermore,  I  discovered  that  my  only  British  Infantry  regiment, 
the  2nd  Battalion  of  the  8th  Foot,  was  sickly  to  a  degree,  and  therefore  in 
an  unserviceable  condition.  It  was  largely  composed  of  quite  young, 
unacclimatized  soldiers,  peculiarly  susceptible  to  fever,  that  terrible 
scourge  which  fills  the  hospitals  of  our  Punjab  stations  in  the  autumn  of 
each  year.  I  rode  out  to  meet  the  battalion  on  its  way  into  Kohat,  and 
was  horrified  to  see  the  long  line  of  doolies  and  ambulance-carts  by  which 
it  was  accompanied. 

"  The  inefficient  state  of  the  transport  added  to  my  anxieties.  "  Notwith- 
standing the  difficulties  experienced  in  former  campaigns  from  the  same 
cause,  the  Government  had  neglected  to  take  any  steps  for  the  organization 
of  a  proper  transport  service  while  we  were  at  peace;  consequently,  when 
everything  should  have  been  ready  for  a  start,  confusion  reigned  supreme 
in  this  all-important  department.  Large  numbers  of  camels,  mules  and 
bullocks  arrived  daily,  picked  up  at  exorbitant  prices  from  anyone  who 
would  supply  them ;  but  most  of  these  animals  were  quite  unfit  to  enter 
upon  the  hard  work  of  a  campaign,  and  with  a  totally  inexperienced  and 
quite  insufficient  staff  of  officers  to  supervise  them,  it  was  evident  that  the 
majority  must  succumb  at  an  early  date." 


THE  POSSIBILITY  OF  A  SOLUTION  OF  THE  PROB- 
LEM  OF  TRANSPORTATION  BY  THE  BRITISH 
ARMY,  UNDER.  EXISTING  CONDITIONS. 


Here,  of  course,  all  that  can  be  done  is  to  state  conditions. 

Results,  especially  the  results  of  a  serious  and  bitterly  eon- 
tested  war,  are  beyond  the  knowledge  of  finite  human  beings. 

The  conditions,  however,  that  we  have  thus  far  ascertained 
to  exist  in  South  Africa  to-day  are  these : 

I.  The  impossibility  of  handling  the  problem  of  transporta- 
tion and  supply,  for  any  large  army  in  South  Africa,  by  any 
means  other  than  by  railway. 

II.  The  extreme  ease  of  the  processes  of  destruction,  with 
the  extreme  difficulty  of  the  processes  of  construction,  of  rail- 
way communications,  in  the  present  South  African  field  of 
operations. 


50 


III.  The  absence  of  preparation,  on  the  part  of  the  British 
Army,  for  the  handling  of  the  present  problem  of  transportation 
and  supply. 

IV.  The  fact,  that  the  reason  for  that  absence  of  preparation 
is  to  be  found  in  the  immense  and  dense  ignorance,  and  in- 
competence, of  the  British  War  Office. 

In  the  face  of  these  existing  conditions,  we  come  to  a  further 
question:  What  are  the  probabilities,  as  nearly  as  we  can  fore- 
cast them,  that  the  British  War  Office  will  be  able  to  solve  the 
transportation  and  supply  problem,  within  any  reasonable  period 
of  time  ?  In  case  of  a  prolonged  war,  they  will  have  many  other 
problems  to  solve.  But  what  are  the  probabilities,  as  to  their 
being  able  to  solve  this  one,  that  is,  to  solve  it  within  any  reason- 
able time  ?  For  it  is  hardly  to  be  deemed  within  the  reasonable 
probabilities,  that  the  entire  civilised  world,  especially  these 
United  States,  will  quietly  sit  by  and  wait  for  the  British  Gov- 
ernment to  pursue  to  the  end  a  war  of  extermination,  even  on 
the  assumption,  that  the  British  people  would  be  willing  to 
carry  the  cost  of  such  a  war,  in  men  and  money.  The  British 
people,  be  it  noted,  have  not  as  yet  uttered  their  judgment  on 
the  existing  situation.  Assuming,  however,  that  they  are  will- 
ing to  pay  the  cost,  in  men  and  money,  of  a  war  of  extermina- 
tion against  the  South  African  Republics,  what  are  the  prob- 
abilities, even  then,  of  success  to  the  British  Government  % 

Bearing  in  mind,  at  all  times,  the  almost  infinite  margin,  that 
must  be  allowed  for  the  contingencies  of  war,  let  us  look  at  some 
of  the  remaining  features  of  the  situation  which  have  not  as  yet 
been  fully  considered. 

The  first  of  these  features  is  to  be  found  in  the  extreme 
mobility  of  the  forces  of  the  Burghers,  in  contrast  with  the  ex- 
treme immobility  of  the  British.  The  contrast  is  overwhelming. 
On  the  one  hand,  the  Burghers,  most  of  them  mounted  men, 
operating  in  a  friendly  population,  accustomed  to  long  journeys 
on  short  rations,  having  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  country, 
can  move  in  small  bodies,  in  all  directions,  almost  at  will.  Es- 
pecially, they  can  move  with  the  greatest  ease  in  the  small  de- 
tachments, which  will  be  needed  for  a  war  on  railway  com- 
munications. 


51 


On  the  other  hand,  the  British  forces,  operating  in  a  hostile 
population,  with  their  ignorance  of  the  country,  without  cavalry, 
compelled  to  move  in  comparatively  large  bodies,  will  be  chained 
to  the  lines  of  railway  by  the  necessities  of  the  problem  of  trans- 
portation and  supply.  ISTo  doubt,  they  can  send  out  recon- 
noitering  and  scouting  parties  for  short  distances  from  the  rail- 
road. But  for  the  present,  they  will  be  unable  to  move  any 
considerable  bodies  of  troops  for  any  considerable  distance  from 
the  line  of  the  railways. 

The  situation,  in  this  respect,  is  almost  that  of  a  contest  be- 
tween a  man  who  has  complete  freedom  of  movement  and  one 
who  is  weighted  by  a  ball  and  chain.  We  may  go  even  further, 
and  say,  that  it  is  a  contest  between  a  light  and  agile  boxer  and 
a  giant  chained  to  a  railway  track. 

The  immobility  of  the  British  troops  under  present  condi- 
tions is  made  still  more  clear,  if  we  consider  the  matter  of 
wagon  roads. 

Taking  first  the  situation  around  Colenso  and  Ladysmith,  if 
we  look  at  the  map,  we  see  that  there  is  only  one  main  road  from 
Colenso  to  Ladysmith  direct.  To  the  west  of  that  there  are 
roundabout  roads  of  an  inferior  character;  one  leading 
through  TJnderbroek;  another  from  Frere,  through  Spring- 
field and  Dewdrop;  another  by  Zunckles  and  Bethany, 
through  Acton  Homes  and  Dewdrop.  Taking  the  other 
side  of  the  main  road,  on  the  east,  the  only  road  of 
any  kind  is  the  circuitous  one  through  Weenen,  Weenen 
being  on  the  main  road  from  Weston  to  Ladysmith.  The 
distance  by  this  other  easterly  route  from  Colenso  to  Ladysmith 
through  Weenen,  according  to  the  map,  roughly,  must  be  as 
much  as  seventy  miles.  The  region  about  Colenso  and  Lady- 
smith is  one  of  mountains  and  streams.  Movements  by  troops 
are  a  virtual  impossibility  in  such  a  country,  except  by  roads. 
Artillery  and  supply  wagons  must  have  roads  of  good  quality, 
if  the  movements  of  troops  are  to  have  any  reasonable  degree 
of  celerity.  The  roads  in  Natal  are  not  of  good  quality.  Any 
body  of  troops  that  moves  in  that  country  with  any  considerable 
number  of  wagons,  or  with  any  considerable  force  of  artillery, 
must  necessarily  move  slowly.  Any  attempt  at  an  advance  by 
the  British  over  any  road  in  that  district  is  certain  to  come  im- 


52 


mediately  to  the  knowledge  of  the  Boer  forces.  It  is  a 
probability  so  strong  as  to  amount  to  a  virtual  certainty,  that 
every  road  of  importance  was  long  ago  blocked  by  some  kind  of 
entrenchment.  Even  if  that  be  not  so,  the  construction  across 
any  road  of  field-works  which  if  manned  by  fairly  steady  troops 
will  make  an  impassable  barrier  to  any  advance  from  the  front, 
is  a  thing  which  can  be  accomplished  in  a  very  short  space  of 
time.  It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  the  British  advance  from 
Colenso  to  Ladysmith,  no  matter  by  what  route  it  may  be  at- 
tempted, must  of  necessity  be  an  advance  against  entrenchments 
on  the  front.  We  have  of  late  heard  much  of  "  traps,"  set  by 
the  Boers  for  the  British  troops.  That  term  is  an  entire  mis- 
nomer, for  the  reason  that  no  soldier  of  ordinary  intelligence 
would  have  supposed  that  officers  in  any  civilised  army  would 
be  guilty  of  the  mad  indiscretion  of  plunging  their  troops 
against  earthworks  manned  with  good  steady  riflemen  in  front, 
without  skirmishers  thrown  out  in  advance  who  should  apprise 
the  main  body  of  infantry  of  the  conditions  which  they  were 
approaching.  The  simple  fact  is,  that  a  large  number  of  the 
British  army  officers,  who  hold  the  positions  of  high  com- 
mand, are  so  ignorant  of  the  most  elementary  rules  and 
principles  of  the  art  of  modern  warfare,  that  they  neglect  all 
the  ordinary  precautions  that  would  be  adopted  in  a  campaign 
against  any  alert  enemy,  on  any  military  field.  It  is  not  that 
the  Boers  have  been  remarkably  wily,  but  that  the  British 
officers  have  been  remarkably  stupid  and  ignorant.  It  was 
mere  madness  to  push  forward  solid  lines  or  solid  columns  of 
infantry,  without  scouts  or  skirmishers,  until  they  got  within 
very  short  range  of  well-manned  fieldworks.  But  the  fact  that 
they  did  so,  as  before  stated,  is  an  evidence  not  of  superior 
astuteness  on  the  part  of  the  Burghers,  but  of  immense  ard  in- 
tense dullness  and  ignorance  on  the  part  of  the  British  officers. 

The  fundamental  consideration,  however,  is  that  the  immo- 
bility of  the  British  troops  is  a  necessary  result,  not  merely  of 
the  ordinary  impossibility  of  supplying  any  large  force  by  any 
other  means  than  a  line  of  railway,  but  of  the  absence  of  any 
reasonable  number  of  good  roads,  in  the  newly  settled  country 
which  is  the  present  field  of  operations. 

Precisely  the  same  considerations  apply  to  the  operations  on 


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tenet    ^       Krefntei^l /j^ 
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'ra*        I  ,y     /    0<?«/-'/>tc/)<'i"  / 


&  ^ 


9fr  W: 


J  Jffurokwcfh- 


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lamusa 

JTi&kerk's  Jtuet      \  M 

J>adimoe  SidX  \y'  'AT  "ii  /  gheppnrd^.. 
J^.d^f^^n^n?  ^  stor 

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<™.^J  IN.0-*.  * 

Moshwedu 
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y  /'/^fv^i/reritori 


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Groot  Constanac 
DPSTAD  o  N 

^       WnnJer  Jbnlcin 


y<V/\  3>rieTorit 
fOONSTAD 


.indley  Jffitz. 


o 


\  <z^&>  oJt>raaoa7ioeX\. 

Carlton,  „Zo 


r/,i 


KIMBERLE^ 

Jrat  

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fipy -t/brztein  a 

dc7\J?iver) 


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Poplar  Grove  OZceM^Wet 


o  1/ 


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meyneJtJCloof 


buoemfS^teTi 


■JBeVrriont 


WMejPtlifi  0JiraM  2>an 

-°JfCoffI^Ml 
(fa 

V 

I O  JtdifiJbn 


Berp  Dewk  Dor) 


foZertie-  VV  '^bv 
rMotge.         ^  ' 

■     ^ypte/'^f^y  B  j%A      S       U      T  O 
°reyateyaner^  £.D>pefu„g  Nek 

LAND 

c>?c/  /"       /^(S  oSerea- 

 "0990 


•  /-LA/,;';? 


[Pal  T'onlt -in  Sidy 


lipStov 


psburg  /l  ^ 


aTerlapS 


■dpfP). 


FIELD  OF  OPERATIONS 

ON  THB  LINE  OP 

LORD  METHUEN'S 
ADVANCE 


gNIITfo  FIELD 

f^7 


3Si(ua'<!-^'-<:,a''ROUXVlLLE J, 


jfrundelJ  r* 

D>.  dal  ^Wj/f  iTTO^.^  OTwerdale 

nrddlinlebP^     I  , 


°  ©HerschelK 

■^■X    J.<t<t>  tircy 

V,niers+adN.  '^SS^^o 
^«eV  Jo. 


SCALE   OF  STATUTE  MILES. 

30  *? 
30Miles  =  1  Inch. 


EXPLANATION. 

RAILWAYS  

ROADS.   — 


53 


Lord  Methuen's  line  of  advance  at  Modder  Kiver.  At  that  point 
the  map  shows  that  practically  there  is  no  route  by  which  troops 
can  move  towards  Kimberley  except  the  line  of  the  railroad. 
The  railroad  the  Burghers  have  already  blocked,  so  that  it  is 
apparently  impossible  for  it  to  be  carried  by  any  British  force  at 
present  available.  The  only  roads  laid  down  upon  the  map 
from  the  Modder  Kiver  to  Kimberley  are  two ;  the  comparatively 
direct  one,  east  of  the  railroad,  and  the  more  circuitous  one, 
through  Jacobsdal. 

It  is  a  virtual  certainty,  that  both  of  these  roads  have  been 
strongly  entrenched  by  the  Boers.  It  is  evident  from  the 
events  that  have  already  taken  place,  that  any  advance  by  Lord 
Methuen  is  at  present  a  virtual  impossibility.  In  this  region, 
too,  as  well  as  in  the  region  around  Ladysmith  and  Colenso, 
movements  of  British  troops  in  large  bodies  are  made  practi- 
cally impossible,  by  reason  simply  of  this  fundamental  fact,  the 
lack  of  practicable  roads. 

In  both  these  regions,  moreover,  and  in  every  portion  of  South 
Africa  which  is  likely  for  a  considerable  time  to  be  the  field  of 
military  operations,  the  further  point  already  mentioned  is  to 
be  noted  in  this  connection,  and  that  is,  the  large  number  of 
rivers  and  smaller  streams.  It  has  already  been  mentioned, 
that,  as  to  railways,  every  stream  makes  a  point  of  vulnerability 
in  its  bridge. 

Quite  aside  from  that  fact,  however,  is  the  further  one,  most 
material,  that  every  stream  makes  a  strong  line  of  defense. 
Lord  Methuen  has  already  found  out  that  fact  to  his  cost  at 
Modder  Eiver.  But  this  entire  region  is  a  series  of  rivers. 
Each  one  of  them  will  be  an  obstacle  as  difficult  of  passage  as 
the  Tugela  and  the  Modder,  of  which  Lord  Methuen  and  Sir 
Bedvers  Buller  have  already  had  experience.  If  we  were  to 
assume,  that  Sir  Bedvers  Buller  could  get  his  army  across  the 
Tugela  River  at  Colenso,  he  would  next  have  to  get  over  the 
Sand  at  Ladysmith ;  thereafter  he  would  have  to  force  Sundays 
River  north  of  Elandslaagte ;  and  thereafter  still,  the  many 
rivers  which  have  already  been  mentioned,  which  appear  upon 
the  maps.  > 

It  is  easily  seen,  that  the  advance  of  British  troops  through 
the  South  African  country  will  be  one  of  a  greater  difficulty 
than  has  ever  been  encountered  by  any  modern  army.  General 


54 


Sherman's  advance  through  Tennessee  was  through  a  country 
which  was  almost  a  river  bottom,  level,  and  fairly  supplied  with 
roads.  The  roads,  no  doubt,  were  inferior.  Still  they  were 
passable  for  artillery  and  wagons.  Then,  too,  as  has  been  before 
stated,  General  Sherman  had  the  inestimable  advantage  of  two 
large  rivers  as  lines  of  transportation  and  supply.  Nothing  of 
that  sort  exists  in  South  Africa.  It  is  hardly  too  much  to  say, 
that  the  region  which  is  now  the  scene  of  conflict  between  the 
British  and  Burgher  forces,  is  one  almost  ideal  for  the  purposes 
of  defense.  In  fact,  the  region  between  the  two  Republics  and 
the  seasoast  may  be  considered  almost  as  a  series  of  natural  fort- 
resses, each  one  of  which  has  to  be  carried  by  an  invading  force, 
before  actual  entry  can  be  made  upon  the  territory  either  of  the 
Orange  Free  State  or  the  Transvaal. 

The  next  point  is  to  be  found  in  the  contrast  between  the  de- 
grees of  knowledge  possessed  by  each  of  the  contending  armies 
of  the  movements  of  the  other.  The  current  discussions  of  the 
present  South  African  military  situation  deal  very  copiously 
with  the  matters  of  front  attacks,  flank  movements,  turning 
movements,  and  other  things  too  numerous  to  mention.  Gen- 
erally, they  make  an  omission  of  a  feature  of  the  military  situa- 
tion, which  in  actual  operations  is  entitled  to  some  weight ;  and 
that  is,  the  force,  and  the  position,  of  the  enemy.  This  feature 
is  one  generally  ignored  by  British  soldiers.  Nevertheless,  as 
they  are  beginning  to  find  out  to  their  cost,  it  is  a  feature  which 
cannot  be  ignored  with  due  regard  to  safety. 

As  to  this  vital  fundamental  factor,  in  every  military  situa- 
tion, in  all  military  movements,  the  force  and  positions  of  the 
enemy,  the  Burghers  have  at  all  times  an  immense  advantage 
over  their  adversaries.  Every  farm  house  is  for  the  Burghers 
a  bureau  of  intelligence,  is  a  branch  office  of  their  secret  service. 
In  any  mountainous  district,  a  system  of  signals  is  a  thing  of 
ease.  The  Burghers,  however,  have  telegraph  lines  in  abun- 
dance. At  every  point,  thus  far,  their  knowledge  of  the  move- 
ments of  the  British  has  been  apparently  most  complete. 
Equally  complete  has  been  the  British  ignorance. 

So  far  as  we  can  judge,  this  ratio  of  equality,  between  the 
knowledge  of  the  one  side  and  the  ignorance  of  the  other,  will 
continue  to  the  end  of  the  war. 


55 


The  next  point  to  be  noted  is  as  to  the  fighting  capacities  of 
the  two  contending  forces,  so  far  as  it  concerns  the  quality  of 
their  strategy. 

Here  let  us  ask  ourselves  two  questions : 

What  has  been  the  quality  of  the  strategy  on  the  two  sides 
thus  far? 

Is  there  any  sufficient  reason  for  thinking  that  there  will  be, 
in  this  respect,  any  considerable  change  in  the  future  ? 

Those  two  questions  every  man  can  answer  for  himself. 

But  let  us  look  at  some  of  the  facts,  which  tend  to  throw  light 
on  the  answers  to  these  two  questions. 

The  most  prominent  characteristics  to-day  of  the  British  War 
Office,  and  of  the  ordinary  British  Army  officers,  are  arrogance, 
and  indocility.  Absolutely  confident  of  their  own  superiority 
to  the  rest  of  the  world,  civilised  and  uncivilised,  with  an  innate 
imbedded  conviction  impossible  to  dislodge,  of  the  completeness 
of  their  knowledge  on  all  subjects,  and  of  the  impossibility  of 
their  learning  anything  from  other  men,  the  inability  of  the 
British  War  Office,  or  of  the  ordinary  British  officer,  to  adapt 
themselves  to  the  modern  methods,  of  modern  warfare,  is  almost 
beyond  conception.  For  it  must  be  steadily  borne  in  mind,  that 
the  present  fighting  methods  of  the  British  Army  are  essentially 
mediaeval.  They  are  antiquated.  They  are  out  of  date.  The 
sum  and  substance  of  the  typical  British  strategy  of  to-day  is  a 
rush  with  the  bayonet.  Practically  as  an  army,  they  have  learned 
nothing  since  Waterloo,  where  they  won  only  by  a  combination  of 
chances.  The  saying  attributed  to  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  that 
his  officers  got  their  training  for  war  at  Eton  and  Harrow,  gives 
the  most  accurate  evidence  of  the  fundamental  conception  of 
strategy  held  by  the  Duke  in  his  time,  and  by  the  average  British 
officer  to-day.  That  idea  is  that  war  is  a  game  of  football — to  be 
won  by  a  front  rush.  A  rush — at  one  point  or  another,  that  is  the 
present  prevalent  typical  British  idea  of  war.  It  stands  out  in 
nearly  every  despatch  sent  home  from  the  present  field  of 
operations. 

On  the  other  side,  however,  it  is  well  understood,  that  war 
to-day  is  a  contest,  not  of  brawn,  but  of  brains.  Transportation 
and  supply,  position,  full  and  accurate  information  as  to  the 
forces  and  positions  of  your  enemy, — these  are  the  factors  that 


56 


enter  into  any  problem  of  modern  scientific  war.  And  these 
problems  are  to  be  bandied,  not  by  brawn,  but  by  brains.  These 
facts  are  well  understood,  and  are  made  matters  of  practical 
study,  by  the  Burghers. 

British  valor  needs  not  to  be  put  in  evidence.  Single 
individual  soldiers,  of  a  high  order,  are  no  doubt  to  be  found  to- 
day in  considerable  numbers  in  the  British  Army.  But  the 
British  Army  of  to-day,  as  a  fighting  organisation,  as  a  machine 
for  the  needs  of  modern  scientific  warfare,  is  not  a  subject  of 
serious  consideration.  Lord  Roberts  and  Lord  Kitchener  are 
very  able  men.  Lord  Kitchener,  according  to  all  the  indica- 
tions, is  an  admirable  organiser,  and  a  most  efficient  executive. 
If  he  were  put  at  the  head  of  the  War  Office,  and  were  given  a 
free  hand,  he  probably  could — in  time — convert  the  British 
Army  into  a  modern  fighting  organism.  But  the  time  re- 
quired would  be  large.  First  and  foremost,  he  would  have  to  get 
rid  of  an  enormous  mass  of  excrescences  and  dead  wood.  The 
conditions  which  he  would  have  to  exterminate  are  those  which 
Lord  Roberts  describes  as  existing  in  the  British  Army  in 
India. 

"  That  the  long-existing  discontent  and  growing  disloyalty  in  our 
Native  army  might  have  been  discovered  sooner,  and  grappled  with 
in  a  sufficiently  prompt  and  determined  manner  to  put  a  stop  to  the 
Mutiny,  had  the  senior  regimental  and  staff  officers  been  younger, 
more  energetic,  and  intelligent,  is  an  opinion  to  which  I  have  always 
been  strongly  inclined.  Their  excessive  age,  due  to  a  strict  system  of 
promotion  by  seniority  which  entailed  the  employment  of  Brigadiers 
of  seventy,  Colonels  of  sixty,  and  Captains  of  fifty,  must  necessarily 
have  prevented  them  performing  their  military  duties  with  the 
energy  and  activity  which  are  more  the  attributes  of  younger  men, 
and  must  have  destroyed  any  enthusiasm  about  their  regiments,  in 
which  there  was  so  little  hope  of  advancement  or  of  individual  merit 
being  recognized.  Officers  who  displayed  any  remarkable  ability  were 
allowed  to  be  taken  away  from  their  own  corps  for  the  more  attractive 
and  better  paid  appointments  appertaining  to  civil  employ  or  the 
irregular  service.  It  was,  therefore,  the  object  of  every  ambitious  and 
capable  young  officer  to  secure  one  of  these  appointments,  and  escape 
as  soon  as  possible  from  a  service  in  which  ability  and  professional 
zeal  counted  for  nothing." 

Upon  the  question  of  the  time  required  to  organize,  drill  and 
discipline  an  ordinary  force  of  British  soldiery,  we  may  quote 


57 


Napier  as  to  the  capacities  of  the  British  soldier  in  his  day. 
He  says,  speaking  of  the  British  soldier:  "When  completely 
disciplined  (and  three  years  are  required  to  accomplish  this) 

his  port  is  lofty,  and  his  movement  free." 
What  delicious  naivete! 

In  this  connection  we  may  also  cite  the  language  put  in  the 
mouth  of  the  Earl  of  Oxford  by  the  great  novelist,  which  ex- 
presses in  the  clearest  way  the  actual  conditions  as  they  have 
existed  at  all  times  of  her  military  history,  with  one  exception, 
concerning  the  organization  and  maintenance  of  a  British  army 
in  any  foreign  country: 

"  Look,  therefore,  at  this  English  Army.  Winter  is  approaching;  where 
are  they  to  be  lodged?  how  are  they  to  be  victualed?  by  whom  are  they  to 
be  paid?  Is  your  Highness  to  take  all  the  expense  and  labor  of  fitting  them 
for  the  summer  campaign?  For,  rely  on  it,  an  English  army  never  was,  nor 
will  be,  fit  for  service,  till  they  have  been  out  of  their  own  island  long 
enough  to  accustom  them  to  military  duty.  They  are  men,  I  grant,  the 
fittest  for  soldiers  in  the  world;  but  they  are  not  soldiers  as  yet,  and  must 
be  trained  to  become  such  at  your  Highness'  expense. " 

In  view  of  all  these  facts,  what  are  the  reasonable  possibilities 
which  can  be  accomplished  in  South  Africa  by  Lord  Roberts 
and  Lord  Kitchener  ?  Or  by  any  other  two  or  three  individuals, 
even  if  they  were  Napoleons. 

The  essential  difficulties  of  the  situation  lie  further  back — in 
the  British  War  Office. 

But  taking  the  situation,  as  it  exists  in  South  Africa  alone. 
How  long  will  it  take,  to  organise,  equip,  and  supply  an  army 
adequate  for  a  successful  invasion  of  the  two  Republics  ?  How 
much  distance  in  advance  have  the  British  Armies  surmounted 
since  the  opening  of  the  war  ?  At  the  same  rate  of  progress,  or 
at  any  rate  of  progress  which  is  at  all  within  reasonable  prob- 
ability, how  long  will  it  take  the  British  Army  to  reach  Pretoria  ? 

Especially,  what  will  be  the  cost,  in  money,  and  in  men  ? 

Then  comes  another  question,  which  looms  up  in  the  back- 
ground—WHAT  WILL  HAPPEN  IN  INDIA  ? 

These  are  questions,  to  which  the  entire  British  people  will 
do  well  to  give  their  mind,  their  best  thought. 

It  is  not  the  part  of  prudence  to  leave  them  to  be  decided  by 
a  Birmingham  ward  politician. 


58 


II. 


THE  POLITICAL  SITUATION  BETWEEN  BOERS 
AND  BRITISH. 


The  redress  of  the  grievances  of  the  Uitlanders,  of  the  "  in- 
tolerable grievances"  of  the  Uitlanders — that  is  the  pretext, 
which  has  been  put  forward  as  the  real  reason  for  the  latest 
act  of  invasion,  and  attempt  at  conquest,  by  the  British  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Transvaal  Republic. 

It  becomes,  therefore,  a  matter  of  interest  to  ascertain  who 
these  Uitlanders  are. 

Many  persons  no  doubt  suppose,  that  the  Uitlanders  consist 
in  the  main  of  Englishmen  and  Americans,  who  have  been  al- 
ways accustomed  to  liberal  institutions,  who  are  intelligent 
law-abiding  citizens,  who  earnestly  desire  the  most  advanced 
facilities  for  education,  with  all  the  concomitants  of  the  most 
modern  civilisation. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  Johannesburg,  where  the  Uitlanders 
live,  is  a  mining  camp,  with  all  that  the  term  implies.  Its 
population  is  a  mining  population.  Mr.  Bryce  describee  its 
residents  as  "  a  crowd  of  English,  Australian  and  American 
miners,  employed  by  capitalists,  mostly  of  Jewish  extraction." 
In  another  passage  Mr.  Bryce  describes  them  in  this  way: 
"  Nearly  all  of  the  latter  [the  recent  emigrants]  were  gathered 
in  the  mining  district  around  Johannesburg,  which  is  practically 
an  English,  or  rather  an  Anglo- Jewish,  city,  with  a  sprinkling 
of  Australians,  Americans,  Germans  and  Frenchmen."  In 
these  quotations  Mr.  Bryce  has  omitted  one  of  the  chief  ele- 
ments of  the  Johannesburg  population,  that  is,  a  collection  of 
over  forty  thousand  Kaffirs,  who  are  held  in  what  is  practically 
slavery  by  this  collection  of  liberty  loving  adventurers. 

The  idea,  that  the  denizens  of  this  mining  camp  care  any- 
thing for  religion,  or  education,  or  free  representative  govern- 


59 


meat,  so  long  as  they  are  allowed  to  pursue  their  regular  voca- 
tion of  gold  mining,  is  simply  ridiculous.  These  men  went  to 
the  Transvaal  for  gold.  They  are  engaged  in  digging  gold. 
All  that  they  care  for,  the  large  majority  of  them,  is  gold.  They 
intend  to  leave  the  Transvaal,  as  soon  as  each  of  them  has 
collected  his  bag  of  gold.  If  the  Johannesburg  mines  should 
cease  profitable  production,  practically  the  whole  of  this 
motley  crowd  would  leave  the  Transvaal  as  soon  as  they  could  get 
out  of  it.  They  have  never  signified  any  wish,  or  inten- 
tion, the  large  majority  of  them,  to  take  upon  themselves  any 
of  the  burdens  of  citizenship  in  the  Republic,  or  to  give  up  the 
benefits  of  citizenship  in  the  countries  which  they  have  left. 
All  of  this  talk  about  the  desire  of  the  Uitlanders  to  be  admitted 
to  citizenship  in  the  Transvaal  is  a  mere  manufacture  for 
foreign  consumption,  for  the  purpose  of  justifying  the  aggres- 
sions of  Mr.  Rhodes  and  Mr.  Chamberlain.  It  has  no  founda- 
tion in  fact.  Mr.  Chamberlain  is  well  aware  of  this.  So  is 
Mr.  Rhodes. 

So  late  as  the  27th  day  of  January,  1899,  the  British  Resident 
at  Pretoria,  who  was  stationed  there  for  the  express  purpose  of 
protecting  the  rights  of  British  subjects,  who  was  fully  convers- 
ant with  their  situation  and  needs,  had  written  officially  of  the 
political  conditions  of  the  Uitlander  population.  It  is  now  well 
understood,  that  the  real  purpose  of  all  this  agitation  about 
the  Transvaal  franchise  has  been  the  ultimate  overthrow  of  the 
present  Transvaal  government.  The  purpose  has  been,  to  get 
the  franchise  for  this  large  number  of  foreigners  who  live  in 
Johannesburg,  in  order  thereafter  to  get  the  control  of  the  entire 
government  of  the  Transvaal  Republic.  In  other  words,  the 
purpose  of  Mr.  Rhodes  and  Mr.  Chamberlain  has  been  to  com- 
pel a  fundamental  change  in  the  existing  institutions  of  the 
Transvaal  Republic;  to  require  the  government  of  that  Repub- 
lic to  make  a  complete  subversion  of  its  existing  constitution 
in  its  most  important  feature,  that  is,  in  the  conditions  on  which 
new-comers  can  have  the  rights  of  citizenship.  In  view  of  this 
fact,  it  will  perhaps  be  somewhat  of  a  surprise  to  persons  who 
have  not  taken  the  trouble  to  investigate  the  official  documents, 
to  learn  that  the  British  Resident  at  Pretoria  so  late  as  the  27th 
of  January,  1899,  in  an  official  letter,  gave  a  statement  of  the 


60 


political  desires  of  the  TJitlander  population  in  the  following 
words  :* 

' '  The  Acting  British  Agent,  Pretoria,  to  the  High  Commissioner,  Cape 
Town. 

Her  Majesty's  Agency,  Pretoria,  January  27,  1899. 

Sir  : 

I  have  the  honor  to  enclose  a  summary  of  the ]Annual  Report  of  the 
Transvaal  Chamber  of  Mines  for  tlie  year  1898,  as  well  as  an  able  essay 
upon  the  general  situation  of  the  gold  mining  industry  and  its  relations 
ivith  the  Government,  which  was  read  by  the  President,  M.  Rouliot,  at  the 
annual  meeting  on  the  26th  instant. 

The  principal  points  dealt  with  in  the  Report,  and  by  the  President,  are 
the  regret  of  the  mining  industry  at  the  recent  refusal  by  the  Volksraad  to 
consider  the  Chamber's  proposal,  for  the  formation  of  a  local  board,  even 
composed  only  of  government  nominees,  to  control  the  workings  of  the 
laws  dealing  with  native  labour  supply,  liquor  traffic,  and  gold  thefts, 
although  the  Chamber  acknowledges  that  it  has  hopes  of  better  things  if 
the  recent  proposal  to  place  the  control  of  the  detective  department  under 
the  State  Attorney  is  approved  by  the  JRaad.  Suggestions  are  again  made 
for  the  reduction  of  railway  rates,  and  the  dynamite  monopoly  is 
again  attacked  at  considerable  length  by  M.  Rouliot,  who  warns  the 
Volksraad  in  the  strongest  terms  against  the  recent  scheme — to  be 
laid  again  before  the  Volksraad  in  February — for  prolonging  for 
fifteen  years  beyond  the  present  concession,  what  can  only  bring 
loss  both  to  the  State  and  to  the  industry,  a  proposal  which  M.  Rouliot 
terms  iniquitous.  The  accusation  which  has  been  brought  against 
the  mining  companies  of  late,  namely,  that  they  keep  up  depression  in 
trade  by  ordering  their  supplies  direct  from  abroad,  to  the  detriment  of 
the  Transvaal  merchants,  is  refuted  by  convincing  statistics  ;  and  I  may 
add  that  I  myself  have  heard  no  good  reason  alleged  in  proof  of  jthis  accu- 
sation, which  I  regard  as  wholly  unfounded.  The  recent  gold  taxes  are 
likewise  discussed,  with  the  conclusion  that  the  principle  of  a  gold  tax 
may  be  a  reasonable  one,  but  not  under  existing  circumstances  here,  when 
more  revenue  is  not  needed  by  the  State,  but  only  better  financial  adminis- 
tration, and  when  no  reductions  in  existing  taxation  have  been  effected 
in  compensation  for  the  increased  burden  from  the  gold  taxes.  The  fail- 
ure of  recent  State  loan  proposals  is  touched  upon  in  connection  with  the 
assertion  that  the  industry  might  have  helped  the  government  to  obtain  the 
capital  it  required;  and  reasons  are  given  why  such  assistance  was  not 
forthcoming,  not  the  least  of  which  was  that  it  was  not  asked.  The  sup- 
posed connection  between  political  agitation  and  the  capitalists  is  repud- 
iated, and  I  myself  believe  this  repudiation  and  the  proofs  given  to  be  the 


*  British  Blue  Book,  C.  9345,  p.  49. 


61 


truth,  in  every  respect.  The  Chamber,  in  fact,  statesjagain  emphatically  that 
it  takes  its  stand  upon  a  purely  economic  platform,  and  has  no  desire  to  al- 
ter any  of  the  institutions  of  the  country,  if  only  its  voice  against  monopolies, 
concessions,  and  other  well-known  abuses,  were  listened  to.  In  conclusion, 
M.  Rouliot  alludes  to  a  recent  campaign  carried  on  by  some  of  the  Gov- 
ernment subsidized  organs,  against  the  capitalists,  and  points  out  the  near 
connection  between  this  campaign  and  the  existence  of  the  wealthy  syndi- 
cates who  support  the  illicit  liquor  traffic,  which  is  perliaps  at  present  the 
chief  enemy  of  the  capitalist,  and  the  one  they  certainly  mean  to  be  untir- 
ing in  their  efforts  to  attack.  I  regret  to  say  that  I  myself  entirely  agree 
with  M.  Eouliot  that  all  those  attacks  upon  the  capitalist  here  (without 
whom  not  one  mine  in  the  Transvaal  could  be  worked  at  a  profit)  are 
merely  the  outcome  of  the  wealthy  influence  of  the  Jews,  who  grow  rich  in  a 
few  years  by  the  enormous  profits  of  the  sale  of  poisonous  alcohol  to  the 
native  labourers  on  the  mines,  a  traffic  which  incapacitates  perhaps  a  per- 
manent twelve  per  cent,  out  of  88,000  natives  from  doing  any  work.  The 
Volksraad  even  threatened  to  introduce  a  flogging,  to  help  the  enforcement 
of  the  liquor  laws  ;  and  the  illicit  dealers  have  now  combined  to  utilize  the 
press,  of  a  certain  shade,  in  order  to  attack  the  capitalist  who  makes  their 
evil  deeds  so  patent.  The  whole  report  and  speech  of  the  President  are  very 
instructive  summaries  of  the  industry's  position  both  politically  and  econom- 
ically, and  the  statistics  for  the  last  year's  gold  production  being  also  laid 
out  at  considerable  length  in  the  enclosed  speech. 

I  have  

Edmund  Fraser. 

His  Excellency  the  High  Commissioner. " 

In  short,  the  topics,  which  engrossed  the  minds  of  the 
Uitlanders,  were  labor,  rum  and  gold. 

That  statement  is  of  authority.  It  is  made  by  an  official  of 
the  British  government.  It  is  made  with  complete  fullness  of 
knowledge.  The  fact  is,  that  at  no  time  since  the  opening  of  the 
Johannesburg  mining  camp  has  there  been  the  expression  of  a 
wish,  on  the  part  of  any  considerable  number  of  the  inhabitants 
of  Johannesburg,  for  any  considerable  reform  of  the  laws  or  in- 
stitutions of  the  Transvaal  Republic,  except  in  the  matter  of  tax- 
ation. It  is  no  doubt  the  fact,  that  they  have  asserted  that  taxa- 
tion pressed  unduly  upon  the  mining  interests.  They  have 
also,  at  one  time  and  another,  complained  of  the  inefficiency 
of  the  administration  of  existing  laws.  On  many  occasions, 
however,  they  have  formally  conceded  that  the  laws  were  reason- 
ably good, — were  as  good  as  could  have  been  expected  under 
existing  circumstances,  and  that  the  only  practical  difficulties 


62 


of  their  situation  lay  in  the  inadequate  enforcement  of  those 
laws. 

That  fact  is  one  of  which  complaint  has  been  made  in  many 
of  the  cities  of  the  United  States.  No  one  will  pretend  that  a 
matter  of  that  nature  furnishes  the  slightest  ground  for  the  in- 
terference of  a  foreign  power  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  South 
African  Republic. 

It  is  time  that  we  heard  the  last  of  this  talk  of  the  grievances 
of  the  Uitlanders.  The  Uitlanders  knew  whether  or  not  they 
had  grievances.  The  British  Agent  at  Pretoria  knew  whether 
or  not  they  had  grievances.  What  the  Uitlanders  wanted  was 
gold.  They  came  to  the  Transvaal  for  gold.  They  were  get- 
ting gold — with  rum — to  the  full  measure  of  their  wishes. 
They  cared  nothing  for  the  franchise,  or  religion,  or  for  educa- 
tion, in  either  language,  English  or  Dutch.  These  continued 
assertions,  reiterated  month  after  month  by  Mr.  Chamberlain 
and  Mr.  Rhodes,  and  by  many  Englishmen  who  honestly  believe 
the  truth  of  the  assertions,  are  manufactured  out  of  whole 
cloth.  ISTo  doubt,  there  have  been  petitions  and  manifestoes, 
signed  by  men  who  have  lived  in  Johannesburg,  asking  for  the 
franchise,  and  for  many  other  rights  and  privileges.  No  doubt, 
too,  there  have  been  public  meetings,  in  Cape  Colony  and  else- 
where, protesting  against  the  "  intolerable  grievances  "  of  the 
Uitlanders.  Those  petitions  and  manifestoes,  and  those  public 
meetings  have  been  got  up  by  Mr.  Rhodes  and  his  friends,  aided 
in  London  by  Mr.  Chamberlain,  by  dishonest  means,  for  dis- 
honest purposes.  They  do  not  represent  the  genuine  wishes, 
or  acts,  of  any  considerable  number  of  honest  men. 


THE  BOERS,  AND  THEIR  RIGHTS. 


But  then  we  come  to  other  questions:  Who  are  the  Boers? 
What  is  the  nature  of  their  title  to  the  territory  which  they  now 
inhabit  ?    Whereon  do  they  rest  their  right  to  self-government  ? 

The  answer  to  these  questions  requires  a  statement,  at  no 


63 


great  length,  of  some  historical  facts.  The  statement  will  be 
taken  entirely  from  British  sources, — from  sources  of  authority. 

To  the  full  consideration  of  these  questions  it  will  be  necessary 
to  give  a  short  history  of  the  relations  between  Briton  and  Boer 
during  the  last  century.  The  facts  stated  are  gathered  from 
British  sources.  As  to  the  history  of  the  earlier  years  down  to 
the  discovery  of  the  Kand  gold  mines,  the  facts  stated  will  be 
taken  in  the  main  from  books  written  by  two  high  British 
officials— from  "  The  Story  of  the  Great  Boer  Trek  "  by  the 
Honorable  H.  Cloete,  LL.  D.,  Her  Majesty's  High  Commissioner 
for  Natal  in  1843  and  1844— and  the  "  Story  of  South  Africa," 
by  George  M.  Theal  of  the  Cape  Colonial  Civil  Service.  Both 
books  are  recognized  as  authorities.  As  to  the  events  since  the 
discovery  of  the  mines,  and  especially  as  to  the  Jameson  Raid, 
the  statements  of  chief  importance  here  made  will  be  based  on 
original  documents  from  the  British  Blue  Books. 

The  authorities  for  the  statements,  then,  would  seem  hardly 
open  to  question. 

The  first  question,  which  we  must  answer,  is,  Who  are  the 
Boers? 

As  to  ancestry,  as  to  blood,  the  Boers  are  Putch^and  French 
Huguenots.  Their  blood  is  that  of  lovers,  and  defenders,  of 
civil  and  religious  liberty  for  centuries.  In  this  respect,  their 
record  is  without  a  break.  It  furnishes  a  striking  contrast  to 
the  record  of  the  British  hereditary  official  class.  Of  this  last — 
the  record  has  been  one  of  continuous  cruelty  and  tyranny,  in 
their  own  land,  and  in  other  lands.  In  this  respect,  and  through- 
out this  study,  we  must  at  all  times  keep  clearly  before  our 
minds  the  essential  fundamental  distinction  between  the  English 
hereditary  official  class,  and  the  grand  old  liberty  loving  English 
people.  But  the  Boers,  in  the  persons  of  their  ancestors  in 
Europe,  and  in  their  own  persons  in  South  Africa,  have  at  all 
times  been  the  bulwarks  of  civil  and  religious  freedom. 

We  come,  then,  to  the  history  of  the  political  relations  of  Boers 
and  Britons. 

Any  history,  however  short,  of  the  relations  of  the  Boers  to 
British  rule  would  omit  nearly  the  most  important  feature  of 
their  story,  if  it  gave  no  account  of  the  exhibition  of  British 


64 


cruelty  and  barbarism  at  the  execution  at  Slagter's  Neck  in 
1815.  Here  is  Mr.  Theal's  account  of  the  scene,  when  men 
were  put  to  death,  whose  only  crime  had  been  an  attempt  to  es- 
cape from  British  oppression: 

"  All,  except  Martha  Taber,  widow  of  Jan  Bezindenhout,  were  to  be 
conveyed  to  the  place  on  Van  Aardt's  farm  where  William  Krugel  had 
taken  the  oath  in  the  name  of  the  men  under  his  command,  and  there 
Hendrik  Prinsloo,  Corneles  Taber,  Stephanus  Botma,  Abraham  Botma, 
Thennis  de  Kleck  and  William  Krugel  were  to  suffer  death  by  hanging. 
The  remaining  thirty-two,  after  witnessing  the  execution,  were  to  undergo 
various  punishments  ranging  from  banishment  for  life  to  imprisonment 
for  one  month  or  a  fine  of  fifty-six  dollars. 

"  The  sentences  were  in  accordance  with  the  letter  of  the  law  ;  but  it 
was  generally  supposed  that  the  Governor  would  use  his  power  of  mitiga- 
tion to  prevent  the  penalty  of  death  being  inflicted,  as  no  blood  had  actu- 
ally been  shed  by  any  of  the  prisoners.  Banishment  would  have  been 
equally  effective  as  a  warning  to  the  others  and  it  seemed  to  most  people 
then  as  now  that  something  was  due  to  the  burghers  who  aided  the  gov- 
ernment, and  who  were  afterwards  horrified  at  the  thought  that  they  had 
helped  to  pursue  their  deluded  countrymen  to  death.  There  was  an  op- 
portunity for  the  English  Government  to  secure  the  affections  of  these  peo- 
ple, by  granting  to  them  the  lives — though  not  the  liberty — of  the  chief  cul- 
prits ;  but  Lord  Charles  Somerset  did  not  avail  himself  of  it.  On  the  inter- 
cession of  Landdrost  Cuyler,  who  represented  the  services  that  Krugel  had 
rendered  in  the  last  Kaffir  war  and  his  uniform  good  conduct  before  he 
permitted  himself  to  be  led  astray  by  the  leaders  of  the  insurrection,  that 
individual  was  spared,  but  the  Governor's  fiat  was  affixed  to  the  sentences 
of  the  other  five. 

"  On  the  9th  of  March,  1816,  they  were  executed  at  Captain  Andrews' 
post  on  Van  Aardt's  farm.  The  Reverend  Mr.  Herrold,  of  George,  attended 
them  in  their  last  moments.  Before  ascending  the  scaffold  they  requested 
to  be  allowed  to  sing  a  hymn  with  their  late  companions  and  friends,  and 
upon  permission  being  granted,  their  voices  were  clear  and  firm.  After 
this  Stephanus  Botma — whose  ancestor  of  the  same  name  was  the  first 
burgher  in  South  Africa — addressed  those  present,  advising  them  to  be 
cautious  in  their  behaviour,  and  take  warning  from  his  fate.  To  out- 
ward appearance,  they  were  all  perfectly  resigned  to  die.  When  the  drop 
fell,  four  of  the  ropes  snapped,  and  the  condemned  men  rose  from  the 
ground  unharmed.  The  great  crowd  of  people  standing  round,  regarding 
this  as  an  intervention  of  God,  raised  a  cry  for  mercy,  which  Landdrost 
Cuyler,  who  was  in  command,  was  powerless  to  grant.  Three  hundred 
soldiers  guarded  the  scaffold,  and  prevented  confusion  until  all  was  over. " 

Thereafter  came  the  Great  Trek,  as  it  has  been  called,  the 
exodus  of  the  Boers  from  Cape  Colony.    Historians  are  gener- 


65 


ally  agreed,  that  the  Boers  were  driven  from  their  homes  into 
exile  by  the  oppression  and  cruelty  of  the  British  authorities. 

The  cause  of  the  emigration  is  thus  stated  by  Mr.  Fitzpatrick, 
in  his  book  entitled  "  The  Transvaal  from  Within."  Mr. 
Fitzpatrick  was  a  member  of  the  so-called  Johannesburg  Reform 
Committee.  He  will  therefore  not  be  charged  with  partiality 
in  favor  of  the  Boers  in  his  statements. 

He  says  (p.  4)  : 

"  The  Boers  have  produced  from  their  own  ranks  no  literary  champion 
to  plead  or  defend  their  cause,  and  their  earlier  history  is  therefore  little 
known,  and  often  misunderstood  ;  but  to  their  aid  has  come  Mr.  George 
McCall  Theal,  the  South  African  historian,  whose  years  of  laborious 
research  have  rescued  for  South  Africa  much  that  would  otherwise  have 
been  lost.  In  his  '  History  of  the  Boers '  Mr.  Theal  records  the  causes  of 
the  great  emigration,  and  shows  how  the  Boers  stood  up  for  fair  treatment, 
and  fought  the  cause,  not  of  Boers  alone,  but  of  all  colonists.  Boers  and 
British  were  alike  harshly  and  ignorantly  treated  by  high-handed  Gov- 
ernors, and  an  ill-informed  and  prejudiced  Colonial  Office,  who  made  no 
distinction  on  the  grounds  of  nationality  between  the  two  ;  for  we  read 
that  Englishmen  had  been  expelled  the  country,  thrown  in  gaol,  and  had 
their  property  confiscated,  and  their  newspapers  suppressed  for  asserting 
their  independence,  and  for  trifling  breaches  of  harsh  laws." 

Mr.  Theal's  statement*  of  the  causes  of  the  Great  Trek  is  as 
follows : 

"  To  people  in  England  one  of  the  strangest  events  of  the  present  cen- 
tury is  the  abandonment  of  their  homes  by  thousands  of  Cape  colonists 
after  1836,  and  their  braving  all  the  hardships  of  life  in  the  wilderness  for 
no  other  cause  than  to  be  free  of  British  rule.  Yet  there  is  nothing  to 
cause  surprise  in  the  matter,  if  the  character  of  the  Dutch  people  is  con- 
sidered. These  colonists  were  of  the  same  blood  as  the  men  who  with- 
stood the  great  power  of  Philip  II  of  Spain,  who  laid  the  richest  part  of  their 
country  under  water  rather  than  surrender  it  to  Louis  XIV  of  France. 
They  were  not  the  men  and  women  to  submit  to  what  they  believed  to  be 
misrule,  if  there  was  a  possibility  of  successful  resistance  or  a  chance  of 
making  their  escape. 

' '  Many  of  them,  as  we  have  seen,  were  accustomed  to  live  in  wagons 
and  to  subsist  to  a  large  extent  upon  game,  so  that  moving  deeper  into  the 
continent  was  in  itself  no  great  difficulty.  Before  them  was  a  great  waste 
swarming  with  wild  animals.  What  wonder  that  they  should  move  into  it 
with  such  powerful  motives  to  urge  them  on. 

"  Let  us  look  again  briefly  at  the  grievances  which  determined  their  con- 
duct. First,  there  was  subjection  by  a  foreign  unsympathetic  government. 

*  "The  Story  of  South  Africa,  by  George  M.  Theal,  of  the  Cape  Colonial 
Civil  Service,"  p.  195. 


66 


Second,  there  was  the  prohibition  of  their  language  in  the  public  offices 
and  courts  of  law.  Third,  there  was  the  superintendent  of  the  London 
missionary  society,  their  ablest  and  most  relentless  opponent,  in  possession 
of  boundless  influence  with  the  British  authorities.  Fourth,  there  were 
the  slanderous  statements  made  by  the  philanthropic  societies  in  England 
concerning  them.  Fifth,  there  was  the  sudden  emancipation  of  their 
slaves  without  adequate  compensation.  Sixth,  there  was  the  whole  mass 
of  the  coloured  people  placed  upon  a  political  footing  with  tbem,  and  that 
without  a  vagrant  act  being  put  in  force.  Seventh,  there  was  no  security 
for  life  or  property  in  the  eastern  districts,  which  were  exposed  to  invasion 
by  the  Kosas,  as  the  Secretary  of  State  took  part  with  the  barbarians. 
These  were  the  chief  causes  of  their  great  emigration,  and  there  were 
many  others  of  less  importance. 

"  And  now  all  over  the  frontier  districts  the  great  wagons  were  laden 
with  household  goods  and  provisions  and  ammunition,  and  bands  of  peo- 
ple set  out  .to  seek  a  new  home  in  the  north.  Each  party  was  usually 
made  up  of  families  related  to  each  other,  and  the  man  of  greatest  influ- 
ence in  it  was  elected  its  leader,  with  the  title  of  commandant.  The 
horned  cattle,  horses,  sheep  and  goats  were  driven  slowly  on,  and  often 
when  the  pasture  was  good  the  caravans  would  rest  for  weeks  together. 
They  went  up  from  the  grass-covered  hills  along  the  coast  and  the  bare 
Karoo  farther  inland,  till  they  came  to  one  or  other  of  the  steep  passes  into 
the  elevated  basin  drained  by  the  Orange  and  its  numerous  tributaries. 
With  twenty  to  thirty  oxen  before  each  waggon  they  struggled  up,  and 
then  went  on  without  difficulty  down  the  long  slope  to  the  river  and  across 
the  wide  plains  of  the  present  Orange  Free  State. 

"North  of  the  Orange  the  emigrants  regarded  themselves  as  beyond 
English  authority,  for  over  and  over  again  it  had  been  officially  an- 
nounced that  Great  Briain  would  not  enlarge  her  possessions  in  South 
Africa." 

Here  is  the  Declaration  issued  at  the  time,  of  the  motives  and 
purposes  of  the  Great  Trek. 

"  Graham's  Town, 

January  22,  1837. 

"  1.  We  despair  of  saving  the  colony  from  those  evils  which  threaten  it 
by  the  turbulent  and  dishonest  conduct  of  vagrants  who  are  allowed  to 
infest  the  country  in  every  part  ;  nor  do  we  see  any  prospect  of  peace  or 
happiness  for  our  children  in  a  country  thus  distracted  by  internal  com- 
motions. 

2.  To  complain  of  the  severe  losses  which  we  have  been  forced  to  sus- 
tain by  the  emancipation  of  our  slaves,  and  the  vexatious  laws  which  have 
been  enacted  respecting  them. 

3.  We  complain  of  the  continual  system  of  plunder  which  we  have  for 
years  endured  from  the  Kaffirs  and  other  coloured  classes,  and  particu- 
larly by  the  last  invasion  of  the  colony,  which  has  desolated  the  frontier 
districts,  and  ruined  most  of  the  inhabitants. 


67 


4.  We  complain  of  the  unjustifiable  odium  which  has  been  cast  upon  us 
by  interested  and  dishonest  persons,  under  the  name  of  religion,  whose 
testimony  is3believed  in  England,  to  the  exclusion  of  all  evidence  in  our 
favor;  and  we  can  foresee,  as  the  result  of  this  prejudice,  nothing  but  the 
total  ruin  of  the  country. 

5.  We  are  resolved,  wherever  we  go,  that  we  will  uphold  the  just  prin- 
ciples of  liberty ;  but,  whilst  we  will  take  care  that  no  one  is  brought  by 
us  into  a  condition  of  slavery,  we  will  establish  such  regulations  as 
may  suppress  crime,  and  preserve  proper  relations  between  master  and 
servant. 

6.  We  solemnly  declare  that  'we  leave  this  colony  with  a  desire  to  enjoy 
a  quieter  life  than  we  have  hitherto  had.  We  will  not  molest  any  people, 
nor  deprive  them  of  the  smallest  property  ;  but,  if  attacked,  we  shall  con- 
sider ourselves  fully  justified  in  defending  our  persons  and  effects,  to  the 
utmost  of  our  ability,  against  every  enemy. 

7.  We  make  known  that  when  we  shall  have  framed  a  code  of  laws  for 
our  guidance,  copies  shall  be  forwarded  to  this  colony  for  general  informa- 
tion ;  but  we  take  the  opportunity  of  stating  that  it  is  our  firm  resolve  to 
make  provision  for  the  summary  punishment,  even  with  death,  of  all 
traitors,  without  exception,  who  may  be  found  amongst  us. 

8.  We  purpose,  in  the  course  of  our  journey,  and  on  arrival  at  the 
country  in  which  we  shall  permanently  reside,  to  make  known  to  the  na 
tive  tribes  our  intentions,  and  our  desire  to  live  in  peace  and  friendly  inter- 
course with  them. 

9 .  We  quit  this  colony  under  the  full  assurance  that  the  English  gov- 
ernment has  nothing  more  to  require  of  us,  and  will  allow  us  to  govern 
ourselves  without  its  interference  in  future. 

10.  We  are  now  leaving  the  fruitful  land  of  our  birth,  in  which  we  have 
suffered  enormous  losses  and  continual  vexation,  and  are  about  to  enter  a 
strange  and  dangerous  territory  ;  but  we  go  with  a  firm  reliance  on  an 
all-seeing,  just  and  merciful  God,  whom  we  shall  always  fear,  and  humbly 
endeavor  to  obey. 

In  the  name  of  all  who  leave  the  colony  with  me. 

P.  Retief." 

Mr,  Theal  gives  us  the  following  account  of  the  original  organ- 
ization of  the  Transvaal  Government : 

' '  On  the  6th  of  June,  1837,  a  general  assembly  of  the  emigrants  was 
held  at  Winburg,  when  a  provisional  constitution,  consisting  of  nine 
articles,  was  adopted.  The  supreme  legislative  power  was  entrusted  to  a 
single  elective  chamber  termed  the  volksraad,  the  fundamental  law  was 
declared  to  be  the  Dutch,  a  court  of  landdrost  and  heemraden  was 
created,  and  the  chief  executive  authority  was  confided  to  Mr.  Retief  with 
the  title  of  commandant-general.  The  strong  feeling  of  antagonism  that 
Dr.  Philip  had  roused  is  shown  in  one  of  the  articles  of  the  constitution, 
which  provided  that  every  member  of  the  community  and  all  who  should 
thereafter  join  them  must  take  an  oath  to  have  no  connection  with  the 


68 


London  missionary  society.  That  body  was  regarded  by  them  as  purely  a 
political  institution,  advocating  and  spreading  principles  of  anarchy  ;  and 
they  regarded  it  as  something  like  blasphemy  to  speak  of  its  superintend- 
ent in  Capetown  as  a  minister  of  the  gospel. " 

So  much  for  the  exodus  of  1836 — as  to  its  causes. 
The  Boers  took  refuge  in  a  wilderness, — in  a  land  that  no  civil- 
ized people  inhabited,  or  wished  to  inhabit,  for  the  reason  that  it 
had  at  that  time  no  known  value.  It  was  partially  occupied  by 
sporadic  and  nomadic  savages.  It  may  be  assumed,  that  in 
their  treatment  of  those  savages  the  Boers  were  themselves 
guilty  of  many  acts  of  cruelty  and  injustice.  That  is  the  result 
of  the  infirmities  of  human  nature.  That  is  a  feature  which 
has  disgraced  our  own  conduct  towards  the  North  American 
Indian,  and  has  characterized  the  conduct  of  all  the  dominant 
races  in  the  world's  history,  whenever  they  have  come  in  contact 
with  races  weaker  than  themselves.  Whoever  may  have  the 
right  to  reproach  the  Boers  on  this  account,  certainly  the  right 
does  not  belong  to  Americans,  or  Englishmen. 

Assuming,  therefore,  that  the  Boers'  treatment  of  the  savages 
whom  they  displaced  was  harsh,  and  even  cruel,  the  fact  still 
remains,  not  open  to  question  or  criticism  on  the  part  of  Ameri- 
cans or  English,  that  the  Boers  established  themselves  in  a 
wilderness,  opened  it,  cultivated  it,  planted  there  their  homes, 
and  have  lived  there  ever  since.  Their  right — to  dwell  in  that 
land,  and  to  govern  themselves,  and  all  newcomers,  in  their  own 
way,  is  one  not  open  to  question  on  any  reasonable  grounds,  by 
any  Englishman  or  American.  It  never  has  been  seriously 
questioned  by  Englishmen.  It  has  on  several  occasions  been 
formally  acknowledged  by  the  British  Government  by  solemn 
treaties.  Eo  doubt,  Englishmen  and  Americans  who  enter  the 
Boer  territory  are  entitled  to  that  degree  of  protection  for  life, 
liberty,  and  property,  which  should  always  be  secured  by  the 
government  of  every  civilized  people  to  the  citizens  of  other 
governments  who  come  within  its  territories.  It  has  not  been 
made  matter  of  serious  complaint  against  the  Transvaal  Govern- 
ment, that  British  citizens  have  not  had  due  protection  for  life, 
liberty,  and  property.  That  has  not  been  put  forward  as  a 
ground  for  the  aggressive  action  of  the  British  Government.  Un- 
less, therefore,  there  be  other  circumstances  not  yet  disclosed,  the 


69 


right  of  the  Transvaal  people  to  establish  and  maintain  their  own 
government,  for  themselves  and  all  newcomers  in  their  territory, 
is  fully  established  by  the  fact  that  they  opened,  and  settled,  a 
territory  which  had  theretofore  been  occupied  by  no  civilized 
race.  Their  title  to  their  territory,  and  their  right  to  independ- 
ent self  government,  rests  on  precisely  the  same  grounds  with 
the  same  rights  vested  in  the  English  and  American  peoples. 

This  right  of  the  Boers  to  self  government,  however,  as 
against  the  British  Government,  rests  on  additional  and  stronger 
grounds.     On  four  distinct  occasions  it  has  been  guaranteed 
by  the  British  Government  in  solemn  treaties.    That  fact  has 
never  been  questioned.    The  language  of  the  treaties  is  clear, 
and  its  meaning  is  free  from  all  possible  doubt    By  the  Sand 
„River  Convention,  as  it  is  called,  made  in  the  year  1852,  the 
[British  Government  guaranteed  to  the  Boers  "  the  right  to  man- 
age their  own  affairs,  and  to  govern  themselves  according  to  their 
own  laws  without  any  interference  on  the  part  of  the  British 
Vjrovernment."    In  1854  this  Convention  of  1852  was  confirmed 
by  another  Convention.     The  Boers'  right  to  complete  self 
government  was  even  then  placed  beyond  legal  question. 
Here  is  Mr.  Theal's  statement : 

•*  Under  these  circumstances  the  governor  decided  to  acknowledge  the 
independence  of  the  Transvaal  emigrants,  as  the  imperial  ministers  had 
announced  their  determination  not  to  add  another  square  inch  of  ground 
in  South  Africa  to  the  Queen's  dominions,  and  advantages  which  could  be 
obtained  by  a  convention  were  not  to  be  had  in  any  other  way.  Two 
assistant  commissioners  —  Major  Hogg  and  Mr.  Owen — were  therefore 
sent  to  make  the  necessary  arrangements  with  Commandant  Pretorius  and 
a  number  of  delegates  from  the  Transvaal  people.  The  conference  took 
place  on  a  farm  in  the  Sovereignty,  and  there,  on  the  17th  of  January, 
1852,  a  document — known  ever  since  as  the  Sand  River  convention — was- 
signed,  in  which  the  British  Government  guaranteed  to  the  emigrants  north 
of  the  Vaal  the  right  to  manage  their  own  affairs  without  interference. 
The  convention  was  confirmed  by  the  secretary  of  state  for  the  colonies, 
and  was  ratifledi  by  the  Volksraad,  so  that  thereafter  the  South  African 
Republic — as  the  country  was  named — had  a  legal  as  well  as  an  actual 
existenece  in  the  eyes  of  the  British  Government. " 

"  For  some  time  the  imperial  government  had  been  undecided  whether 
to  retain  the  Sovereignty  of  a  British  possession  or  not,  but  as  soon  as 
intelligence  of  the  engagement  with  the  Basuto  reached  England  a  decision 
was  formed.  The  next  mail  brought  a  despatch  from  the  secretary  of  state- 
for  the  colonies  that  the  territory  was  to  be  abandoned. 


70 


"  To  carry  this  resolution  into  effect,  Sir  George  Clerk  was  sent  out  as 
special  commissioner.  He  called  upon  the  European  inhabitants  to  elect  a 
body  of  representatives  to  take  over  the  government ;  but  when  the  repre- 
sentatives assembled,  they  objected  in  the  strongest  terms  to  be  abandoned 
by  Great  Britain,  for  even  while  they  were  debating,  Moshesh  was  crush- 
ing Sikonyela  and  another  of  his  opponents,  and  adding  their  territory 
to  his  own.  In  effect,  the  'representative  assembly  said  to  Sir  George 
Clerk  that  they  held  England  in  honour  bound  to  reduce  the  great  bar- 
baric power  she  had  done  so  much  to  build  up.  When  that  was  done,  they 
would  not  need  military  assistance,  and  would  be  prepared  to  take  over 
the  government  of  the  country,  though  they  wished  to  remain  perma- 
nently connected  with  the  British  empire.  The  special  commissioner, 
however,  was  prevented  by  his  instructions  from  paying  any  attention  to 
language  of  this  kind,  and  was  obliged  to  term  those  who  used  it  '  obstruc- 
tionists. '  The  assembly  then  sent  two  delegates  to  England  to  implore  the 
queen's  government  and  the  parliament  not  to  abandon  them,  but  those 
gentlemen  met  with  no  success  in  their  mission. 

"Sir  George  Clerk  now  encouraged  the  remnant  of  the  party  that  was 
at  heart  opposed  to  British  rule  to  assert  itself  openly.  With  his  concur- 
rence, one  of  its  ablest  leaders  returned  from  beyond  the  Vaal,  and  went 
about  the  country  addressing  the  people  and  arguing  that  connection  with 
England  meant  nothing  but  restraint,  for  no  protection  whatever  was  re- 
ceived. In  the  special  commissioner's  phraseology,  Mr.  Stander  and  those 
of  his  way  of  thinking,  who  used  language  to  that  effect,  were  1  -well  dis- 
posed. ' 

"This  party  elected  a  body  of  delegates,  who  met  in  Bloemfontein,  and 
opened  negotiations  with  Sir  George  Clerk.  The  '  obstructionist '  assembly 
protested,  and  was  thereupon  dissolved  by  the  special  commissioner,  when 
most  of  its  members  and  supporters,  finding  resistance  to  the  will  of  the 
British  government  useless,  went  over  to  the  '  well  disposed '  side,  and 
tried  to  get  as  good  terms  as  possible.  Gold  was  freely  used  to  suppress 
complaints — it  was  termed  part  compensation  for  losses — and  nothing  that 
was  possible  to  be  done  was  neglected  to  make  the  abandonment  accept- 
able to  the  people  generally.  The  result  was  that  on  the  23rd  of  February, 
1854,  a  convention  was  signed  at  Bloemfontein  by  Sir  George  Clerk  and  the 
members  of  the  '  well  disposed  '  assembly,  by  which  the  government  of 
the  territory  previously  termed  the  Orange  River  Sovereignty,  thereafter 
the  Orange  Free  State,  was  transferred,  and  its  future  independence  was 
guaranteed. 

"  There  were  now  in  South  Africa  five  distinct  European  governments, 
namely  of — 

1.  Cape  Colony,  ) 


2.  Natal. 

3.  British  Kaffraria, 


4.  The  South  African  Republic, 

5.  The  Orange  Free  State, 


Independent  Republics. 


71 


P  But  later,  in  the  year  1873,  came  the  discovery  of  the  Trans- 
vaal gold  fields.  Then  the  territory  of  the  Burghers  became 
more  inviting  to  outsiders.  Then  came  the  beginning  of  a 
series  of  acts  of  unlawful  unjustifiable  aggression  on  the  part 
of  the  British  Government. 

In  the  year  1877  Sir  Theophilus  Shepstone,  the  Commissioner 
of  the  British  Colonial  Office,  issued  a  Proclamation,  so-called, 
whereby  he  stated  that  he  "  annexed  "  the  Transvaal  Republic  to 
the  dominions  of  the  British  Crown.  Sir  Theophilus  Shepstone 
alleged,  that  this  act  of  his  had  the  secret  approval  of  some  of  the 
high  officials  of  the  Transvaal  Republic.  But  no  official  of  the 
Republic  had  any  authority  to  assent  to  such  an  act.  Nor  was 
any  official  action  in  the  way  of  an  assent  to  the  annexation  ever 
taken  by  any  public  officer,  or  authorized  body,  acting  on  behalf 
of  the  Transvaal  Government.  So  far  as  concerns  any  point 
of  legal  validity,  the  Act  of  Annexation  was  an  act  of  bald 
spoliation,  an  act  of  purely  arbitrary,  illegal,  and  unjusti- 
fiable aggression,  against  the  sovereignty  of  a  free  independent 
State.  So  far  as  concerned  any  point  of  law,  or  right,  Sir 
Theophilus  Shepstone  might  as  well  have  made  a  proclamation 
annexing  the  City  or  the  State  of  New  York.  The  so-called 
Proclamation — as  matter  of  law — was  not  worth  the  paper  on 
which  it  was  written.  No  doubt,  the  Transvaal  Government  had 
not  at  that  time  become  a  very  efficient  working  organization.  But 
the  doctrine  that  inefficiency  on  the  part  of  a  government  fur- 
nishes ground  for  some  other  government,  or  unauthorized  gov- 
ernment official,  to  come  in  and  "annex"  an  entire  people,  with 
their  territory,  and  put  them  under  the  dominion  of  a  foreign 
powerpwould  introduce  somewhat  novel  principles  and  rules  of 
international  law. 

A  protest  was  immediately  made  in  London  against  this  high 
handed  lawless  act  of  aggression. 

-  Of  course,  British  officials  of  the  time  made  their  statements 
that  this  action  on  their  part  was  taken  for  the  purpose  of  pro- 
tecting the  Boers  against  the  savages !  But  the  Boers  had  con- 
quered the  country  from  the  savages,  and  had  protected  them- 
selves against  the  savages  for  forty  years,  when  they  were  fewer 
in  numbers  and  weaker  than  in  1877.  Moreover,  it  is  to  be 
noted,  that  this  charitable  protecting  British  hand  was  not  out- 


72 


stretched  during  the  time  of  the  trekkers'  early  struggles,  but 
came  most  opportunely  after  the  discovery  of  gold. 

For  a  time  the  Boers  submitted  to  superior  force.  At  that 
time — they  were  too  weak  to  venture  on  a  contest  at  arms  with 
the  great  British  Empire. 

But  then  came  a  fresh  series  of  abuses  at  the  hands  of  British 
officials,  of  the  same  kind  with  those  which  had  originally  driven 
the  Boers  to  leave  the  Cape  and  go  into  the  wilderness.  Those 
abuses  are  thus  described  by  Mr.  Fitzpatrick : 

"  The  real  mistakes  of  the  British  Government  began  after  the  annexa- 
tion. The  failure  to  fulfil  promises  ;  the  deviation  from  old  ways  of  gov- 
ernment ;  the  appointment  of  unsuitable  officials,  who  did  not  understand 
the  people  or  their  language  ;  the  neglect  to  convene  the  Volksraad,  or  to 
hold  fresh  elections,  as  definitely  promised  ;  the  establishment  of  personal 
rule  by  military  men,  who  treated  the  Boers  with  harshness  and  contempt, 
and  would  make  no  allowance  for  their  simple,  old-fashioned  ways,  their 
deep-seated  prejudices,  and,  if  you  like,  their  stupid  opposition  to  modern 
ideas  ;  these  things  and  others  caused  great  dissatisfaction,  and  gave  ample 
material  for  the  nucleus  of  irreconcilables  to  work  with." 

Meantime  two  deputations  had  been  sent  to  England  to  protest 
against  the  lawless  action  of  Sir  Theophilus  Shepstone. 

In  April,  1879,  Sir  Bartle  Frere  held  a  conference  with  a 
deputation  of  the  Boers  to  consider  their  grievances  at  the  hands 
of  the  British  authorities.  His  account  of  that  conference  is  as 
follows : 

"If  I  may  judge  from  the  gentlemen  composing  the  deputation,  and 
others  of  their  class,  whom  I  have  had  the  honour  of  meeting  since  com- 
ing to  the  Transvaal,  the  leaders  are,  with  very  few  exceptions,  men  who 
deserve  respect  and  regard  for  many  valuable  and  amiable  qualities  as 
citizens  and  subjects.    *   *   *  * 

"Of  the  results  of  our  meeting  it  is  impossible  at  present  to  say  more 
than  that  it  must  have  cleared  away  misconceptions  on  all  sides.  If  they 
have  learnt  anything  as  to  the  finality  of  the  act  of  annexation — that  I 
have  no  power  to  undo  it,  and  do  not  believe  that  it  will  ever  be  undone- 
in  the  only  sense  in  which  they  will  ask  it — I  have,  on  the  other  hand,  been 
shown  the  stubbornness  of  a  determination  to  be  content  with  nothing  else, 
for  which  I  was  not  prepared  by  the  general  testimony  of  officials  who  had 
been  longer  in  the  country,  and  who  professed  to  believe  that  the  opposi 
tion  of  the  Boers  was  mere  bluster,  and  that  they  had  not  the  courage  of 
their  professed  opinions.  *  *  *  I  feel  assured  that  the  majority  of  the 
Committee  felt  very  deeply  what  they  believed  to  be  a  great  national 
wrong." 


73 


Then  came  war. 

Even  in  those  days  of  their  weakness,  that  war,  so  far  as  it 
went,  resulted  in  signal  victories  of  the  Boers.  Those  victories 
were  followed  by  the  Pretoria  Convention,  made  in  August, 
1881, — by  which  the  British  Government  again  formally  and 
expressly  conceded,  by  solemn  treaty,  what  they  never  had  any 
right  to  question,  the  right  of  the  Boers  to  self  government. 
The  Convention  of  1881  also  stated  that  this  right  was  conceded 
subject  to  the  "  suzerainty  of  Her  Majesty."  The  only  clauses 
of  that  treaty,  which  are  here  important  are  the  following : 

"  Her  Majesty's  Commissions  for  the  Settlement  of  the  Transvaal  terri- 
tory, duly  appointed  as  such  by  a  Commission  passed  under  the  Royal 
Sign  Manual  and  Signet,  bearing  date  the  5th  of  April,  1881,  do  hereby 
undertake  and  guarantee  on  behalf  of  Her  Majesty  that,  from  andi  after 
the  8th  day  of  August,  1881,  complete  self  government,  subject  to  the  suzer- 
ainty of  Her  Majesty,  her  heirs  and  successors,  will  be  accorded  to  the  in- 
habitants of  the  Transvaal  territory,  upon  the  following  terms  and  condi- 
tions, and  subject  to  the  following  reservations  and  limitations  :  " 
***** 

"  Her  Majesty  reserves  to  herself,  her  heirs  and  successors,  (a)*  the  right 
from  time  to  time  to  appoint  a  British  Resident  in  and  for  the  said  State 
with  such  duties  and  functions  as  are  hereinafter  defined;  (b)  the  right 
to  move  troops  through  the  said  State  in  time  of  war,  or  in  case  of  the 
apprehension  of  immediate  war  between  the  Suzerain  Power  and  any 
Foreign  State  or  Native  tribe  in  South  Africa  ;  and  (c)  the  control  of  the 
external  relations  of  the  said  State,  including  the  conclusion  of  treaties  and 
the  conduct  of  diplomatic  intercourse  with  Foreign  Powers,  such  inter- 
course to  be  carried  on  through  Her  Majesty's  diplomatic  and  consular 
officers  abroad." 

******  * 

"On  the  8th  day  of  August,  1881,  the  Government  of  the  said  State, 
together  with  all  rights  and  obligations  thereto  appertaining,  and  all  State 
property  taken  over  at  the  time  of  annexation,  save  and  except  munitions 
of  war,  will  be  handed  over  to  Messrs.  Stephanus  Johannes  Paulus  Kruger, 
Martinus  Wessel  Pretorius  and  Petrus  Jacobus  Joubert,  or  the  survivor  or 
survivors  of  them,  who  will  forthwith  cause  a  Volksraad  to  be  elected  and 
convened,  and  the  Volksraad,  thus  elected  and  convened,  will  decide  as  to 
the  further  administration  of  the  Government  of  the  said  State.  " 

The  right  of  the  Transvaal  State  to  self-government  was 
again  recognized,  and  put  on  a  firm  basis,  by  the  later  London 
Convention  of  1884.    That  Convention  expressly  recognized 


74 


the  existing  government  of  the  Transvaal  State  under  a  new 
title,  that  of  the  "  South  African  Republic."  All  mention  of 
the  suzerainty  was  omitted;  and  the  only  clause  contained  in 
that  Convention  of  1884  restricting  in  any  respect  the  powers 
of  the  Republic  as  an  independent  government,  is  to  be  found 
in  Article  4  in  the  following  words : 

"  The  South  African  Republic  will  conclude  no  treaty  or  engagement 
with  any  state  or  nation,  other  than  the  Orange  Free  State,  nor  with  any 
native  tribe  to  the  eastward  or  westward  of  the  Republic,  until  the  same 
has  been  approved  by  Her  Majesty  the  Queen. 

"  Such  approval  shall  be  considered  to  have  been  granted  if  Her  Majes- 
ty's government  shall  not  within  six  months  after  receiving  a  copy  of 
such  treaty  (which  shall  be  delivered  to  them  immediately  upon  its 
completion)  have  notified  that  the  conclusion  of  such  treaty  is  in  conflict 
with  the  interests  of  Great  Britain  or  of  any  of  her  Majesty's  possession 
in  South  Africa." 

The  right  of  the  British  government  to  move  troops  through 
the  Republic  in  time  of  war,  "  and  the  control  of  external  rela- 
tions "  of  the  Republic,  including  the  conclusion  of  treaties  and 
conduct  of  diplomatic  intercourse  with  foreign  powers,  which 
had  been  reserved  under  the  prior  Convention  of  1881,  were 
abrogated,  as  matter  of  law,  by  the  terms  of  the  later  Con- 
vention, and  no  right  was  reserved  to  the  British  government, 
by  implication  or  otherwise,  to  interfere  in  any  form  in  the 
internal  administration  of  the  government  of  the  Transvaal 
State. 

No  breach  of  the  obligations  of  the  Republic  under  that  Con- 
vention has  been  charged. 

So  it  is  clear,  that  as  to  all  internal  affairs,  the  right  of  the 
Transvaal  Republic  to  complete  self  government,  free  from  "  any 
interference  on  the  part  of  the  British  Government"  was,  and  is, 
beyond  question.  It  was  as  undoubted  as  the  same  right,  of 
the  "United  States  of  America,"  or  any  one  of  our  separate 
States.  In  those  internal  affairs  the  British  Government  had, 
and  has,  no  more  right  to  intervene  than  it  has  in  our  affairs. 

That  fact  has  never  been  questioned  by  any  responsible 
British  official.  It  has  been  more  than  once  formally  conceded 
by  Mr.  Chamberlain. 


75 


Mr.  Chamberlain  has  stated  in  the  House  of  Commons: 
"  I  do  not  say  that  under  the  terms  of  the  Convention  we  are  entitled  to, 
force  reforms  on  President  Kruger,  but  we  are  entitled  to  give  him  friend- 
ly counsel.  *  *  *  If  this  friendly  counsel  was  not  well  received,  there 
was  not  the  slightest  intention  on  the  part  of  her  Majesty's  Government  to 
press  it.  *  *  *  I  am  perfectly  willing  to  withdraw  it,  and  to  seek  a 
different  solution  if  it  should  not  prove  acceptable  to  the  President.  The 
rights  of  our  action  under  the  Convention  are  limited  to  the  offering  of 
friendly  counsel,  in  the  rejection  of  which,  if  it  is  not  accepted,  we  must  be 
quite  willing  to  acquiesce." 

On  another  occasion  Mr.  Chamberlain  said : 

"What  is  the  policy  which  the  honorable  gentleman  would  put  forward 
if  he  were  standing  here  in  my  place  ?  We  know  what  it  would  be.  He 
would  send,  in  the  first  place,  an  ultimatum  to  President  Kruger  that  un- 
less the  reforms  which  he  was  specifying  were  granted  by  a  particular 
date  the  British  Government  would  interfere  by  force.  Then,  I  suppose, 
he  would  come  here  and  ask  this  House  for  a  vote  of  £10,000,000  or  £20,- 
000,000 — it  does  not  matter  particularly  which — and  would  send  an  army 
of  10,000  men,  at  the  very  least,  to  force  President  Kruger  to  grant  re- 
forms in  regard  to  which  not  only  this  Government,  but  successive  Secre- 
taries of  State,  have  pledged  themselves  repeatedly  that  they  would  have 
nothing  to  do  with  its  internal  affairs.  That  is  the  policy  of  the  honorable 
gentleman.    That  is  not  my  policy. ' ' 

Mr.  Chamberlain  is  always  ready  to  eat  his  words.  He  does 
not  forget  them. 

Meantime,  however,  came  fresh  discoveries  of  gold.  The 
diamond  mines  of  Kimberley,  too,  became  known,  and  fell  into 
the  control  of  Mr.  Cecil  Rhodes,  under  the  ownership,  as  com- 
monly reported,  of  the  Rothschilds.  Thereafter  Mr.  Rhodes 
formed  his  scheme  for  the  Cape  to  Cairo  railway.  A  certain 
Birmingham  ward  politician,  too,  became  possessed  with  the  idea 
of  British  imperialism.  Mr.  Rhodes  formed  the  purpose,  in 
which  he  was  afterwards  aided  and  abetted  by  Mr.  Chamberlain, 
of  again  attempting  the  action  of  Sir  Theophilus  Shepstone,  by 
making  a  conquest,  and  an  annexation,  of -the  Transvaal  Re- 
public. 

The  means  by  which  Mr.  Rhodes  and  Mr.  Chamberlain  sought 
to  accomplish  their  purpose  was  the  celebrated  Jameson  raid. 

Mr.  Chamberlain,  with  his  political  friends  and  supporters, 
has  persistently  repeated  the  statement,  that  the  Jameson  raid 
was  really  only  an  incident  to  a  revolution;  that  there  was  a 


76 


revolution  within  the  Republic,  on  the  part  of  the  Uitlanders,  the 
foreign  population  of  Johannesburg,  to  redress  grievances  suf- 
fered by  them  at  the  hands  of  the  Transvaal  Government ;  that 
those  grievances  had  then  become  "  intolerable  " ;  that  the  people 
of  Johannesburg  had  exhausted  all  lawful  and  peaceable  means 
to  get  redress ;  that  those  means  had  failed ;  that  the  Johannes- 
burghers  had  resorted  to  arms  only  after  that  failure;  and 
that  the  Jameson  raid  was  only  a  movement  of  sympathy 
from  without — in  aid  of  armed  rebellion  within — a  movement  to 
succor  a  deeply  wronged  and  suffering  people. 

The  facts  are  directly  the  reverse.  The  population  of  Johan- 
nesburg did  not  revolt.  They  did  not  wish  a  revolution.  They 
were  not  in  favor  of  the  Jameson  Raid.  No  doubt,  there  were 
many  things  in  the  Transvaal  public  administration,  which  were 
not  thoroughly  satisfactory  to  the  Uitlanders.  But  they  did 
not  consider  that  their  grievances  were  "  intolerable."  Nor  did 
they  consider,  that  they  had  exhausted  their  peaceable  and  legal 
remedies.  On  the  contrary,  their  efforts  to  get  improvement 
in  governmental  methods  had  been  very  successful.  The  evils 
of  which  they  complained  were  of  precisely  the  same  nature, 
though  much  less  gross,  with  those  endured  so  patiently  for  many 
years  by  the  people  of  the  City  of  New  York.  The  complaints 
of  the  Johannesburg  population  were  almost  wholly  as  to  matters 
of  taxation.  They  thought  that  the  government  raised  more 
money  than  it  needed.  They  charged  that  some  of  that  money 
was  misused.  They  even  charged,  that  there  were  some  corrupt 
officials.  But  no  considerable  portion  of  the  people  of  Johannes- 
burg went  so  far  as  to  even  allege,  that  such  abuses  as  existed 
reached  the  extent  which  similar  abuses  had  for  many  years 
reached  in  the  City  of  New  York,  that  the  abuses  warranted 
revolution,  or  that  they  were  "  intolerable."  We  have  heard 
much  from  Mr.  Chamberlain  and  his  supporters,  as  to  the  dread- 
ful injustice  which  the  Uitlanders  suffered  in  the  matter  of 
education,  in  the  fact  that  instruction  in  the  public  schools  was 
given  only  in  the  Dutch  language.  The  Uitlanders  cared 
nothing  for  education.  That  is,  no  considerable  number  of  them 
cared  for  it.  Johannesburg  was  a  mining  camp — a  heterogen- 
eous collection — of  Kaffirs,  Chinamen,  Japanese,  Italians,  Ger- 
mans, Frenchmen,  Englishmen  and  Americans.    It  is  fair  to 


77 


assume,  that  some  of  them  wished  their  children  to  have  some 
kind  of  education.  But  the  statement  that  any  considerable 
number  of  the  Johannesburg  miners  were  willing  to  have  a  war, 
or  even  a  J ameson  Raid,  over  a  question  whether  the  instruction 
in  the  public  schools  should  be  in  English  or  Dutch,  if  such  a 
statement  had  been  made  in  Johannesburg,  would  have  produced 
no  result  more  serious  than  laughter.  Such  a  statement  might 
easily  be  made  in  the  British  House  of  Commons  by  Mr.  Cham- 
berlain. But  that  any  well  informed  person  should  make  the 
statement  truthfully,  in  the  House  of  Commons  or  elsewhere, 
was  quite  impossible.  No  doubt,  there  was,  as  an  adjunct  of  the 
Jameson  Raid,  the  publication  of  a  manifesto,  purporting  to  be 
from  the  downtrodden  TJitlanders,  demanding  the  franchise, 
civil  and  religious  liberty,  purity  of  public  administration, 
liberal  education,  and  in  general  an  ideal  condition  of  public 
affairs  far  above  anything  at  the  time  existing  in  Great  Britain 
or  the  United  States*  But  that  alleged  petition  was  only  a 
special  manufacture  for  the  London  market.  It  was  never  in- 
tended to  be  used  as  a  genuine  public  document.  It  first  saw 
the  light  when  Dr.  Jameson  was  waiting  on  the  border  of  the 
Transvaal  Republic,  four  days  before  his  invasion  of  the  Trans- 
vaal territory.    It  was  a  spurious  paper,  concocted  for  use  in 

*This  remarkable  paper,  as  printed  in  Mrs.  Hammond's  "A  "Woman's 
Part  in  a  Revolution,"  at  page  4,  is  given  as  follows  : 

"The  Leonard  Manifesto  was  published,  December  26th,  setting  forth 
the  demands  of  the  Uitlander. 

'  We  want,'  it  reads: — 

'  1.  The  establishment  of  this  Republic,  as  a  true  Republic. 

'  2.  A  Grondwet  or  constitution  which  shall  be  framed  by  competent 
persons  selected  by  representatives  of  the  whole  people  and  framed  on 
lines  laid  down  by  them ;  a  constitution  which  shall  be  safeguarded  against 
hasty  alteration. 

'  3.  An  equitable  Franchise  Law  and  fair  representation. 

'  4.  Equality  of  the  Dutch  and  English  languages. 

'  5.  Responsibility  to  the  Legislature  of  the  Heads  of  the  great  Depart- 
ments. 

'  6.  Removal  of  religious  disabilities. 

'  7.  Independence  of  the  Courts  of  Justice,  with  adequate  and  secured 
remuneration  of  the  Judges. 

'  8.  Liberal  and  compreliensive  education. 

1  9.  An  efficient  Civil  Service,  with  adequate  provision  for  pay  and  pen- 
sion. 

'  10.  Free  Trade  in  South  African  products.'  " 


78 


England,  as  a  pretended  justification  for  the  overthrow  of  the 
Transvaal  Government,  after  the  overthrow  of  that  government 
should  have  become  an  acompKshed  fact.  It  was  never  used, 
or  intended  to  be  used,  as  a  genuine  petition  for  relief  against 
real  grievances. 

The  Jameson  Raid  was  an  operation  organized,  paid  for,  and 
carried  out,  by  Mr.  Cecil  Rhodes,  aided  and  abetted  by  Mr. 
Chamberlain.  It  was  not  an  operation  for  the  relief  of  op- 
pressed Uitlanders.  It  was  merely  an  attempt  on  the  part  of 
Mr.  Rhodes  and  a  few  men  who  were  associated  with  him  in 
his  financial  enterprises,  to  overthrow  the  Transvaal  government, 
and  thereby  get  the  control  of  the  Transvaal  taxation,  and  of  the 
laws  which  should  affect  mining  properties.  No  evidence  has  ever 
been  presented,  which  has  come  to  the  knowledge  of  the  writer, 
that  there  was  any  considerable  degree  of  discontent  on  the 
part  of  the  Uitlanders  in  Johannesburg  prior  to  the  Jameson 
Raid.  ~No  evidence  has  ever  been  presented,  that  any  consider- 
able number  of  the  inhabitants  of  that  town  desired  a  revolu- 
tion, or  a  resort  to  arms.  No  evidence  has  ever  been  presented, 
that  any  considerable  number  of  them  considered  that  they 
were  in  any  respect  oppressed  by  the  Transvaal  government. 
The  growth  of  Johannesburg  has  been  very  remarkable.  Neces- 
sarily there  were  in  Johannesburg  a  considerable  number  of 
orderly  business  people,  who  desired  to  have  perfect  political 
conditions.  But  the  abuses  and  imperfections  of  government 
in  Johannesburg,  or  in  the  mining  region,  were  only  those  that 
exist  in  every  new  community,  especially  in  every  new  mining 
community.  There  was  a  large  mass  of  ignorant  disorderly 
population.  It  was  a  matter  of  course,  that  there  was  some 
degree  of  inefficiency  in  the  administration  of  the  laws.  But 
the  condition  of  public  affairs  in  Johannesburg  at  the  time  of 
the  Jameson  Raid  was  far  superior  to  that  in  many  of  the 
mining  camps  in  the  United  States.  However  that  may  be, 
and  whatever  may  have  been  the  condition  of  public  administra- 
tion in  and  around  Johannesburg,  the  idea  that  it  furnished 
any  legal  justification  for  interference  by  any  outside  govern- 
ment, is  simply  ridiculously  absurd.  Even  Mr.  Chamberlain 
never  ventured  to  take  that  position,  until  he  had  decided  upon 
the  second  Raid  of  1899,  when  it  became  necessary  for  him  to 


79 


make  excuses  for  his  second  attack  upon  the  Transvaal  .Republic. 

Prior  to  the  Jameson  Raid,  moreover,  no  attempt  had  been 
made  by  any  considerable  body  of  men  in  Johannesburg  for 
any  substantial  reform  in  the  existing  laws,  or  in  the  existing 
administration  of  those  laws. 

The  Jameson  Raid  was  organized  from  outside,  by  Mr.  Rhodes. 
Mr.  Rhodes,  as  is  well  known,  was  at  that  time  Prime  Minister  of 
the  Cape  Colony.  The  troops  that  were  used  in  that  expedition 
were  almost  entirely  the  Mashonaland  Mounted  Police  and  the 
Bechuanaland  Border  Police.  To  all  intents  and  purposes,  those 
troops  were  part  of  the  British  Army.  They  were  under  the 
command  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Sir  John  Willoughby,  of  the 
Royal  Horse  Guards.  Associated  with  him  in  those  operations 
were  Major  Hon.  Robert  White,  of  the  Royal  Welsh  Fusiliers, 
Major  C.  Hyde  Villiers,  of  the  Royal  Horse  Guards,  Captain 
Kincaid  Smith,  of  the  Royal  Artillery,  Captain  Kennedy,  of 
the  British  South  African  Company's  Service,  Captain  E. 
Holden,  of  the  Derbyshire  Yeomanry,  Surgeon  Captain  Seaton 
Hamilton,  late  1st  Life  Guards,  Lieutenant  Grenfell,  of  the 
1st  Life  Guards,  Captain  Lindsell,  late  Royal  Scots  Fusiliers, 
Major  J.  B.  Stracey,  of  the  Scots  Guards,  Lieutenant  Harry 
R.  Holden,  late  Grenadier  Guards.  In  command  of  the 
Bechuanaland  Border  Police  was  Lieutenant-Colonel  Raleigh 
Grey,  6th  Dragoons. 

That  these  officers  in  the  British  regular  army  took  part  in 
this  expedition  without  leave  of  absence  from  the  War  Office, 
and  without  the  full  knowledge  and  approval  of  the  home  gov- 
ernment, is  not  for  an  instant  to  be  believed.  They  were  men 
of  high  Army  rank.  It  is  not  open  to  reasonable  doubt,  that 
the  British  War  Office  were  fully  cognizant  of  the  move  these 
men  were  then  undertaking.  It  is  not  open  to  reasonable  doubt, 
that  Mr.  Chamberlain,  at  least,  of  the  British  Home  Govern- 
ment was  fully  apprised  of  the  fact  that  these  officers  were 
going  to  South  Africa  for  the  purpose  which  they  afterwards 
attempted  to  execute.  Sir  John  Willoughby  made  an  official 
Report  to  the  War  Office  in  London,  according  to  the  statement 
of  Mr.  Fitzpatrick  in  his  book  entitled  "  The  Transvaal  from 
Within,"  of  the  operations  of  his  command  on  what  is  termed 
the  Jameson  Raid.    So  far  as  has  ever  appeared,  those  officers 


80 


from  the  British  Regular  Army,  who  have  here  been  named,  have 
never  been  called  to  account  by  the  War  Office  for  their  act  of 
lawless  armed  aggression  against  a  friendly  government  with 
which  Her  Majesty  was  then  at  peace.  !Nor  have  they  received 
any  punishment  at  the  hands  of  the  authorities  of  the  British 
Army  for  their  act  in  levying  war  upon  a  foreign  power.  For 
the  Transvaal  Republic,  as  to  these  questions,  was  undoubtedly 
a  foreign  power. 

Let  us  now  consider  the  real  nature  of  the  operations  on 
which  these  officers,  with  Dr.  Jameson,  embarked  in  what  has 
been  termed  the  Jameson  Eaid. 

Taking  that  expedition  on  the  simple  uncontradicted  facts, 
it  was  an  expedition  for  the  purposes  of  mere  robbery  and  mur- 
der. It  was  so  understood  by  Dr.  Jameson,  by  every  one  of  the 
officers  who  were  associated  with  him,  by  Mr.  Cecil  Rhodes,  and 
by  Mr.  Chamberlain.  Especially  Mr.  Chamberlain  was  well 
aware,  that  there  was  no  legal  ground,  on  which  the  acts  of  those 
British  officers  could  be  defended.  He  was  well  aware  of  the 
legal  and  political  nature  of  their  action.  Robbery  and 
murder  are  the  strictly  accurate  terms,  and  are  the  only  ac- 
curate terms,  which  can  be  used  to  characterize  the  action  of 
Dr.  Jameson,  and  the  British  officers  who  took  part  with  him  in 
that  expedition.  Upon  the  evidence  thus  far  disclosed  by  Mr. 
Chamberlain  himself,  as  to  those  operations,  the  conclusion  of 
every  reasonable  man  must  be  that,  as  to  these  crimes  of  rob- 
bery and  murder,  Mr.  Chamberlain  was  an  accessory  before  the 
fact. 

Moreover,  until  the  action  of  Mr.  Chamberlain  in  regard  to 
the  Jameson  Raid  be  disavowed  by  the  British  Nation,  the 
British  Nation  is  to-day  an  accessory  before  the  fact  to  the 
crimes  of  the  Jameson  Raid, — in  other  words,  to  the  crimes  of 
robbery  and  murder. 

The  Jameson  Raid,  as  is  now  a  matter  of  history,  met  with 
speedy  and  crushing  defeat.  The  men  who  conducted  it  were 
children,  playing  with  a  giant.  They  had  fondly  fancied,  that 
their  so-called  military  operations,  petty  and  contemptible  as 
they  must  be  deemed  from  one  standpoint,  were  certain  of 
speedy  success.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  everything  they  were  do- 
ing was  well  known  to  the  Pretoria  authorities.    Every  move 


81 


that  they  made  was  met  with  the  most  careful  preparation. 
They  were  allowed  to  go  just  so  far  as  to  make  it  impossible 
thereafter  to  conceal  the  real  character  of  their  action.  When 
it  became  a  pronounced  fact,  that  those  men  had  been  engaged 
in  a  mere  act  of  lawless  aggression,  in  an  unjustifiable  attempt 
at  robbery  and  murder,  then  the  Transvaal  military  forces  were 
found  to  be,  as  they  have  been  in  the  present  war,  at  precisely 
the  right  point,  at  precisely  the  right  time.  Sir  John  Wil- 
loughby's  Report  of  those  so-called  military  operations  was  mere- 
ly a  premonition  of  the  reports  that  have  been  made  by  Sir 
Eedvers  Buller  of  the  operations  of  this  present  war. 

The  result  was  the  unconditional  surrender  of  the  entire 
force. 

fY  The  Jameson  Raid  was  merely  the  culmination — of  a  series 
of  lawless  and  unjustifiable  aggressions  on  the  part  of  the 
British  Government;  of  a  series  of  attempts  at  bald  conquest. 
It  would  have  been  strange,  if  this  last  act  of  British  aggression 
and  British  brutality  had  not  revived  in  the  minds  of  the  Repub- 
licans all  the  memories  of  previous  wrongs ;  memories  which  had 
to  some  extent  become  softened  by  lapse  of  time,  and  which 
would  have  entirely  disappeared,  if  the  British  Government  had 
at  any  time  treated  the  Republics  with  common  decency  and 
justice.  Of  course — the  Jameson  Raid  revived  all  those  mem- 
ories of  past  oppression  and  cruelty.  Of  course — the  Jameson 
Raid  revived  the  recollection  of  all  those  old  British  outrages 
and  injustice.  The  citizens  of  the  Republics  would  have  been 
more  than  human,  if  they  had  been  able  after  this  latest  invasion 
of  their  territory  to  take  a  calm  judicial  view  of  the  political 
situation  between  them  and  the  British  Government. 

Notwithstanding  all  this,  however,  the  treatment  by  Presi- 
dent Kruger  and  his  government,  and  by  the  entire  people  of 
the  Transvaal  Republic,  of  the  men  who  had  been  engaged  in 
this  latest  attempt  to  devastate  their  country,  destroy  their 
homes,  and  take  their  lives,  was  characterised  by  a  degree  of 
magnanimity,  and  delicacy,  which  it  is  hard  to  parallel  in  the 
historical  records  of  civilised  races.  The  Jameson  invading 
force  were  nothing  but  a  band  of  robbers  and  murderers.  There 
was  no  pretense  of  a  justification  in  law  for  their  action.  They 
were  outlaws.    Except  that  the  term  "  pirates  "  is  ordinarily 


82 

applied  to  men  who  rob  and  murder  on  the  high  seas,  they  were 
a  band  of  "pirates."  They  were  well  aware  of  that  fact,  as 
will  hereafter  appear. 

In  view  of  these  features  of  the  situation,  it  would  have  been 
lawful,  highly  natural,  and  quite  reasonable,  if  the  Transvaal 
government  had  visited  the  crimes  of  the  Jameson  force,  at  least 
in  the  case  of  some  of  its  leaders,  with  the  punishment  of  death. 

On  the  contrary,  however,  President  Kruger  insisted  on  a 
policy  of  clemency;  and,  with  great  difficulty,  finally  accom- 
plished his  purpose,  of  surrendering  all  the  members  of  the 
Jameson  force  to  the  British  Government,  to  be  dealt  with  by 
them  in  accordance  with  British  law.  Undoubtedly  President 
Kruger  was  conscious  at  the  time,  that  those  men  would  escape 
with  only  a  nominal  punishment.  We  may  be  sure  that  he  was 
not  deceived,  as  to  the  results  that  would  follow  from  this  re- 
markable generosity,  on  his  part,  and  on  the  part  of  his  govern- 
ment It  is  seldom,  however,  that  any  government  has  adopted 
a  policy  so  forbearing,  so  generous,  and  so  magnanimous,  under 
the  most  extreme  provocation,  as  was  adopted  by  the  Trans- 
vaal Eepublic  in  the  disposition  of  the  prisoners  taken  at  the 
end  of  the  Jameson  K-aid. 

So  much  for  the  action  of  the  Transvaal  Government. 

But  let  us  see  what  was  the  action  of  the  Burghers,  the  indi- 
vidual citizens  of  the  Transvaal  Republic.  Mr.  Poultney  Bige- 
low,  in  his  book  entitled  "  White  Man's  Africa,"  at  page  12, 
gives  us  some  extracts  from  the  diary  of  a  surgeon  who  took 
part  in  the  Jameson  Raid.  The  diary  of  that  surgeon,  speaking 
of  the  scene  immediately  after  the  surrender  of  Jameson's 
forces,  reads  as  follows : 

"  Nothing  could  exceed  the  kindness  of  the  people,  both  Dutch  and 
English,  who  came  up  afterwards.  Milk,  brandy,  meat,  and  bread  were 
sent  for  the  wounded,  and  ambulance  carts  came  out  from  Krugersdorp. 
On  Saturday,  11th  January,  1896,  about  9  A.  M.,  a  guard  of  the  Pretoria 
Volunteer  Cavalry  came  down,  and  we  were  marched  up  to  the  railway 
station  in  two  separate  lots,  and  put  into  two  special  trains,  which  left 
Pretoria  about  noon.  We  were  very  well  treated  here,  and  a  Dr.  Saxton, 
Surgeon  to  the  Staats  Artillery,  was  sent  with  us,  as  well  as  a  strong  escort 
of  Pretoria  Volunteer  Cavalry.  "We  officers  were  put  into  first  class  car- 
riages, and  were  supplied  with  fruit  and  liquor.  We  were  cheered  as  toe 
left  the  station,  and  at  every  station  as  we  passed." 


83 


Historical  records  will  be  searched  in  vain  for  many  in- 
stances of  forbearance  and  generosity  shown  by  conquerors  to 
conquered,  which  can  compare  with  the  story  here  just  given. 
Consider  for  a  moment  what  would  have  been  the  treatment  of 
the  Boers  by  the  Jameson  bandits,  if  the  result  had  gone  the 
other  way.  We  know  well,  from  our  own  experience,  what  is 
the  treatment  of  their  prisoners  by  British  soldiers,  and  by  the 
British  Home  Government.  Does  any  one  believe,  that  there 
would  have  been  this  high  degree  of  courteous  consideration,  or 
any  consideration,  for  the  comfort  of  their  victims,  if  Sir  John 
Willoughby  and  Dr.  Jameson,  and  their  titled  associates,  had 
succeeded  in  their  attempt  at  murder  and  conquest,  dealing  as 
a  conquering  British  force  with  people  they  deemed  their  in- 
feriors, as  they  deem  most  people  their  inferiors?  Does  any 
one  believe,  that  Sir  John  Willoughby  and  his  band  of  outlaws, 
would  have  shown  a  magnanimity  and  courtesy  for  the  defeated 
which  would  in  the  slightest  degree  compare  with  that  shown  by 
the  Transvaal  Burghers  for  their  captives  ?  To  find  a  parallel  to 
the  tender  delicacy  of  the  treatment  of  the  British  by  the  Trans- 
vaal Burghers,  we  have  to  go  back  to  the  story  of  Sidney  on  the 
battlefield  of  Zutphen.  But  the  British  of  later  years,  when 
they  have  been  conquerors,  so  far  as  my  reading  goes,  have  on  no 
occasion  shown  any  tender  consideration  for  the  persons  or 
rights  of  the  conquered.  To  get  the  real  essence  of  their  treat- 
ment of  the  Transvaal  Burghers,  we  are  compelled  to  go  back 
to  the  scene  at  Slagter's  Neck. 

It  is  interesting  to  give  the  ensuing  incidents  after  the  com- 
pletion of  the  Burghers'  victory,  as  they  are  told  us  by  Mr. 
Bigelow.    Those  incidents  were  as  follows : 

"  When  the  Boers  had  silenced  the  firing  of  Jameson's  men,  and  had 
saved  their  country  from  what  they  feared  might  prove  an  invasion  dis- 
astrous to  their  independence,  they  did  not  celebrate  the  event  by  cheers 
or  bonfires.  They  fell  upon  their  knees  and  followed  the  prayers  offered 
by  their  elders ;  they  gave  praise  to  Almighty  God  for  having  protected 
them.  They  searched  their  hearts  and  prayed  to  be  cleansed  from  the 
spirit  of  boasting.  They  prayed  for  Jameson  and  his  men,  that  they 
might  be  guided  by  the  light  of  justice  and  Christian  fellowship;  and  thus 
they  prayed  while  some  of  the  dead  lay  yet  unburied  about  them." 

These  are  the  men  who  are  mediaeval  in  their  natures  and 


84 


methods,  who  are  a  barrier  to  the  movements  of  civilisation,  and 
the  growth  of  free  government. 

Medievalism  of  that  kind — the  more  we  have  of  it,  the 
better.  Barriers  of  that  kind. — the  more  we  have  of  them, 
the  better. 

When  it  comes  to  a  choice,  between  the  civilisation  of  the 
Transvaal  Burghers  and  that  of  the  English  hereditary  official 
class,  my  vote  is  in  favor  of  the  civilisation  of  the  Burghers.  It 
is  more  in  consonance  with  the  spirit  of  the  nineteenth  and 
twentieth  centuries. 

At  this  point  it  is  interesting  to  give  Mr.  BigeloVs  account 
of  a  Transvaal  Burgher  whom  he  met  on  the  railway  train, 
who  had  taken  part  in  the  skirmish  with  the  Jameson  bandits. 
Mr.  Bigelow  says :  "  He  spoke  English  well,  could  repeat 
Shakespeare  and  Longfellow  by  the  hour,  and  loved  his  native 
country ;  in  short  I  found  him  an  interesting  companion." 

How  many  were  there  of  the  men  in  Dr.  Jameson's  band,  in 
the  Johannesburg  mining  camp,  or  even  among  the  titled  of- 
ficers of  the  British  Army  who  took  part  in  that  expedition  of 
robbery  and  attempted  conquest,  who  could  "  repeat  Shakes- 
peare and  Longfellow  by  the  hour"  ?  ISTo  doubt,  they  were  au- 
thorities on  horses  and  grouse. 

We  are  reminded  of  the  account  given  by  Tocqueville  of  the 
family  that  he  found  in  a  frontiersman's  log  cabin  on  his  visit 
to  this  country  in  1831,  the  chief  furniture  of  which  consisted  of 
copies  of  Shakespeare  and  the  Bible. 

These  peoples  that  are  brought  up  on  the  Hebrew  Bible  are 
factors  of  danger,  in  any  political  situation  whereof  the  end  is 
oppression  and  conquest.  Mr.  Green,  if  my  memory  serves  me 
rightly,  gives  a  chief  place  among  the  influences  which  have 
created  the  English  people,  to  the  King  James  Bible,  and  its 
predecessor  versions. 

Thereafter  came  the  present  war,  which,  if  it  were  not  already 
so  dreadful,  ought  to  be  termed  the  Chamberlain  Raid.  It  was 
not  brought  to  redress  any  grievances,  of  the  TTitlanders,  or  of 
any  other  persons.  It  is  a  war  of  mere  lawless  conquest,  for 
land  and  gold.  It  is  a  war  of  the  pure  mediaeval  Spanish  type, 
promoted  by  a  stock  jobber  and  a  tawdry  politician.  It  has  not 
yet  become  a  war  to  which  the  British  people  is  a  party.  It 


85 


will  become  such,  if  they  do  not  speedily  disown  Mr.  Chamber- 
lain, and  disavow  his  acts. 

When  we  have  seen  the  action  of  the  British  people,  then  we 
shall  be  able  to  form  our  final  judgment  of  the  merits  of  the 
situation  between  Boers  and  Britons. 


86 


III. 


THE  PEE  SENT  OUTLOOK. 


The  British  troops  at  this  present  writing  have  fully  estab- 
lished the  fact  that  British  valor  is  what  it  ever  was.  That  fact 
hardly  needed  any  further  evidence.  It  was  not  necessary, 
in  order  to  establish  that  fact,  that  there  should  have  been  a  war 
of  unprovoked  aggressive  invasion  in  South  Africa. 

But  we  have  now  had  a  signal  British  defeat,  instead  of  a 
series  of  signal  British  victories,  which  were  confidently  antici- 
pated by  the  British  War  Office,  in  case  there  should  be  anything 
that  deserved  the  name  of  war.  The  British  War  Office  had 
jauntily  assumed,  that  there  would  be  no  serious  contest,  that 
the  British  troops  would  have  a  holiday  march  into  Pretoria, 
followed  by  a  speedy  return  with  flying  colors. 

That  anticipation  has  been  disappointed.  There  is  now  no 
good  reason  for  anticipating  any  speedy  considerable  British 
success.  It  is  now  quite  apparent,  that  the  want  of  prep- 
aration on  one  side,  taken  in  connection  with  the  very  complete 
preparation  on  the  other  side,  together  with  the  wholesale  inca- 
pacity of  the  officers  in  high  places  in  the  British  army,  give  a 
very  strong  probability  of  further  British  reverses,  with  some- 
thing almost  approaching  a  certainty,  that  there  will  be  no 
considerable  success  to  the  British  arms  in  South  Africa  within 
any  reasonable  period. 

This  being  the  situation,  we  may  consider  some  further  fun- 
damental facts,  which  bear  upon  the  entire  outlook. 

The  first  of  those  facts  to  command  our  attention  is  the 
essential  quality  of  the  British  army,  as  a  fighting  organ- 
ization, as  it  has  been  now  developed  by  the  operations 
since  the  first  of  October.  The  preceding  pages  of  this 
paper  on  the  military  situation  were  written  long  before 
the  movement  of  General  Buller  from  Frere  and  Chieveley  to 


87 


the  westward,  from  which  it  was  anticipated  that  there  would 
be  such  important  results.  That  movement,  with  its  ending, 
has  given  us  much  further  light  on  the  real  present  condition 
of  the  British  army.  Taken  in  connection  with  the  facts  pre- 
viously known,  from  the  former  history  of  the  so-called  British 
wars  during  the  nineteenth  century,  we  can  now  more  confidently 
analyze  the  real  present  condition  of  the  British  Army  as  an 
organization  fitted,  or  unfitted,  for  the  requirements  of  modern 
scientific  warfare. 

The  first  point  to  be  noted  in  this  connection  in  regard  to  the 
British  army  of  to-day  is  its  lack  of  brains. 

By  this  is  meant  the  lack  of  adequate  mental  power  in  the 
men  at  the  head.  It  is  the  men  at  the  head,  who  must 
in  any  army  always  have  the  control  of  its  active  opera- 
tions. Brains,  to  be  of  service,  must  be  in  the  head.  Else  they 
do  not  serve  as  brains.  It  may  be  conceded,  that  the  British 
army  has  among  its  commissioned  officers  a  considerable  num- 
ber of  single  individuals,  who  are  men  of  intellect,  who  have 
given  time  and  labor  to  the  study  of  the  principles  and 
practice  of  modern  warfare.  At  the  same  time  the  fact  remains, 
that  these  men  are  not  the  men  who  are  to-day  in  positions  of 
high  command.  Especially,  the  men  who  hold  the  high  places 
in  the  British  army  now  serving  in  South  Africa,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  Lord  Roberts  and  Lord  Kitchener  who  alone  can 
accomplish  little,  have  clearly  demonstrated  their  incapacity  to 
conduct  active  military  operations  in  the  field.  They  have 
shown  their  utter  ignorance  of  the  most  elementary  principles 
and  practices  of  war. 

This  fact  is  due  to  the  practice,  which  has  obtained  to  a 
large  extent  for  centuries,  of  giving  the  positions  of  high 
command  in  the  British  army  to  men  who  have  shown  little 
or  no  fitness  for  those  positions,  but  who  have  received  their 
commissions  for  purely  family  reasons.  The  British  Govern- 
ment, in  all  its  branches,  has  been  a  close  corporation,  in  the 
hands  of  a  few  powerful  families.  !NTo  doubt  it  has  at  times 
happened,  after  months  or  years  of  active  service  in  the 
field,  that  the  meritorious  men  have  gradually  fought  their 
way  to  positions  of  high  command  in  the  British  army.  Never- 
theless, it  has  generally  been  the  rule  in  the  times  of  peace,  and 


88 


in  the  beginning  of  any  war,  that  the  positions  of  high  command 
have  been  given,  not  by  reason  of  the  known  fitness  of  men,  but 
from  what  must  be  termed,  if  language  is  used  with  accuracy, 
reasons  of  mere  family  favoritism. 

That  condition  is  absolutely  fatal  to  the  efficiency  of  any 
army,  for  the  elaborate  operations  of  modern  scientific  warfare. 

The  next  point  to  be  noted  in  the  British  army  of  to-day  is 
its  lack  of  organization. 

Organization  means  something  more  than  the  mere  possession 
of  a  large  mass  of  valuable  raw  material.  It  means,  that, 
throughout  the  entire  body  of  individuals  who  taken  together 
compose  an  army,  the  right  man  must  be  in  the  right  place ;  and 
every  man  must  have  training,  for  the  duties  of  the  place  which 
he  holds.  More  than  that,  after  individuals  are  thus  adjusted, 
the  different  smaller  bodies  of  which  an  army  is  composed  must 
learn  to  work  together  as  a  harmonious  whole.  They  must  have 
training,  and  experience,  as  the  component  parts  of  one  single 
organism.  Organization,  using  the  term  in  any  correct  sense, 
even  with  a  mass  of  the  finest  raw  material,  is  generally  the 
result  only  of  active  service  in  the  field  for  a  considerable  period, 
even  with  the  most  adaptable  and  resourceful  of  men. 

Organization  of  the  kind  that  has  here  been  stated  is,  in  the 
British  army,  only  conspicuous  by  its  utter  absence.  It  is 
practically  an  unknown  quantity. 

Last,  and  not  least,  comes  the  immense  dense  intense  ignor- 
ance of  the  British  army,  as  an  army,  of  the  principles  and 
practice  of  modern  scientific  warfare. 

Here  again  it  may  be  assumed,  that  there  is  a  considerable 
number  of  single  individuals  who  have  made  the  military  art  a 
subject  of  conscientious  study.  But  the  British  Army  to- 
day is  still  full  of  younger  sons,  who  do  not  know  what  study 
is;  or  what  work  is.  We  have,  too,  the  further  fact  that 
no  officer  of  the  British  army  to-day  has  had  any  experience  de- 
serving mention  in  actual  modern  warfare.  Their  previous  ex- 
periences in  India,  in  Abyssinia,  on  the  Nile,  and  in  South 
Africa,  have  none  of  them  risen  to  the  dignity  of  war.  There 
have  been  only  contests,  with  superior  weapons  and  superior 
organization,  against  savages,  who  were  wholly  unequipped  with 
the  machinery,  and  were  ignorant  of  the  methods,  of  modern 


89 


warfara  None  of  the  contests  in  which  British  troops  have 
heretofore  been  engaged  since  the  year  1815  deserves  to  be 
classed  as  an  operation  of  war.  The  Crimean  campaign  was  so 
limited  in  its  character,  and  consisted  of  operations  on  so  small 
a  scale,  that  it  deserves  no  serious  consideration  in  this  respect. 
Moreover,  the  Crimean  men  are  nearly  all  of  them  superan- 
nuated. They  count  for  nothing  in  any  practical  consideration 
of  the  British  army  of  today. 

It  is,  therefore,  the  fact,  singular  as  it  may  at  first  appear, 
that  the  British  army,  as  an  army,  however  high  may  be  the 
degree  of  professional  accomplishments  of  some  of  its  individual 
members,  still  wholly  lacks,  as  a  body,  any  thorough  or  systematic 
knowledge  of  the  principles  or  practice  of  modern  scientific 
warfare. 

To  these  facts  must  be  added  the  further  one,  of  extreme  im- 
mobility. 

The  fighting  quality  of  any  army  depends  on  its  capacity 
for  quick  movement.  It  is  like  the  case  of  a  boxer;  he  has  no 
efficiency  as  a  fighter,  unless  he  is  a  quick  hitter  and  stopper,  and 
unless  he  is  quick,  with  his  hands,  and  on  his  feet.  Of  all  things, 
in  order  to  make  an  army  an  efficient  fighting  organism,  it  must 
be  a  good  marcher ;  it  must  have  the  capacity  of  covering  long 
distances  in  a  short  space  of  time. 

That  capacity  the  British  army  essentially  lacks,  by  reason 
of  its  complete  absence  of  experience,  in  any  considerable  move- 
ments of  troops  in  large  numbers.  Especially  it  has  never 
learned  the  matter  of  reducing  to  the  lowest  terms  its  impedi- 
menta. [No  more  signal  instance  of  its  ignorance  in  this  respect 
could  be  given  than  is  found  in  the  Cabul-Kandahar  march  of 
Lord  Roberts,  which  has  been  before  alluded  to.  On  that  march 
Lord  Roberts'  fighting  force  consisted  of  9,986  men  of  all  ranks, 
and  18  guns.  The  camp  followers  numbered  8,13^!  Of  these 
only  4,698  are  stated  to  have  belonged  to  the  "transport  and  other 
departments."  Doolie  bearers  numbered  2,192.  Private  ser- 
vants and  saices  of  native  cavalry  regiments  numbered  1,124. 
Each  European  officer  was  allowed  a  mule;  every  eight  officers 
for  mess  was  allowed  a  mule ;  to  each  staff  officer  for  office  pur- 
poses was  allowed  80  pounds  of  baggage ;  each  native  officer  was 
allowed  30  pounds  of  baggage;  each  British  soldier  was  allowed 


90 


for  kit,  and  camp  equipage,  including  great  coat  and  waterproof 
sheet,  30  pounds ;  each  native  soldier  was  allowed  20  pounds. 
These  allowances  were  in  addition  to  the  supplies  of  all  sorts 
that  were  taken,  including  food,  spirits,  delicacies,  ammunition, 
hospital  equipment,  and  "  carriage  for  foot-sore  soldiers  and 
followers"  !  Lord  Roberts'  force,  marching  after  these  methods, 
required  8,000  animals ! 

It  is  easily  seen  that  anything  like  mobility,  with  habits  of  this 
nature,  is  an  impossibility.  But  that  is  the  method  adopted  by 
the  British  army,  and  the  only  one  permitted  by  its  present 
traditions. 

It  is  quite  apparent,  that  anything  that  deserves  the  name  of 
light  marching  order  is  a  thing  wholly  unknown  to  the  British 
troops,  as  a  matter  of  practical  experience.  That  is  a  thing  they 
have  yet  to  learn.  It  is  only  one  of  many  points,  wherein  they 
must  have  the  hard  training  that  comes  only  from  a  considerable 
experience  in  active  operations  in  the  field.  They  have,  in  fact, 
yet  to  learn  nearly  everything,  as  to  practical  campaigning.. 

We  come  then  to  the  further  most  serious  fact  of  all,  that  the 
War  Office  has  now  exhausted  all  its  resources  in  the  way  of 
men,  which  are  available  to-day  for  operations  in  South  Africa, 
or  which  will  be  available  within  any  reasonable  period.  They 
have  already  taken  from  India  more  men  than  they  dared  to 
withdraw.  They  have  taken  from  Great  Britain  and  Ireland 
every  available  regular.  As  to  men — they  are  at  the  end 
of  their  rope,  for  a  long  time  to  come.  The  militia  and 
volunteers  cannot  be  taken  out  of  England  without  their  consent. 
It  is  already  open  to  grave  doubt,  whether  any  considerable 
number  of  them  will  volunteer.  Conscription  in  the  present 
temper  of  the  British  people,  is  a  very  improbable  resort  There 
is  no  reasonable  prospect  that  the  British  government  will  be 
able  to  carry  on  this  war  by  using  paid  mercenaries,  the  method 
which  for  a  considerable  time  past  has  been  their  method  of 
carrying  on  any  large  military  operations  in  which  they  have 
been  engaged  in  foreign  lands. 

Bearing  this  fact  steadily  in  mind,  that  there  are  no  more 
available  troops  which  the  British  government  can  place  in 
South  Africa  within  a  period  of  several  months,  we  have  the 
further  vital  fact,  well  established  by  recent  events,  that  the 


91 


numbers  of  the  British  forces  now  in  the  field  are  entirely  in- 
adequate to  any  active  aggressive  operations. 

In  addition  to  the  impossibility  under  which  the  British  gov- 
ernment labors,  of  furnishing  any  adequate  number  of  troops 
properly  equipped,  disciplined  and  organized  within  the  period 
of  several  months,  we  further  have  the  fact,  that  for  any  new 
levies  of  new  men  the  British  government  has  no  trained  and 
experienced  officers  capable  of  converting  those  men  into  service- 
able soldiers. 

Any  one  who  remembers  the  conditions  existing  at  the  begin- 
ning of  our  Civil  War  is  well  aware,  that  on  both  sides,  North 
and  South,  the  fact  of  most  importance  for  the  organization 
and  discipline  of  an  army,  was  the  existence  of  a  consider- 
able number  of  trained  and  experienced  soldiers.  Both  North 
and  South  had  at  their  disposal  a  supply  of  West  Point  men 
who  had  seen  active  service  in  the  field;  men  accomplished  in 
their  knowledge  of  the  military  art,  and  familiar,  at  least,  with 
the  handling  of  troops  in  small  numbers.  But  the  British  gov- 
ernment has  no  such  material  at  its  disposal.  Officers,  as  well 
as  men,  for  any  new  bodies  of  troops  which  they  might  raise, 
will  have  to  be  educated.  With  the  inadaptability  of  the  British 
nature,  a  year  is  a  very  moderate  estimate  of  the  time  that  would 
be  required  for  the  organization  and  discipline  of  any  consider- 
able number  of  new  troops. 

The  probability  is  very  great,  that  before  that  time  the 
further  reverses  of  the  British  army  in  South  Africa  would 
be  accompanied  by  intervention,  in  one  form  or  another,  assum- 
ing that  the  British  nation  were  willing  to  make  the  expenditure 
of  men  and  money,  which  would  be  absolutely  required  for  the 
further  prosecution  of  the  present  war. 

General  Buller  is  now  virtually  in  retreat.  His  operations 
of  advance  have  been  a  failure.  There  is  no  reasonable  prospect 
that  they  will  be  soon  resumed.  As  has  been  before  shown,  any 
active  aggressive  movement  by  him  is  virtually  a  military  im- 
possibility, except  by  a  line  of  railway.  On  the  lines  of  railway 
the  Boers  have  a  large  number  of  positions  of  defense,  which  are 
under  existing  conditions  practically  impregnable. 

The  conclusion  to  which  we  are  led  by  these  facts, — lack  of 
brains,  lack  of  organization,  lack  of  practical  knowledge  of  the 


92 


principles  and  practices  of  modern  scientific  warfare,  immobility 
for  the  purposes  of  the  present  conflict  in  South  Africa, — is 
that  the  British  army,  as  an  organization  for  the  -purposes  of 
modern  scientific  warfare,  has  to-day  no  existence.  It  is  not  an 
army,  in  any  serious  sense  of  the  word.  It  is  only  a  mass  of 
magnificent  raw  material,  which  might  be  made  into  a  superior 
fighting  organization,  if  it  had  the  right  men  at  the  head,  if  those 
men  should  be  given  an  entirely  free  hand.  If,  moreover,  which 
is  the  most  serious  point  of  all,  they  had  for  the  purposes  of  re- 
construction and  reorganization  an  unlimited  amount  of  time. 

We  come  next  to  the  consideration  of  the  military  situation 
in  the  immediate  future,  as  nearly  as  the  facts  can  be  now  ascer- 
tained. 

Here  the  first  point,  which  it  is  important  for  us  to  consider, 
is  the  one  already  so  many  times  repeated,  of  the  impossibility 
of  advance  for  active  operations  in  South  Africa  otherwise  than 
by  a  line  of  railway. 

The  ordinary  impossibility  of  supplying  troops  in  large  num- 
bers otherwise  than  by  railway,  is  immeasureably  increased  in 
South  Africa  by  the  absence  of  good  wagon  roads.  The  move- 
ment of  troops  in  large  bodies  must  be  on  roads.  Especially  is 
this  the  case,  in  hilly  and  mountainous  regions.  Even  if  the 
British  forces  were  already  amply  supplied  with  wagons  and 
animals,  they  would  be  unable  to  use  transportation  by  wagon 
for  any  considerable  distance  from  a  railway,  by  reason  of  the 
absence  of  adequate  roads.  Army  wagons  cannot  move  across 
lots.  Poor  roads  soon  get  cut  up  by  heavy  wagons.  The  con- 
sequence is,  that,  in  the  absence  of  a  sufficient  number  of  good 
roads,  the  impossibility  of  moving  troops  in  large  bodies  with- 
out railways  becomes  infinitely  increased. 

The  combination  of  these  two  facts,  the  impossibility  of  sup- 
ply for  troops  in  large  numbers  except  by  rail,  with  the  absence 
of  adequate  wagon  roads  in  South  Africa,  adds  another  feature 
to  the  advantages  of  the  defense,  in  that  it  gives  to  the  Boers  al- 
most invariably  the  selection  of  the  positions  of  conflict.  The 
advance  of  the  invading  force  being  necessarily  along  a  line  of 
railway,  or  of  some  existing  wagon  road,  and  the  movements  of 
troops  being  practically  impossible  elsewhere,  the  defense  has 
the  greatest  possible  latitude  in  the  selection  of  the  positions 


93 


where  it  will  make  a  stand.  Especially  is  this  so  in  a  mountain- 
ous region.  So  that  the  combination  of  these  two  facts  consti- 
tutes another  feature  which  goes  to  make  the  entire  position  of 
the  Boers  well  nigh  impregnable. 

The  Boers  are  able  to  convert  their  opponents'  flanking  and 
turning  movements  into  frontal  attacks.  The  reason  of  it  is, 
that  with  few  and  poor  roads,  the  flanking  and  turning  move- 
ments are  necessarily  so  slow,  that  the  defense  is  able  easily  to 
meet  those  movements  with  new  fronts  and  new  fieldworks.  In 
effect,  the  defense  can  nearly  always  make  its  own  choice  of 
position  where  it  can  turn  every  flanking  movement  into  an  at- 
tack on  its  front. 

The  next  point  that  we  have  to  consider  is  the  immense  dif- 
ficulty of  any  substantial  advance  by  either  existing  line  of 
railway. 

Four  lines  of  railway  are  the  only  ones  in  existence.  They 
are :  the  line  from  Lourenco  Marquez  to  Pretoria ;  the  line  from 
Durban  through  Colenso,  Ladysmith,  Charlestown  and  Stander- 
ton  to  Pretoria ;  the  three  lines,  which  virtually  form  only  one, 
from  East  London,  Port  Alfred  and  Port  Elizabeth,  through 
Middelburg  and  Molteno,  to  Springfontein,  and  thence  through 
the  Eree  State  to  Pretoria ;  and  the  fourth  line  from  Cape  Town, 
through  DeAar  and  Hopetown  to  Kimberley  and  Maf  eking. 

The  first  line  from  Lourenco  Marquez  is  not  within  the  im- 
mediate possibilities,  inasmuch  as  it  goes  through  Portuguese 
territory.  If  that  fact,  however,  were  absent,  that  line  is 
essentially  like  the  one  on  which  Sir  Bedvers  Buller  has  already 
been  making  his  futile  efforts.  It  goes  through  the  same  kind 
of  country.    It  admits  the  same  kind  of  defense. 

The  second  line,  from  Durban  through  Colenso  and  Lady- 
smith,  has  already  been  demonstrated  to  be  practically  impos- 
sible. Erom  Colenso  to  Charlestown  it  runs  virtually  through 
one  continuous  defile.  General  Buller  has  already  found  it 
impossible  to  advance  beyond  Colenso.  An  examination  of 
the  map  shows  that  in  addition  to  numerous  other  difficult  posi- 
tions, there  is  between  Mt.  Prospect  and  Charlestown  a  long 
tunnel.  Between  Mt.  Prospect  and  Ingogo  is  a  reversing 
station,  where  the  curves  are  very  sharp,  for  the  purpose  of 
carrying  the  railroad  up  a  very  steep  incline.    At  all  these  points 


94 


destruction  of  the  railroad  is  a  matter  of  the  greatest  ease,  while 
its  re-construction  and  preservation  would  be  a  practical  im- 
possibility. In  addition  to  those  points  there  are  many  others, 
where  the  railroad  crosses  streams,  as  has  already  been  men- 
tioned, any  one  of  which  points  is  a  point  of  vulnerability. 

But  the  possibilities  of  the  British  army  on  those  lines  of 
railway  have  already  been  exhausted.  Advance  along  those 
lines,  for  any  considerable  distance,  with  the  present  British 
forces,  has  already  been  shown  to  be  a  practical  impossibility. 
Even  if  the  British  troops  had  to-day  succeeded  in  relieving  the 
beleaguered  forces  at  Ladysmith,  the  position  as  to  an  advance 
through  Charlestown  towards  Pretoria  would  not  be  changed  in 
its  essentials.  The  distance  from  Ladysmith  to  Charlestown  by 
rail  is  115  miles.  Since  the  first  of  October  the  British  troops 
have  hardly  advanced  a  single  mile.  It  is  easy  to  see  that  the 
accomplishment  of  any  considerable  distance  along  these  lines 
of  railway,  with  the  forces  now  at  the  command  of  the  British 
Government,  or  with  any  force  which  will  be  at  their  command 
within  a  year,  is  a  practical  impossibility. 

The  next  line  to  the  west  through  Colesburg  and  Bloemfon- 
tein,  so  far  as  concerns  an  advance  on  Pretoria,  is  even  more 
impracticable  than  the  shorter  line  from  Durban  through  Colenso 
and  Ladysmith.  On  the  Bloemfontein  line  the  British  troops 
have  not  yet  succeeded  in  getting  north  of  the  Orange  River.  In 
all  human  probability  the  Orange  River  would  be  found  to  be  a 
more  serious  obstacle  to  their  advance  than  they  have  already  ex- 
perienced in  the  Tugela.  Assuming,  however,  that  the  British 
troops  could  succeed  in  forcing  the  Orange  River,  an  assumption 
quite  beyond  the  bounds  of  reasonable  military  probabilities, 
thereafter  their  advance  would  be  one  over  a  distance  of  over 
eight  hundred  miles.  From  their  experience  hitherto,  the  possi- 
bility of  the  British  forces  accomplishing  that  distance,  within 
any  reasonable  time,  is  a  matter  upon  which  every  man  can 
form  his  own  opinion. 

The  same  considerations  that  have  already  been  presented 
apply  with  even  greater  force  to  the  line  of  railway  from  Cape 
Town  through  DeAar,  Kimberley  and  Mafeking.  If  we  as- 
sume that  any  considerable  British  force  could  succeed  in  reach- 
ing Mafeking,  from  that  point  they  would  have  a  march  to 


95 


Pretoria  overland  through,  a  country  full  of  streams,  without 
roads,  without  any  railway  line.  If  the  considerations  here 
previously  presented  are  sound,  that  is  a  possibility  not  seriously 
to  be  considered. 

The  conclusion  on  this  point  of  our  study,  then,  is  that  the 
advance  by  either  line  of  railway  considered  separately,  is  a 
practical  impossibility  for  any  force  at  the  command  of  the 
British  government 

We  have  next  to  consider  the  possibility  of  any  advance  by 
several  lines  simultaneously. 

This  possibility  is  one  easily  comprehended. 

If  the  available  forces  at  the  command  of  the  British  govern- 
ment are  inadequate  to  the  accomplishment  of  any  advance,  even 
if  those  forces  be  concentrated  on  a  single  line  of  railway,  it  is 
evidently  a  mere  matter  of  mathematical  demonstration  that 
the  same  force  distributed  on  different  lines  would  be  even  more 
unable  to  accomplish  any  substantial  result. 

This  statement,  of  course,  is  made  with  the  proviso  that  any 
military  situation  may  be  at  any  moment  completely  trans- 
formed by  unforeseen  accidents. 

At  the  same  time  it  is  to  be  noted  that  nearly  all  of  those 
accidents  will  operate  in  the  large  majority  of  cases  to  the  ad- 
vantage of  the  defense. 

But  here  we  come  on  the  most  vital  consideration  of  all,  the 
unwillingness  of  the  British  people  to  make  the  expenditure  of 
men  and  money,  which  will  undoubtedly  be  necessary  in  order 
to  complete  the  Transvaal  conquest. 

The  British  press  to-day  is  full  of  protestations  of  the  deter- 
mination of  the  British  public  to  see  this  war  through  to  the 
bitter  end.  Those  protestations,  however,  go  upon  the  assump- 
tion, that  British  success  can  be  achieved  within  a  reasonable 
time,  and  with  a  reasonable  expenditure  of  men  and  money.  So 
far  as  the  indications  have  yet  gone,  the  British  people  have 
given  no  practical  consideration  to  the  cost  in  men  and  money 
that  the  war  will  entail.  Thus  far  there  has  been  one  appro- 
priation of  money  for  purposes  of  the  war,  of  ten  million  pounds. 
It  needs  a  very  slight  consideration  of  the  existing  situation,  to 
see  that  any  such  amount  will  be  utterly  inadequate  to  a  prosecu- 
tion of  the  war  for  any  considerable  period, — even  with  the? 


96 


forces  now  in  the  field.  When,  however,  we  go  further,  and  con- 
sider the  vast  expenditure  of  money  alone,  that  will  be  required 
in  order  to  organize  and  equip  any  large  body  of  re-enforcements 
and  put  those  re-enforcements  in  the  field  in  South  Africa,  the 
gross  disproportion  of  any  amounts  of  money  that  have  thus  far 
been  mentioned  in  the  English  press  will  strike  every  reasonable 
and  well-informed  person.  Two  hundred  millions  of  pounds 
would,  in  all  probability,  not  cover  the  expenditure  of  a  single 
year.  A  loss  of  ten  thousand  men  in  killed  and  wounded  down 
to  the  present  day  is  the  cost  in  men  alone,  that  has  already  en- 
sued upon  these  comparatively  small  operations,  which  have 
only  been  the  preliminaries  to  the  war.  Judging  from  the 
present  accomplished  results,  and  the  present  existing  situation, 
a  loss  of  fifty  thousand  men  is  not  at  all  beyond  the  reasonable 
probable  requirements  of  a  final  British  success, — unless  the 
Republics  are  overwhelmed  by  the  failure  of  supplies.  Such  a 
failure  does  not  now  seem  probable.  The  probabilities,  there- 
fore, are  that  an  expenditure  of  many  millions  of  money  and  of 
many  thousands  of  men  will  be  required  by  the  British  govern- 
ment before  any  conquest  of  the  Republics. 

Will  the  British  people  be  ready  to  make  that  sacrifice  for 
success  in  a  war  which  has  been  begun,  as  the  best  Englishmen 
are  aware,  simply  to  promote  the  designs  of  a  great  stock  specu- 
lator and  a  professional  politician  ? 

That  question  is  one  which  has  not  been  yet  answered.  It  is 
one  which  cannot  to-day  receive  a  certain  answer.  The  proba- 
bility, however,  judging  from  the  past  of  the  British  people, 
and  from  the  main  features  of  the  present  situation,  are  very 
large,  that  the  sober  second  sense  of  the  English  people  will  fol- 
low the  same  lines  followed  in  the  year  1881.  On  this  point  we 
are  to  consider  the  temper  existing  on  the  other  side.  The  two 
Republics  are  determined  to  fight  this  war  through  to  th9  death. 
Eor  them  it  is  a  struggle  for  existence.  It  is  a  struggle  which 
has  been  forced  upon  them.  The  war,  as  they  look  upon  it,  and 
as  it  actually  exists,  on  the  real  facts,  is  a  war  of  unjustifiable 
aggression.  The  two  Republics  rightly  look  upon  it  as  a  war  for 
freedom.  Their  determination,  as  nearly  as  we  are  able  to 
judge,  will  suffer  no  change.  The  war  must  be  a  war  of  com- 
plete subjugation,  of  final  and  absolute  conquest,  practically  a 


97 


war  of  extermination,  before  it  can  be  crowned  with  a  British 
victory. 

But  at  all  times  it  must  be  repeated,  defense  by  the  Boers  de- 
pends on  the  adequacy  of  their  supplies,  of  ammunition,  and 
food.  It  is  understood,  that  their  supply  of  both  is  ample.  But 
on  this  vital  essential  point,  no  outsider  can  have  knowledge. 
This  is  the  key  to  the  entire  military  situation.  If  the  Boers 
can  hold  out  on  the  question  of  supplies,  their  position  is  one  of 
immense  strength. 

Any  advantages  of  position  may,  of  course,  be  thrown  away 
by  bad  generalship.  But  the  bad  generalship  thus  far  has  all 
been  on  the  side  of  the  British.  It  will  probably  remain  there, 
until  they  get  rid  of  their  immense  superincumbent  mass  of 
dead  wood. 

But  that  would  require  a  long  time. 

These  features  of  the  situation  lead  us  to  a  consideration  of  a 
further  point, — the  question  whether  the  British  Government 
will  be  allowed  to  carry  through  a  war  of  extermination,  without 
an  effectual  protest  on  the  part  of  other  nations. 

At  this  point  we  start  with  the  well  known  fact,  that  all  of  the 
continental  nations  warmly  sympathize  with  the  Boers;  that 
they  thoroughly  desire  British  failure;  and  that  British  mis- 
fortune will  not  only  satisfy  their  present  sentiments,  but  will 
serve,  in  their  opinion,  their  present  and  future  interests.  The 
public  policies  of  nations  are  almost  invariably  dominated  by  the 
view  that  they  entertain  of  their  own  interests.  The  view  en- 
tertained of  their  own  interests  by  all  of  the  continental  nations 
to-day  is,  that  those  interests  will  be  best  served  by  British 
failure.  The  probability  then  is  very  strong,  that  before  allow- 
ing the  completion  of  a  war  of  extermination  against  the  two 
Republics,  some  one  or  all  of  the  Continental  powers  will  commit 
themselves  to  a  policy  of  intervention  in  one  or  another  form. 

This  possibility  of  foreign  intervention  is  further  compli- 
cated by  the  possibilities  of  Russian  policy.  For  more  than  a 
century  there  has  been  a  steady  Russian  advance  over  the  Asiatic 
continent.  Russian  policy  has  been  one  of  continuous  Asiatic 
absorption.  Has  that  policy  yet  reached  its  end  ?  Even  if  it  has 
not,  has  it  yet  reached  a  point  which  satisfies  Russian  aspira- 
tions ?    The  most  prominent  Russian  enterprise  of  to-day  is  the 


98 


completion  of  the  so-called  Trans-Siberian  railway.  That  rail- 
way, euphemistically  termed  Trans-Siberian,  is  at  present,  so  far 
as  concerns  Siberia,  largely  a  project  of  the  future.  If,  on  the 
other  hand,  we  look  at  the  actual  accomplished  results  of  to-day, 
we  shall  find  that  actual  construction  has  proceeded  up  to  the 
borders  of  India,  or,  to  speak  more  definitely,  up  to  the  borders 
of  Afghanistan.  So  that,  if  the  great  Russian  railway  enterprise 
were  more  correctly  named,  it  would  be  called  the  "Railway  to 
India."  In  this  connection  is  to  be  noted  the  fact  that  very  re- 
cently movements  of  Russian  troops  have  been  reported  on  the 
frontier  of  Afghanistan.  Those  movements,  if  accurately  re- 
ported, can  have  only  one  purpose.  It  is  extremely  improbable, 
so  improbable  as  to  seem  almost  impossible,  that  the  Russians, 
if  the  British  government  is  involved  in  a  long  war,  and  es- 
pecially if  the  British  government  is  involved  in  an  unsuccessful 
war,  will  lose  so  promising  an  opportunity  of  stirring  up  revolt 
in  India.  In  India,  the  opinion  of  the  highest  British  authori- 
ties is  that  the  British  people  is  sleeping  on  a  volcano.  Lord 
Roberts  has  set  forth  in  his  Recollections  with  great  force  the 
serious  dangers  impending  in  India.  Mr.  Steevens,  the  London 
correspondent,  in  his  book  entitled  "In  India,"  has  given  utter- 
ance to  the  almost  universal  consciousness  on  the  part  of  the 
British  Indian  officials,  of  the  extreme  danger  of  insurrection.  It 
is  well  known,  that  there  has  been  widespread  discontent  among 
the  inhabitants  of  that  country  for  the  last  few  years.  It  has 
been  frequently  stated  by  prominent  Englishmen,  that  disaster 
in  the  South  African  war  would  bring  a  large  probability  of 
revolt  in  the  east. 

What  are  the  probabilities,  then,  of  peace  in  India,  if  the 
British  government  should  become  involved  in  South  Africa  in 
a  long  war,  and  especially  if  that  war  should  result  in  great 
disaster?  These  are  questions  which  admit  of  no  certain 
answer. 

On  this  branch  of  our  study  we  have  the  further  fact  that 
the  gold  and  diamond  mines  in  South  Africa  at  present  yield 
no  return  to  their  owners;  and  that  it  was  the  owners  of  those 
mines  who  really  started  this  present  war,  for  the  purpose  of 
getting  control  of  the  government  of  the  Transvaal  Republic, 
and  of  the  Orange  Free  State.    Those  mine  owners  counted  on 


99 


a  speedy  success  of  the  British  arms.  They  assumed  that  victory 
was  certain,  and  would  come  quickly;  and  that  the  profitable 
working  of  their  mines  would  have  only  a  short  interruption. 

As  soon  as  the  mine  owners  see  that  the  resumption  of  the 
working  of  their  mines  will  come  only  at  the  end  of  a  very  long 
and  uncertain  war,  what  are  the  probabilities  as  to  the  direction 
in  which  their  influence  would  be  exercised?  It  would  seem 
highly  probable  that  they  will  make  an  effort  to  have  a  speedy 
peace.  A  speedy  peace  can  come  apparently  only  by  cessation  of 
the  present  attempt  at  conquest. 

Some  weight,  moreover,  must  be  given  to  the  sentiment  of  the 
civilised  world.  The  sentiment  of  the  European  Continent  is 
already  well  known.  The  only  first  class  power  as  to  which  in 
this  respect  there  is  any  doubt  is  the  United  States.  The  feeling 
of  the  people  of  the  United  States  is  rapidly  changing.  The 
indications  of  that  fact  are  not  far  to  seek.  Even  with  the 
present  widespread  ignorance  of  the  real  facts  of  the  political 
situation  between  Great  Britain  and  the  Republics,  the  sympa- 
thies of  the  American  people  are  largely  with  the  Republics. 
When,  however,  the  real  facts  of  the  political  situation  become 
known,  as  those  facts  exist  in  the  British  Blue  Books,  there  can 
be  little  doubt  that  the  sympathies  of  our  people,  now  wavering 
in  the  balance,  will  turn  strongly  on  the  side  of  the  Republics. 
With  such  turning,  it  will  be  a  matter  of  grave  doubt  whether 
the  British  Government  will  venture  to  resist  for  any  consider* 
able  time  the  combined  and  concentrated  sympathy  of  the  entire 
western  world. 

The  latest  cable  advices  as  to  the  British  operations  in  South 
Africa  mention  the  occupation  by  British  troops  of  a  situation 
at  Theebus,  just  west  of  Steynsburg,  between  Steynsburg  and 
Middleburg.  This  movement,  taken  in  connection  with  Gen- 
eral Buller's  reported  proclamation  to  his  troops  of  his  intention 
to  renew  his  advance  on  Ladysmith,  would  seem  to  indicate 
very  possibly  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  British  forces  to 
operate  on  another  line  of  invasion,  the  one  through  the  Orange 
Free  State  by  Springfontein  and  Bloemfontein. 

An  advance  on  this  line  through  the  Orange  Free  State  ap- 
pears to  present  difficulties  of  precisely  the  same  nature  with 
those  attending  the  advance  along  the  line  of  railroad  through 


100 


Colenso  and  Ladysmith,  and  quite  as  insuperable.  Bear  in 
mind  that  General  Buller's  movement  in  retreat,  or  if  that  be 
deemed  an  expression  hardly  warranted  by  the  facts,  his  sus- 
pension of  any  movement  in  advance,  is  virtually  equivalent  to 
a  confession  of  failure.  It  is  an  admission  that  an  advance 
along  the  line  of  railroad  from  Colenso  is  now  impracticable. 
Even  if  General  Buller  should  succeed  in  his  advance  to  Lady- 
smith,  and  should  relieve  the  force  at  present  confined  there, 
the  military  situation  would  not  be  essentially  altered.  British 
prestige  would  be  for  the  time  to  a  slight  extent  rehabilitated. 
The  essential  fundamental  difficulties,  however,  of  an  advance 
on  that  line  of  railway  into  the  Transvaal  would  still  remain. 
It  would  still  be  the  fact  that  the  advance  of  the  British  troops 
could  be  resisted  at  an  almost  indefinite  number  of  points,  by 
lines  of  field  works  well  armed  and  well  manned,  so  that  the 
cost  in  time  and  men  of  a  movement  into  the  Transvaal  Re- 
public on  that  line  must  be  deemed  under  existing  circum- 
stances to  constitute  a  virtually  impossible  barrier. 

The  military  situation  with  reference  to  an  advance  through 
Springfontein  and  Bloemfontein  is  practically  identical  with 
the  one  applicable  to  the  advance  by  Colenso  and  Ladysmith. 
A  mere  glance  at  the  map  makes  it  evident  that  concerted  co- 
operation between  the  forces  operating  on  the  Springfontein 
line  and  forces  on  the  line  between  Durban  and  Charlestown, 
is  an  impossibility.  There  is  no  communication  between  those 
two  districts,  by  rail  or  road.  Any  movement  of  troops  from 
one  district  to  the  other  is  impossible,  that  is  for  the  purposes 
of  concerted  military  action.  The  advance  along  the  Bloem- 
fontein line,  therefore,  must  stand  or  fall  on  its  own  merits  as 
an  independent  operation. 

Considering  it  from  this  point  of  view,  we  have  to  note  the 
following  facts.  The  line  of  supply  from  either  Port  Eliza- 
beth, Port  Alfred  or  East  London  to  Middleburg  and  Molteno 
is  very  long,  and  has  heavy  grades.  Transportation,  therefore, 
will  be  slow  and  difficult.  The  altitude  at  Queenstown  on  the 
line  from  East  London  to  Molteno  is  3,400  feet.  The  altitude 
of  Cradock  on  the  line  from  Port  Alfred  or  Port  Elizabeth  to 
Middleburg  is  3,028  feet.  At  Colesberg  the  altitude  is  4,000 
feet.    From  Colesberg  and  Burghersdorp  the  railroads  descend 


101 


to  the  Valley  of  the  Orange  River.  The  Orange  River  without 
doubt  furnishes  a  line  of  advance  which  can  be  made  very 
strong.  If,  however,  the  British  troops  should  succeed  in  ad- 
vancing through  Molteno  and  Burghersdorp  or  through  Naauw- 
port  and  Colesberg  to  the  Orange  River,  and  should  thereafter 
succeed  in  forcing  a  passage  across  the  Orange  River,  then  their 
advance  could  be  indefinitely  delayed  by  destroying  the  bridges 
over  the  Orange  River  and  over  the  many  streams  to  the  north 
of  it.  In  this  district  the  British  forces  would  be  even  more 
dependent  upon  the  railway  for  their  supplies  than  elsewhere. 
The  maps  at  my  command  indicate  no  wagon  roads  whatever  in 
the  district  from  Burghersdorp  and  Colesberg  to  the  north- 
ward until  we  get  to  Edenburg  on  the  railway  line  to  Bloem- 
fontein,  with  the  exception  of  a  road  from  Bethulie  through 
Welkom  to  Etonburg.  Even  this  is  probably  a  very  poor  road, 
inasmuch  as  it  appears  on  some  of  the  maps  as  only  a  telegraph 
line.  The  probability  therefore  is  that  it  is  practically  worth- 
less for  the  purposes  of  transportation  or  the  movement  of 
troops  in  any  considerable  number.  An  advance  along  the 
Colenso  and  Ladysmith  line  has  at  any  rate  this  in  its  favor, 
that  there  is  a  main  wagon  road  there  which  has  been  long  in 
use,  which  it  is  fair  to  assume,  therefore,  may  be  available  for 
wagon  transportation.  On  the  Bloemfontein  line,  however, 
so  far  as  is  indicated  by  the  maps,  there  is  an  entire  absence 
of  ordinary  wagon  roads.  The  British  forces,  therefore,  would 
be  entirely  dependent  upon  the  railway  for  supplies,  and  conse- 
quently their  line  of  communication  could  be  interrupted  with 
ease  at  any  moment  which  should  suit  the  convenience  of  the 
Republicans.  Basing  our  computations  as  to  the  possibility  of 
any  advance  along  the  Bloemfontein  line  within  any  reasonable 
period  of  time  on  the  rapidity  of  General  Buller's  operations 
along  the  Colenso  line,  it  would  seem  that  there  is  no  sub- 
stantial ground  for  apprehending  any  different  result  to  a  move- 
ment of  the  British  forces  into  the  Orange  Free  State  than  has 
come  from  General  Buller's  attempt,  which  has  thus  far  been 
a  complete  failure. 

The  fundamental  fact  which  underlies  the  entire  military 
situation,  by  whatever  line  the  attempt  may  be  made  to  invade 
the  Transvaal  Republic,  is  simply  the  impregnability  under 


102 


all  ordinary  circumstances  of  the  Republican  position.  It 
is  virtually  one  large  fortress.  The  approaches  to  that 
fortress  lie  through  a  country  impassable  for  military  op- 
erations on  any  large  scale.  This  fact  seems  thus  far  to  be 
wholly  ignored  by  the  British  military  writers.  They  vir- 
tually make  no  allowance  for  the  peculiar  topography  of  the 
field  of  operations.  They  virtually  assume,  that  movements  of 
troops  can  be  made  over  any  part  of  the  South  African  terri- 
tory in  almost  the  same  manner,  and  with  almost  as  much  ease, 
as  would  be  possible  in  the  plains  of  Flanders.  They  have  not 
studied  topography.  It  is  a  matter  of  common  report  that  the 
British  War  Office  has  been  inadequately  supplied  with  maps. 
This  is  merely  a  single  point  which  shows  the  ignorance  and 
incapacity  of  the  British  War  Office,  and  their  ignorance  of 
the  fundamental  conditions  of  modern  warfare.  Their  methods 
are  still  medieval. 

The  difficulties  of  the  British  situation,  so  far  as  any  one  can 
judge,  are  too  deep  to  be  eradicated  within  any  period  of  time 
which  will  be  practicable  for  the  needs  of  this  present  war. 
The  Marquis  of  Salisbury  in  his  speech  in  the  House  of  Lords, 
shows  a  consciousness  of  the  nature  of  the  real  difficulty.  His 
language  is  reported  by  cable  as  follows: 

"  The  Prime  Minister  declared  that  he  regarded  the  British  system  rather 
than  individuals  to  be  at  fault.  He  did  not  think  the  British  Constitution 
as  it  now  worked  was  a  good  fighting  machine.  It  was  unequalled  for 
producing  prosperity  and  liberty  in  times  of  peace,  but  in  times  of  war, 
when  the  great  powers,  with  enormous  armies,  were  watching  Great 
Britain  with  no  gentle  or  kindly  eye,  it  became  Englishmen  to  think 
whether  they  must  not  in  some  degree  modify  existing  arrangements  so 
as  to  enable  themselves  to  meet  dangers  which  might  at  any  moment  arise 
to  menace  them. "   *   *   *  * 

"  '  We  must  all,'  he  said,  '  join  together  and  exercise  all  our  powers  in 
order  to  extricate  ourselves  from  a  situation  that  is  full  of  humiliation  and 
not  free  from  danger.  We  must  defer  the  pleasing  task  of  quarrelling 
among  ourselves  until  the  war  is  satisfactorily  concluded  '  " 

The  Prime  Minister  has  his  hand  upon  the  real  seat  of  the 
trouble.  It  is  a  fact  that  "  the  British  Constitution  as  it  now 
works  is  not  a  good  fighting  machine."  It  is  the  fact  that  "  in 
times  of  war  when  the  great  powers  with  enormous  armies  are 
watching  Great  Britain  with  no  gentle  or  kindly  eye,  it  becomes 


103 


Englishmen  to  think  whether  they  must  not  in  some  degree 
modify  existing  arrangements  so  as  to  enable  themselves  to 
meet  dangers  which  may  at  any  moment  arise  to  menace  them." 

But  in  order  to  make  the  British  Constitution  "  a  good  fight- 
ing machine,"  will  require  a  fundamental  reconstruction,  and  re- 
organization, of  the  entire  British  political  fabric.  Govern- 
ment by  the  members  of  a  few  favored  familits  will  have  to  be 
abandoned.  The  political  system  under  which  the  control  of  the 
army  and  navy  is  placed  in  the  hands  of  a  Committee  of  parlia- 
mentary politicians,  whose  members  change  from  year  to  year, 
or  month  to  month,  whose  time  and  labor  must  necessarily  be 
given,  and  always  is  given,  to  the  retention  of  their  working 
majority  in  the  House  of  Commons,  must  be  thoroughly  recon- 
structed. It  is  not  here  contended,  that  the  development  of 
democracy  on  this  side  of  the  water  has  yet  reached  its  final  form. 
It  is  not  here  contended  that  our  own  national  constitution  gives 
us  as  yet  the  perfection  of  administration.  We  do,  however,  have 
one  inestimable  advantage,  that  the  War  Office  is  in  the  hands 
of  a  single  man,  who  is  under  a  high  degree  of  responsibility 
for  its  action,  who  is  under  responsibility  for  nothing  else,  who 
has  at  least  a  term  of  four  years,  on  which  he  can  depend  as  a 
practical  certainly,  for  the  learning  and  the  doing  of  his  of- 
ficial work.  During  those  four  years,  at  least,  he  can  give  his 
time  and  thought  to  the  affairs  of  the  army.  He  13  not 
compelled  to  be  answering  questions  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, or  looking  after  a  working  majority  from  day  to  day,  in 
order  to  prevent  the  loss  of  his  official  place.  So  it  is,  therefore, 
that  in  spite  of  the  many  imperfections  of  our  own  present 
system  of  government,  we  have  some  great  advantages  which  go 
far  towards  protecting  us  from  the  extreme  inefficiency  and  in- 
competency that  invariably  attends  the  workings  of  the  British 
War  Office.  It  is  the  fact,  as  the  Marquis  of  Salisbury  begins 
dimly  to  understand,  that  the  parliamentary  system  will  have 
to  go  by  the  board.  The  British  people  will  have  to  devise  a 
new  regime,  under  which  they  can  get  brains  at  the  head,  under 
which  the  men  at  the  head  of  the  public  administration  will 
be  selected  for  their  own  ability,  and  not  in  the  main  because 
they  are  the  sons  of  their  ancestors.  In  short,  government  by 
younger  sons,  by  family  favorites,  by  men  who  are  selected 


104 


in  the  main  for  birth  and  not  worth,  must  be  thrown  overboard, 
finally  and  forever  in  England,  if  they  wish  any  serious 
reform  in  the  management  of  their  War  Office,  their  Naval 
Office,  or  of  any  of  their  great  offices  of  administration.  Eou- 
tine  work  of  a  common  place  order  can  be  done  fairly  well 
by  country  gentlemen  who  give  to  public  affairs  the  intervals 
between  golf  and  grouse.  Public  work  of  the  highest  order 
calls  for  men  of  brains,  who  have  learned  how  to  do  hard  work, 
who  approach  politics  with  something  other  than  the  temper 
of  dilettantes,  who  take  their  official  work  seriously,  and  give  to 
it  their  entire  energies.  The  Marquis  of  Salisbury  is  undoubt- 
edly right.  His  views  quite  thoroughly  coincide  with  those  of 
Lord  Eosebery,  who  is  reported  as  having  very  recently  delivered 
himself  of  the  following  remarks : 

"The  war  will  be  cheap  if  it  teaches  the  nation  that  it  has  lived  too 
much  from  hand  to  mouth  and  that  it  must  place  things  on  a  scientific  or 
methodical  basis.  In  commerce,  education  and  war  Great  Britain  is  not 
methodical  and  not  scientific.  The  task  ahead  is  the  greatest  which  ever 
lay  before  a  nation,  and  will  occupy  the  present  Government  and  many 
future  Governments.  But  it  will  have  to  be  faced.  The  country  has  yet 
to  bring  the  war  to  a  triumphant  conclusion.  When  that  is  done,  it  must 
set  to  work  and  put  the  Empire  on  a  business  footing,  and  strive  to  make 
it  realize  the  British  ideal  of  an  Empire,  without  menace,  without  oppres- 
sion— a  model  State  ruled  by  institutions  and  inhabited  by  a  model  race." 


105 


THE  CAUSE  OF  THE  BOERS. 


The  cause  of  the  Boers  is  the  cause  of  all  that  is  best  in  British 
history.  Eor  the  time — the  English  people  have  forgotten  their 
high  mission,  the  diffusion  of  the  blessings  of  civil  and  religious 
freedom.  By  the  strange  irony  of  events,  they  have  allowed  the 
helm  of  State  to  get  into  the  hands  of  a  cheap  Birming- 
ham demagogue,  who  has  in  his  nature  nothing  whatever  that 
is  noble  or  magnanimous.  The  English  people,  in  their  tempo- 
rary neglect  of  public  affairs,  has  allowed  itself  to  drift  into  a 
policy  of  wanton  aggression — into  an  attempt  at  mere  mediaeval 
Spanish  conquest — for  land,  and  gold.  It  has — in  effect — 
placed  its  army,  and  its  navy,  at  the  beck  and  call  of  a  speculator 
in  mining  stocks,  and  a  professional  machine  politician.  Eng- 
land's statesmen  have  been — for  the  time — guilty  of  the  crime 
of  abdication. 

England  must  correct  her  errors.  Those  errors  cannot  be  cor- 
rected by  mere  persistence  in  wrongdoing.  England  must  suf- 
fer— to  some  extent — the  consequences  of  her  own  neglect  of 
her  own  public  affairs.  By  an  oversight,  she  has  allowed  the 
supreme  control  of  her  foreign  policy  to  fall  into  unworthy 
hands.  Her  Prime  Minister  has  been  unduly  confiding.  The 
House  of  Commons  leader  in  Her  Majesty's  Government  has 
been  unduly  confiding.  Their  confidence  has  been  betrayed — 
by  a  man  who  has  been  using  the  great  powers  of  his  public  office 
for  personal  ends.  It  is  by  no  means  the  first  time,  that  the 
same  man  has  been  guilty  of  the  same  offense.  It  is  needless  at 
this  moment  to  recall  from  the  pages  of  their  chosen  organ  the 
veracious  utterances  of  the  feelings  of  loathing  and  disgust, 
which  the  Marquis  of  Salisbury  and  Mr.  Balfour  have  felt  in 
the  past  for  Mr.  Joseph  Chamberlain.  Those  feelings  have 
never  changed.  The  exigencies  of  party  politics  have — for  the 
time — compelled  the  two  Conservative  statesmen  to  treat  with 
an  appearance  of  friendliness,  in  public,  and  probably  in  private, 
a  man  for  whom  they  have  always  had  feelings  of  supreme  com 


106 


tempt.  Those  feelings  were  due  to  the  man's  real  character. 
That  character  has  never  changed.  He  will  sell  out  any  friend, 
or  any  cause. 

!No  obligations,  which  the  statesmen  of  the  Conservative  party 
in  England  have  any  right  now  to  consider,  bind  them  to  give 
a  longer  support  to  a  man  who  has  betrayed  the  confidence  of  his 
colleagues,  of  his  Sovereign,  and  of  the  English  people. 

All  three  of  these,  the  statesmen  of  the  Conservative  party, 
Her  Majesty  our  Sovereign  Lady  the  Queen,  and  the  English 
people,  owe  it  to  themselves,  and  to  the  rest  of  the  civilised  world, 
to  depose  from  his  high  place  the  man  who  is — thus  far — almost 
solely  responsible  for  the  existence  of  a  war  of  unprovoked  law- 
less aggression  on  a  poor  and  small  people,  a  people  that  has 
thus  far  been  commonly  deemed  weak,  even  for  the  mere  pur- 
poses of  self  defense. 

Further  persistence  in  this  unholy  and  unrighteous  war,  by 
the  English  people,  will  make  them  accessories  to  the  crimes  of 
Mr.  Chamberlain  and  Mr.  Rhodes — will  make  them  accessories 
before  the  fact.  In  law,  subsequent  ratification  is  equivalent  to 
previous  authorisation.  If  the  English  people  ratifies  the  ac- 
tion of  Mr.  Rhodes  and  Mr.  Chamberlain — and  an  omission  to 
disavow  and  undo  that  action  will  be  a  ratification — then  the 
English  people  will  be — in  legal  effect — the  originators — from 
the  outset,  and  the  pursuers — to  the  close — of  this  policy  of  law- 
less aggression,  of  wholesale  robbery  and  murder. 

In  that  case,  the  rest  of  the  civilised  world  will  know  how  to 
deal  with  England. 

We  Americans  have  good  memories.  We  were  willing  to 
forget  the  past.  We  were  willing  to  forget  the  cruelty  and  bar- 
barism of  the  persecution  which  drove  our  ancestors  into  exile, 
and  compelled  them  in  their  days  of  poverty  and  distress  to  seek 
an  asylum  with  the  Dutch.  We  were  ready  to  forget  the  years 
of  cold  neglect,  tempered  with  tyranny,  which  we  endured  in 
our  colonial  period.  We  were  ready  to  forget  the  further  periods 
of  oppression  and  misrule,  which  drove  us  into  armed  re- 
bellion, into  a  reluctant  declaration  of  our  independence,  and 
a  protracted  war  to  achieve  our  national  existence.  We  were 
ready  to  forget  the  barbarous  methods  used  by  England  in 
that  contest,  and  her  cruel  and  inhuman  treatment  of  our  cap- 


107 


tured  prisoners.  We  were  ready  to  forget  the  later  acts  of 
insolence  and  cruel  barbarity,  wbich  a  second  time  drove  us  to 
take  up  arms  against  the  mother  country.  We  were  ready  to 
forget  the  occurrences  of  onr  Civil  War ;  the  indecent  speed,  with 
which  she  seized  the  first  opportunity  to  jump  on  us  when  we 
were  down,  the  alacrity  with  which  she  threw  aside  all  her  pre- 
vious protestations  against  the  horrors  of  slavery,  and  the  glee 
with  which  her  oflicial  class  gloated  over  each  fresh  misfortune, 
which  they  fancied  made  another  step  towards  the  final  result  of 
defeat  and  disruption.  All  these  things  we  were  ready  to  rele- 
gate to  the  realm  of  the  forgotten  past — on  the  first  manifesta- 
tion by  the  British  people  of  any  feeling  of  genuine  f riendliness 
or  affection. 

But  when  we  see  the  same  policy  followed,  persistently  and 
relentlessly,  against  another  race  of  kinsmen  beyond  the  sea, 
the  kinsmen  who  gave  us  shelter  in  the  time  of  our  weakness  and 
misery,  when  we  remember  that  the  manifestations  of  friendly 
feeling  for  ourselves  were  delayed  till  the  period  when  we  are 
rich  and  strong  beyond  the  dreams  of  ancient  statesmen,  then 
we  are  compelled  to  think.  Then  we  are  compelled  to  recall 
the  fact,  the  never-ceasing  fact,  that  English  officialism,  the 
English  hereditary  governing  class,  has  at  all  times,  with  all 
peoples,  been  brutal,  insolent,  and  cruel.  We  are  compelled  to 
realise,  that  the  English  hereditary  governing  class  to-day — 
with  many  noble  individual  exceptions — is,  as  a  class,  precisely 
what  it  has  been  for  centuries.  The  leopard  has  not  changed  his 
spots.  To-morrow,  if  that  policy  would  better  serve  its  in- 
terests, and  especially  its  money  interests — and  if  it  dared — the 
English  hereditary  governing  class  would  turn  upon  us  and 
rend  us. 

Let  us  make  no  mistake.  As  to  the  English  people,  this 
American  people  has  always  had  a  longing  for  its  affection. 
That  was  the  real  reason,  why  we  were,  in  years  gone  by,  some- 
what unduly  sensitive  to  criticism  from  the  English.  Com- 
paratively speaking,  we  cared  little  or  nothing  for  criticism 
from  other  sources.  But  we  were  hurt  by  unkind  words  from 
Englishmen.  The  reason  was,  that  we  had  a  longing  for  their 
love.    We  did  not  get  it.    We  did  not  get  treatment  that  was 


108 


reasonably  considerate  or  decent.  And  then — in  our  time  of 
sorest  need — we  had  England  on  our  back. 

Nevertheless,  if  this  war  on  the  part  of  England  had  been  a 
war  of  self  defense,  a  war  for  freedom,  a  war  in  a  just  cause,  our 
hearts  and  our  sympathies  would  have  gone  out,  tumultuously, 
to  our  ancestral  kinsmen. 

But  then,  when  we  look  at  the  facts,  we  are  struck  with  the 
remarkable  resemblance  between  the  story  of  the  Transvaal 
Burghers  and  that  of  certain  Englishmen,  of  the  faith  of  Milton 
and  Cromwell,  who  came  to  New  England  in  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury. They,  too,  were  driven  into  exile  to  escape  the  cruelty 
and  oppression  of  the  British  King,  and  the  British  oligarchy, 
of  that  day.  They  took  refuge  with  the  Dutch.  They  found 
shelter  with  the  Dutch.  Thereafter  they  conquered  new  homes 
in  a  wilderness.  Thereafter  they  suffered  continued  acts  of 
oppression  and  tyranny  at  the  hands  of  the  British  government 
of  that  day.  Finally,  they,  too,  were  forced  by  the  British 
oligarchy  into  war,  a  war  of  self  defense,  a  war  for  liberty. 
In  that  war  they  won,  quite  contrary  to  the  expectations  of  the 
British  ministers  of  the  time.  That  fact,  however,  did  not 
protect  them  from  further  acts  of  British  aggression. 

Really,  the  two  stories  have  a  remarkable  resemblance — thus 
far.  ,i 

To  the  Boers,  to-day,  is  committed  the  guarding  of  the 
Temple  of  Liberty.  To  them,  to-day,  is  committed  the 
contest  for  the  right  of  self  government,  the  struggle  for  free  in- 
stitutions. They  are  the  representatives,  to-day,  of  the  highest 
traditions  of  the  English  people.  At  present,  the  British  Gov- 
ernment is  engaged  in  the  work,  in  which  it  has  often  engaged 
outside  its  own  territory,  of  unholy  conquest.  It  is  false  to  its 
own  highest  ideals. 

Are  we  to-day  to  give  any  weight,  in  matters  of  international 
politics,  to  the  question  of  right  and  wrong  ? 

This  unholy  and  unrighteous  war  ought  to  stop.  It  ought  to 
stop  at  once.  It  can  come  to  an  end  within  any  reasonable 
period,  only  by  the  withdrawal  of  the  party  who  is  in  the  wrong. 

If  that  party  persists  in  a  war  of  lawless  wanton  aggression, 
who  can  say  when  the  war  will  end,  or  how  it  will  end  ? 

But  the  British  people  ought  to  well  comprehend  the  fact, 
that  they  are  sitting  on  a  volcano. 


109 


IV. 


POSTSCRIPT. 


At  the  time  of  this  writing  the  news  comes  of  the  relief  of 
Kimberley. 

The  hand  is  the  hand  of  Roberts.  The  strategy  is  of  Rhodes 
and  Rothschilds. 

.Also,  we  have  a  report  to  the  effect  that  General  Cronje  is 
in  fall  retreat,  pursued  by  the  British  cavalry,  with  a  strong 
probability  of  his  capture  with  an  army  of  several  thousand 
men. 

The  latter  part  of  the  report  is  to  be  scrutinized  with  care. 
Evidently,  there  was  an  attempt  to  cut  off  Cronje's  withdrawal 
towards  Bloemfontein.  That  attempt  has — thus  far — apparently 
failed.  The  British  accounts — thus  far — make  no  mention  of 
captured  guns,  or  of  prisoners.  ISTor  do  they  state  with  clearness, 
that  there  has  been  any  serious  engagement.  Thus  far,  then, 
it  would  seem,  that  General  Cronje  in  due  season  fully  appreci- 
ated Lord  Roberts'  intentions,  made  full  provision  to  meet  them, 
decided  wisely  on  a  policy  of  concentration,  and  proceeded  to 
execute  that  policy  with  speed. 

Every  mile  in  advance  now  made  by  Lord  Roberts  only  puts 
him  in  a  position  of  greater  danger — assuming  that  the  Boers 
are  handled  with  reasonable  skill. 

So  far,  therefore,  as  is  indicated  by  the  reports  to  the  moment 
of  this  writing,  the  result  of  the  first  movement  on  the  part  of 
Lord  Roberts  is  to  place  a  large  portion  of  his  army  in  a  position 
of  imminent  danger,  of  danger  far  greater  than  that  of  General 
White  at  Ladysmith. 

Even  if  Lord  Roberts  were  to  succeed  in  reaching  Bloem- 
fontein, Bloemfontein  might  well  become  another  Moscow. 


110 


jSTo  doubt,  there  is  always  the  possibility  that  any  situation, 
the  most  promising,  may  be  thrown  away.  Thus  far — the 
Boer  generals  have  not  seen  fit  to  interfere  with  British  com- 
munications to  the  rear.  It  is  a  possibility — that  the  Boer 
generals,  with  their  continental  advisers,  have  not  in  mind 
the  most  abundant  lessons  of  our  Civil  War  as  to  the  art  of 
cutting  railways.  But  there  is  at  least  one  "West  Point  man 
in  the  Boer  army.  And  it  is  almost  incredible,  that  the  Boer 
generals  will  now  omit  an  operation  of  such  extreme  ease,  which 
would,  under  all  ordinary  contingencies,  place  at  their  mercy 
the  armies  of  both  Lord  Roberts  and  General  Buller,  and  inflict 
on  the  British  Army  a  disaster  for  which  its  previous  records 
afford  no  parallel. 

As  a  strategic  point,  Kimberley  is  not  of  the  slightest  im- 
portance. No  doubt,  it  was  desirable,  that  Colonel  Baden- 
Powell,  with  the  troops  in  his  command,  who  had  been  making 
a  very  stubborn  resistance  for  a  considerable  period,  should  be 
saved  from  capture,  if  that  result  could  be  accomplished  without 
a  sacrifice  of  other  more  important  considerations.  But  as  a 
matter  of  strategy,  at  this  point  of  the  campaign,  it  is  difficult 
to  conceive  of  a  more  unwise  move,  one  more  full  of  danger  to 
the  British  arms,  one  more  likely  to  result  in  great  disaster, 
if  the  Boer  commanders  now  act  with  skill,  than  this  advance 
of  Lord  Roberts  on  Kimberley  with  a  large  force  of  infantry, 
cavalry,  and  artillery. 

Of  course,  no  one  who  is  not  on  the  ground,  with  a  complete 
and  accurate  knowledge  of  actual  positions,  can  venture  to 
state  with  any  degree  of  confidence  the  purposes  of  the  com- 
manding General  on  either  side.  A  late  report,  however, 
is  that  the  Boer  forces  have  been  making  their  appearance 
near  De  Aar  Junction.  The  wisest  of  the  English  military 
writers  are  already  expressing  grave  apprehensions  as  to  the 
safety  of  Lord  Roberts'  communications.  As  nearly  as  one  can 
judge  at  this  distance,  the  opportunity  for  a  brilliant  achieve- 
ment on  the  part  of  the  Boers  would  now  seem  to  be  presented 
by  the  fact,  that  the  only  two  prominent  British  soldiers,  who 
have  shown  any  capacity  whatever  for  high  command,  Lord 
Roberts  and  Lord  Kitchener,  are  entirely  dependent  for  sup- 
plies on  a  railway  line  of  great  length,  most  easy  of  severance; 


Ill 


a  situation  which  offers  the  easiest  conceivable  opportunity 
for  putting  the  picked  officers  and  picked  soldiers  of  the  British 
army  now  in  South  Africa  in  a  state  of  siege,  from  which,  under 
ordinary  circumstances,  and  with  ordinarily  skillful  general- 
ship on  the  Boer  side,  it  is  almost  possible  that  they  can  be  extri- 
cated. 

It  was  apparently  Lord  Roberts'  purpose  to  capture  the 
considerable  force  of  Boers  which  he  supposed  was  occupy- 
ing the  strong  position  between  Modder  River  and  Kimberley 
on  the  line  of  the  railroad  and  its  parallel  wagon  road.  It  was 
for  that  purpose,  apparently,  that  a  portion  of  his  force  moved 
by  the  way  of  Jacobsdal.  The  accomplishment  of  such  a  pur- 
pose, with  a  commander  as  alert  as  General  Cronje  has  shown 
himself  co  be  thus  far,  was  not  reasonably  to  be  expected, 
with  troops  so  unaccustomed  to  actual  campaigning  as  General 
Roberts'  command.  Nevertheless  that  was,  apparently,  his  pur- 
pose. 

That  purpose  appears,  thus  far,  to  have  been  easily  defeated. 
Inasmuch  as  we  in  ]STew  York  have  been  apprised  for  many  days 
of  the  intention  of  Lord  Roberts  to  make  an  advance  on  the 
Kimberley  line,  it  was  quite  too  much  to  expect,  that  the  move- 
ments of  the  British  general  should  not  have  been  apprehended 
by  the  Boer  commander,  who  has  thus  far  been  thoroughly  well 
informed  of  every  movement  of  his  antagonist,  and  has  been 
remarkably  successful  in  making  adequate  provision  to  meet 
such  movements  in  advance.  It  was  so  improbable,  as  to  rise 
almost  into  the  realm  of  impossibility,  that  General  Cronje 
would  have  been  caught  napping,  and  that  Lord  Roberts  would 
have  been  able  to  cut  off  any  considerable  portion  of  Cronje's 
force  between  Modder  River  and  Kimberley.  Of  course,  there 
is  the  possibility,  that  Lord  Kitchener  may  succeed  in  capturing 
a  portion  of  General  Cronje's  command.  Up  to  this  day,  how- 
ever, there  is  no  indication  that  there  is  any  reasonable  prob- 
ability of  such  a  result.  It  is  is  to  be  noted,  moreover,  that  the 
British  troops  have  suffered  a  loss  of  only  a  very  few  men,  which 
makes  it  certain,  that  they  have  taken  no  position  that  Cronje 
considered  it  at  all  important  to  defend.  The  probability,  there- 
fore, is  extremely  large,  that  Lord  Roberts'  movement,  as  has 
been  the  case  in  the  former  British  operations,  was  apprehended 


112 


by  General  Cronje  in  advance,  that  he  made  very  adequate 
preparations  to  meet  it,  and  that  he  has  withdrawn  the  main 
portion  of  his  forces  for  operations  in  other  directions,  and  prob- 
ably for  operations  on  Lord  Roberts'  line  of  communications. 
It  was  too  much  to  expect,  that  even  General  Cronje  should 
succeed  in  carrying  away  absolutely  the  whole  of  his  supplies. 

In  any  event,  it  is  evident  that  Kimberley,  the  position  which 
Lord  Roberts  has  now  taken,  was  one  to  which  General  Cronje 
attached  no  considerable  military  importance. 

In  this  he  was  quite  correct. 

These  features  of  the  military  situation  are  well  appreciated 
by  one  of  the  London  military  writers,  by  far  the  ablest  among 
them,  Mr.  Spencer  Wilkinson.    Mr.  Wilkinson  says: 

"The  same  day  the  troops  from  the  old  camp  at  Modder  River  Station 
opened  communication  with  Jacobsdal,  which  had  already  been  taken. 
Thus  Lord  Roberts  had  a  semi-circle  around  the  Boer  position  of  Magersfon- 
tein,  from  Kimberley  in  the  north  to  Modder  River  Station  on  the  south, 
and  possibly  the  line  was  prolonged  from  Modder  River  Station  to  the 
northwest  so  that  Gen.  French  might  hope  by  passing  through  Kimberley 
to  complete  the  circle,  and  thus  enable  Lord  Roberts  to  envelop  and  cap- 
ture Cronje's  whole  force. 

' '  This  was  the  result  hoped  for.  The  plan  was  brilliantly  conceived  and 
vigorously  executed,  but  Cronje  has  been  able  to  evade  the  blow.  When 
Gen.  French  reached  Kimberley  it  was  found  that  Cronje,  with  the  bulk  of 
his  force,  had  moved  off  toward  Bloemfontein,  apparently  by  the  Boshof 
road,  or  by  a  shorter  route  along  the  north  bank  of  the  Modder. 
********** 

"  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  Kimberley  is  relieved,  and  that  the  rail- 
way will  soon  be  reopened.  This  is  a  success.  But  the  more  valuable 
result — the  destruction  of  a  part  of  the  Boer  army — has  not  been  secured. 
It  cannot  be  said  in  the  circumstances  that  this  is  attributable  to  weakness 
in  British  generalship,  which  seems  to  have  been  excellent. 

"  There  are  disquieting  features  in  the  neivs.  The  capture  by  Boers, 
said  to  have  come  from  Colesberg,  of  a  large  British  convoy,  may  dimmish 
the  mobility  of  the  British  force,  and  is  a  proof  of  the  judgment  and 
energy  of  the  Boer  leaders.  The  vigorous  attack  on  the  British  post  at 
Rensburg  shows  that  the  Boers  mean  to  reply  to  Lord  Roberts'  advance  by 
striking  at  his  communications. 

"  Until  the  issue  of  the  operations  around  Kimberley  is  fairly  known  it 
is  useless  to  speculate  upon  the  next  move  of  Lord  Roberts.  The  fact  that 
Kimberley  has  been  relieved  and  that  Cronje  has  had  to  make  a  hasty  re- 
treat are  to  the  good  side  of  the  account,  but  the  fact  that  Cronje  has 
not,  at  any  rate  up  to  the  date  of  the  latest  telegrams  I  have  seen,  been 
well  beaten  in  a  fight,  is  a  disappointment. 


113 


"  The  opinion  is  widespread  that  the  invasion  of  the  Free  State  will 
bring  the  Boer  army  or  at  least  the  Free  State  contingent,  out  of  NataL 
Upon  this  point  I  am  less  sanguine  than  most  of  the  English  observers, 
even  those  whose  judgment  most  deserves  confidence;  but  the  news  of 
Eoberts'  advance  -will  encourage  White  and  his  men  to  prolong  their  de- 
fence." 

It  cannot  be  inferred,  from  the  fact  that  the  Boers  have  not 
seen  fit  to  interfere  with  the  British  railway  communications 
down  to  this  date,  that  they  have  not  considered  this  feature  of 
the  military  problem,  or  that  they  are  not  prepared  to  handle  it 
with  skill.  Any  such  idea  would  go  upon  a  radical  misunder- 
standing of  the  military  situation.  It  is  hardly  possible  that 
generals  of  the  adroitness  and  fertility  of  resource  that  the  Boer 
commanders  have  thus  far  displayed,  could  have  omitted  from 
their  catalogue  of  military  operations  the  cutting  of  the  British 
communications  to  the  rear.  Already  they  have  shown  that  they 
know  enough  to  have  destroyed  the  railway  at  Colenso,  for  the 
purpose  of  preventing  a  British  advance  at  that  point.  But 
we  must  bear  in  mind  that  the  policy  of  the  Boers  has  been 
thus  far,  and  wisely,  to  exercise  the  most  careful  economy  in 
the  loss  of  men.  For  that  reason,  they  have  thus  far  avoided 
any  engagements,  except  when  they  were  behind  earthworks, 
which  they  could  compel  the  British  troops  to  attack  in  front. 
It  is  probable,  too,  that  they  have  intended  to  allow  the  British 
generals  to  collect  large  numbers  of  troops  at  a  great  distance 
from  the  sea,  with  the  express  purpose  of  penning  them  after- 
wards in  positions  such  as  General  White  now  occupies  at 
Ladysmith,  and  as  Col.  Baden-Powell  has  hitherto  occupied  at 
Kimberley.  If  this  be  their  policy,  it  is  easy  to  see,  that  the 
concentration  of  any  large  force  by  the  Boers  in  front  of  Lord 
Roberts'  advance  would  have  been  a  great  military  mistake. 
It  was  much  better,  for  their  purposes,  that  Lord  Roberts  should 
be  led  to  collect  a  large  army  on  that  line  of  advance,  at  a 
great  distance  from  Capetown,  with  the  Orange  and  Modder 
Rivers  in  his  rear,  where  his  railroad  communications  can  be 
cut  with  the  utmost  ease,  whereby  the  capture  of  his  entire 
army  may  well  be  brought  within  the  range  of  military  pos- 
sibilities. 

]STo  one,  of  course,  can  say  what  the  actual  plans  of  the  Boer 


114 


commanders  are.  Moreover  the  destruction,  and  reconstruction, 
of  railroad  communications  is  a  branch  of  the  military  art  in 
which  European  officers  have  had  no  experience.  For  it  has 
never  been  practiced  by  any  troops  except  by  our  armies  in 
the  civil  war.  As  stated  before,  that  class  of  military  opera- 
tions was  discovered,  and  developed,  by  the  Union  and  the 
Confederate  armies.  The  matter  of  railway  reconstruction  was 
developed  almost  entirely  by  the  Northern  army.  The  great 
perfection,  which  it  reached,  has  already  been  made  apparent 
in  these  pages.  But  that  branch  of  military  operations  is  a 
thing  practically  unknown  to  European  soldiers.  Neither  side 
showed  the  slightest  apprehension  of  its  existence  in  the  Franco- 
Prussian  war.  General  Sheridan  often  said,  that,  with  ten 
thousand  of  his  old  cavalrymen,  he  could  have  made  Moltke's 
Franco-Prussian  campaign  an  impossibility.  Ten  thousand  of 
our  old  cavalrymen  would  have  severed  the  railways  in  Moltke's 
rear,  and  destroyed  his  communications,  with  great  ease.  Noth- 
ing of  the  kind  was  attempted  by  the  French  army.  So  far  as  the 
writer  is  aware,  no  preparations  were  ever  made  for  meeting  any 
such  contingency.  Certain  it  is,  that  no  European  army  then 
possessed,  or  now  possesses,  any  considerable  body  of  men  who 
could  make  the  faintest  approach  to  accomplishing  the  work 
of  railway  reconstruction  that  was  done  by  Sherman's  army  in 
the  Atlanta  campaign.  Consequently,  it  is  possible,  that  the 
Boer  commanders,  with  their  advisers  from  the  French  and 
Prussian  armies,  have  even  to-day  not  realized  the  possibilities, 
which  easily  lie  at  their  command,  of  making  the  question  of 
supply  for  the  British  troops,  now  so  far  from  the  seaboard,  one 
that  is  practically  an  impossibility. 

Thus  far,  both  in  the  Jameson  raid  and  in  the  present  cam- 
paign, the  completeness  of  preparation  on  the  part  of  the  Boers 
has  been  most  remarkable.  At  every  important  point,  down  to 
this  time,  they  have  had  an  ample  supply  of  men  and  material. 
Strategy,  according  to  the  late  General  Forrest,  one  of  the  most 
brilliant  soldiers  on  either  side  during  our  Civil  War,  con- 
sists mainly  in  "  getting  there  first,  with  the  biggest  number 
of  men."  This  definition  is  not  altogether  complete,  in  that  it 
omits  to  give  the  full  significance  of  the  word  "there."  If 
the  definition  be  amended,  so  as  to  read  "  getting  at  the  right 


115 


point,  at  the  right  time,  with  the  right  supply  of  men  and 
material,"  the  requirements  of  accuracy  would  be  more  fully 
met.  Taking  for  the  moment  this  definition  of  the  term 
"  strategy,"  we  have  to  notice  that  down  to  this  time,  on  every 
occasion,  the  Boers  have  been  at  the  right  place,  at  the  right 
time,  with  the  right  supply  of  men  and  material.  It  is,  there- 
fore, somewhat  reasonable  to  assume,  that  the  completeness  of 
preparation,  combined  with  the  thoroughness  of  comprehension 
of  the  military  situation,  which  has  characterized  all  of  the  Boer 
operations  down  to  date,  will  continue  to  characterize  them 
through  the  remaining  period  of  hostilities. 

"We  must  always  remember,  that  war  is  full  of  unforeseen  and 
unforeseeable  contingencies.  Bearing  that  fact  fully  in  mind, 
however,  the  cardinal  features  of  the  military  situation  in  South 
x\frica  still  remain  as  they  have  already  been  stated.  The 
advantages  of  the  situation  are  overwhelmingly  with  the 
Boers.  It  is  almost  an  impossibility — that  the  difficulties  in 
face  of  the  British  commanders  should  be  surmounted  by  any 
practicable  combination  of  men  and  material,  which  can  be 
brought  about  by  the  British  authorities  within  any  reasonable 
period. 

But  here  we  come  to  another  distinct  difficulty  in  the  way 
of  a  substantial  advance  into  the  Orange  Free  State  or  the  Trans- 
vaal at  this  particular  time. 

The  arid  season  in  South  Africa  is  now  about  to  begin.  In 
the  conditions  that  will  then  exist,  it  is  scarcely  too  much  to  say, 
that  the  larger  the  numbers  of  British  troops  in  the  interior  of 
South  Africa,  the  greater  is  their  danger  of  heavy  losses,  from  in- 
ability to  supply  food,  forage,  and  water.  A  London  corres- 
pondent of  the  New  York  Times,  who  is  apparently  well  in- 
formed as  to  climatic  conditions  in  South  Africa,  writes  as  fol- 
lows: 

"  If  the  advance  of  these  troops  [British]  could  only  be  delayed  until 
the  dry  season  had  fairly  set  in  (as  it  has  done)  then  all  that  would  be 
necessary  for  the  Freestaters  and  their  allies  in  the  south  to  do,  would  be 
to  leave  the  British  troops  to  flounder  about  among  the  burning  sand  hills 
and  valley  and  the  great  practically  tvaterless  desert  and  devote  all  their 
energies  to  preying  upon  the  British  line  of  communication. " 


116 


The  success  of  all  military  operations  depends  on  speed — in 
the  movement  of  men  and  of  material.  This  has  always  been 
the  key  to  successful  operations,  in  modern  as  well  as  in  ancient 
war.    There  has  been  no  change  in  this  respect. 

It  is  for  this  reason,  that  so  much  stress  has  been  laid,  in  what 
has  been  here  written,  on  the  absence  of  good  roads  in  South 
Africa;  and  upon  the  consequent  impossibility  of  conducting 
military  operations,  even  for  only  moderate  distances,  away  from 
the  lines  of  railway. 

These  matters,  of  supply  and  roads,  are  so  vital,  that  it  is  well 
at  this  point,  at  the  risk  of  repetition,  to  give  two  extracts  from 
General  Hamley's  treatise  on  the  "  Operations  of  War."  In 
the  first,  he  gives  some  utterances  of  the  Duke  of  "Wellington, 
p.  18. 

"A  starving  army,"  he  says  to  his  brother,  in  narrating  the  priva- 
tions of  his  troops,  "is  actually  worse  than  none.  The  soldiers  lose 
their  discipline  and  spirit.  They  plunder  even  in  the  presence  of  their 
officers.  The  officers  are  discontented  and  are  almost  as  bad  as  the  men  ; 
and  with  the  army  which  a  fortnight  ago  beat  double  their  numbers,  I 
should  now  hesitate  to  meet  a  French  corps  of  half  their  strength. 

"  To  carry  on  the  contest  with  France  to  any  good  purpose  the  labor 
and  services  of  every  man  and  of  every  beast  in  the  country  should  be  em- 
ployed in  support  of  the  armies,  and  these  should  be  so  classed  and  ar- 
ranged as  not  only  to  secure  obedience  to  the  orders  of  the  Government 
but  regularity  and  efficiency  in  the  performance  of  the  services  required 
from  them.  Magazines  might  then  with  ease  be  formed  and  transported 
wherever  circumstances  might  require  that  armies  should  be  stationed. 

"  But  as  we  are  now  situated  50,000  men  are  collected  upon  a  spot  which 
cannot  afford  subsistence  for  10,000  men  and  there  are  no  means  of  send- 
ing to  a  distance  to  make  good  the  deficiency. 

Again  he  says  :  "  If  we  had  had  60,000  men  (British)  instead  of  20,000,  in 
all  probability  we  should  not  have  got  to  Talavera  to  fight  the  battle  for 
want  of  means  and  provisions.  But  if  we  had  got  to  Talavera  we  could 
not  have  gone  further  and  the  armies  would  probably  have  separated  for 
want  of  means  of  subsistence,  probably  without  a  ^battle  but  certainly  af- 
terwards." 

And  lamenting  the  opportunities  thus  lost,  he  tells  Lord  Castlereagh :  "If 
we  could  have  fed  and  have  got  up  the  condition  of  our  horses  we  might 
probably  after  some  time  have  struck  a  brilliant  blow  with  Soult  at  Pla- 
cenia  or  upon  Mortier  in  the  centre."  "I  have  no  motive,"  he  says  to  a 
Spanish  minister,  "for  withdrawing  the  British  army  from  Spain,  whether 
of  a  political  or  military  nature,  excepting  that  which  I  have  stated  to 
you  in  conversation — namely,  a  desire  to  relieve  it  from  the  privations  of 
food,  which  it  has  suffered  since  the  22d  of  last  month ;  privations  which 


117 


have  reduced  its  strength,  have  destroyed  the  health  of  the  soldiers,  and 
have  rendered  the  army  comparatively  inefficient. 

*****»*#» 

(P-  20). 

The  fortified  lines  of  magazines  constituting  the  base  being  formed,  it  is 
indispensable  to  a  sustained  and  dubious  enterprise  that  good  roads  should 
exist  between  the  magazines  and  the  army  as  it  moves  away  from  its  base. 
In  mountainous  districts  where  the  roads  are  so  rugged  and  steep  as  to  be 
unfit  for  wheeled  vehicles,  the  necessary  supplies  must  be  carried  on  pack- 
horses  or  mules.  But  the  quantity  which  an  animal  can  draw  is  so  much 
greater  than  that  which  it  can  carry,  that  the  number  of  animals  and  the 
extent  of  road  they  occupy  must  be  immensely  increased.  It  is,  therefore, 
very  difficult,  almost  impossible,  to  supply  a  very  large  army,  under  such 
circumstances,  for  a  long  campaign ;  and  roads  practicable  for  carriages 
are  indispensable  to  all  operations,  except  those  which  aim  at  attaining 
results  in  a  brief  and  definite  time.  And  not  only  must  the  roads  be  good 
in  the  ordinary  sense,  but  they  must  be  great  main  arteries  of  the  region, 
solidly  constructed.  Anybody  who  fives  in  the  neighborhood  of  a  newly- 
established  brick-field,  will  see  how  quickly  the  parish  roads  are  broken 
and  wrought  into  hollows  by  the  passage  of  the  heavy  brick-carts.  The 
trains  that  follow  an  army,  laden  as  they  are  with  ammunition,  pontoons, 
platforms  for  guns,  siege-artillery,  and  other  ponderous  materials,  soon 
destroy  all  but  the  best  roads.  In  order,  then,  that  the  enormous  streams 
of  supply  may  not  be  interrupted,  it  is  necessary  that  the  roads  should  be 
of  the  best  construction,  like  our  own  highways  and  the  great  paved 
chausses  of  the  continent.  The  proof  of  this  is  found  in  the  difficulties 
under  which  armies  begin  to  labour  directly  they  are  thrown  on  bad  roads 
for  their  supplies.  Our  own  experience  in  the  Crimea  shows  that  even 
seven  miles  of  soft  soil  interposed  in  winter  between  an  army  and  its 
depots,  may  be  almost  a  fatal  obstacle;  and  General  McClellan,  in  his  re- 
port of  his  campaign  in  the  Yorktown  Peninsular,  tells  us — "  On  the  15th 
and  16th,  the  divisions  of  Franklin,  Smith,  and  Porter,  were  with  great 
difficulty  moved  to  Whitehouse,  five  miles  in  advance,  so  bad  was  the  road 
that  the  train  of  one  of  these  divisions  required  thirty-six  hours  to  pass 
over  this  short  distance."  And  again,  speaking  of  the  movement  from  the 
York  River  to  Williamsburg,  he  says — "The  supply-trains  had  been  forced 
out  of  the  roads  on  the  4th  and  5th  to  allow  the  troops  and  artillery  to 
pass  to  the  front,  and  the  roads  were  now  in  such  a  state  after  thirty -six 
hours'  continuous  rain  that  it  was  almost  impossible  to  pass  even  empty 
wagons  over  them." 

But  it  is  not  only  on  account  of  the  supplies  that  great  armies  operate 
by  great  roads.  It  is  also  because  the  march  of  the  troops  and  artillery  on 
bad  roads  becomes  so  slow  and  uncertain  that  all  the  calculations  on  which 
a  general  bases,  a  combined  operation,  are  likely  to  be  falsified,  and  the 
rapidity  necessary  for  a  movement  intended  to  surprise  or  foil  an  adver- 
sary is  lost,  so  that  the  design  is  seen  and  frustrated  by  the  enemy.  An 
example  of  the  different  rate  at  which  troops  move  over  a  good  and  a  bad 


118 


road  is  afforded  by  the  campaign  of  Waterloo.  Napoleon  followed  Wel- 
lington, and  Grouchy  followed  Blucher  ;  both  quitted  the  field  of  Ligny  on 
the  afternoon  of  the  17th  June.  The  Emperor,  marching  by  the  great 
paved  chaussees  of  Namur  and  of  Brussels,  assembled  his  army  that  night 
in  the  position  of  Waterloo,  seventeen  miles  from  Ligny.  Grouchy,  moving 
by  country  roads,  had  great  difficulty  in  bringing  his  30,000  men  to  Gem- 
bloux,  five  miles  from  Ligny,  by  ten  o'clock  the  same  night.  And,  to  quote 
a  more  modern  instance,  General  McClellan  says  :  "  On  the  14th  of  March, 
a  reconnaissance  of  a  large  body  of  cavalry  with  some  infantry,  under 
command  of  General  Stoneman,  was  sent  along  the  Orange  and  Alexan- 
dria Railroad  to  determine  the  position  of  the  enemy,  and,  if  possible, 
force  his  rear  across  the  Rappahannock  ;  but  the  roads  were  in  such  con- 
dition that,  finding  it  impossible  to  subsist  his  men,  General  Stoneman  was 
forced  to  return." 

The  conditions  in  South.  Africa  are  essentially  different  from 
those  which  have  existed  in  European  wars ;  consequently,  from 
those  which  have  been  the  chief  subjects  of  study  of  European 
writers.  We  hear  much  in  the  discussions  of  the  present  war 
in  South  Africa  of  flanking  movements  and  turning  movements. 
The  conditions,  however,  in  South  Africa  are  so  different  from 
those  which  have  ever  existed  in  European  wars,  that  many  of 
the  ordinary  military  considerations  become  inapplicable  and  use- 
less. Elanking  movements,  and  turning  movements,  to  have 
any  practical  value,  must  be  executed  so  near  to  the  enemy,  and 
with  so  much  celerity,  as  to  make  it  impossible  for  him  to  make 
new  formations  to  meet  the  movements  on  his  flank.  Generally, 
this  is  impossible,  where  the  roads  are  so  few,  and  so  difficult,  as 
they  are  in  South  Africa.  The  principles  of  war  always  remain 
the  same.  Their  application  has  fundamental  differences.  Mili- 
tary operations  must  always  be  adapted  to  the  field  in  which  they 
are  carried  on.  Topography  is  the  first  essential  in  planning 
those  operations.  It  was  invariably  the  first  object  of  the  study 
of  Napoleon  in  deciding  upon  the  form  of  his  military  oper- 
ations. Topography  appears  to-day  to  have  been  the  one  thing 
essentially  ignored  by  the  British  War  Office,  and  the  British 
officers  in  high  command. 

All  these  facts  must  be  taken  into  consideration,  in  judging 
of  the  probable  results  of  the  present  conflict.  It  is  easily  seen, 
that  mere  superiority  in  numbers,  however  large,  becomes  al- 
most wholly  immaterial,  where  the  field  of  operations  is  of  such 
a  character,  as  to  prevent  the  speedy  movement  of  troops  from 


119 


point  to  point.  Especially,  too,  is  the  matter  of  numbers  of  less 
importance  in  a  mountainous  region,  with  few  and  poor  roads, 
a  situation  which  gives  a  position  of  comparative  impregnability 
to  the  defense,  especially  when  the  defending  force  is  made  up  of 
men  who  are  bred  to  the  methods  of  partisan  warfare,  who  cover 
long  distances  with  great  ease,  who  are  consequently  able  to 
make  sudden  and  unexpected  attacks  on  vital  points  in  an 
enemy's  rear,  and  who  will  find  it  especially  easy  to  operate  on 
his  lines  of  communication. 

Events  have  now  gone  so  far  as  to  make  it  as  near  to  a  cer- 
tainty as  it  is  often  possible  to  reach  in  military  affairs,  that  the 
war  will,  at  any  rate,  be  a  long  and  costly  one  for  the  British, 
and  that  British  final  success  is  a  matter  of  grave  doubt.  Grave 
consideration  must  now  be  given  to  the  fact,  that  the  sympathies 
of  all  the  European  peoples  are  against  the  British  Government. 
The  indications  are  also  large,  that  the  sympathies  of  the 
American  people  will  soon  become  pronounced  in  favor  of  the 
Republics. 

Let  me  add  a  few  words  as  to  the  disparity  between  the  two 
contending  powers  in  numbers  and  wealth.  No  doubt  the  dis- 
parity is  immense. 

The  population  of  the  South  African  Republic  proper,  com- 
monly called  the  Transvaal,  according  to  the  latest  report  for 
1898,  was— Whites,  345,397  (137,947  males  and  107,450  fe- 
males); Natives,  748,759  (148,155  men  and  183,280  women, 
and  417,324  children).    Total  population,  1,094,156. 

The  population  of  the  Orange  Free  State,  according  to  the 
census  of  1890,  which  is  the  latest  report  at  this  moment  avail- 
able to  me,  is  stated  to  be  as  follows:  White  population, 
77,716—40,571  males  and  37,145  females.  There  were,  be- 
sides, 129,787  natives  in  the  Orange  Free  State — 67,791  males 
and  61,996  females;  making  a  total  population  of  207,503. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  latest  report  of  the  population  of 
Great  Britain  and  Ireland  at  this  moment  available  to  me, 
given  for  the  year  1891,  is 

Total  for  England  and  Wales   21,413,989 

do  for  Scotland   4,025,647 

do  for  Ireland   4,704,750 


Total 


30,144,386 


120 


In  wealth,  the  discrepancy  is  even  greater. 

"Wealth  alone,  however,  for  the  purposes  of  war,  is  limited  in 
its  power  to  the  bearing  which  it  has  on  the  possibilities  in  men 
and  material,  that  can  be  placed  in  the  field  of  operations,  prop- 
erly drilled,  disciplined,  and  organized,  within  a  practicable 
period  of  time. 

So,  too,  with  population.  Population,  as  an  element  of 
strength  for  any  particular  actual  war,  is  limited,  in  its  effect, 
to  the  number  of  men  who  can  be  placed  in  the  field  of  opera- 
tions, properly  armed,  drilled,  disciplined,  organized,  and 
officered,  within  a  practicable  period  of  time. 

These  considerations  tend  strongly  to  show,  that  the  enor- 
mous preponderance  in  population  and  wealth  which  is  held 
by  Great  Britain  over  the  two  South  African  Republics 
is  to  a  great  extent  unavailable,  for  the  purposes  of  the  present 
war,  within  any  reasonable  period.  In  many  military  situations, 
the  larger  the  number  of  men,  Uhe  worse  it  is  for  the  party  em- 
ploying them.  Men  must  be  armed,  drilled,  disciplined, 
officered,  and  organized.  In  short,  they  must  be  converted  into 
an  efficient  army,  before  they  can  have  any  value  whatever 
for  actual  military  operations.  ISTow,  will  any  competent  judge 
venture  to  assert,  that  Great  Britain  can,  within  six  months, 
add  to  her  forces  in  South  Africa  so  much  as  twenty-five  thou- 
sand real  soldiers?  Will  any  one  go  so  far  as  to  assert,  that 
she  can  add  fifty  thousand  real  soldiers  to  her  present  army 
in  South  Africa  within  a  year?  Tor  it  must  be  borne  in  mind, 
that  Great  Britain  has  at  present  practically  no  available  officers, 
of  either  technical  training  or  practical  experience,  who  can  be 
used  for  the  purpose  of  turning  new  levies  into  fighting  troops. 
As  has  been  already  stated,  she  is  at  the  end  of  her  available  re- 
sources— as  to  men — for  a  considerable  period  of  time.  When 
the  term  "  men  "  is  used  in  this  connection,  it  is  of  course 
understood  to  mean  soldiers;  and  not  merely  so  many  individual 
soldiers,  but  soldiers  properly  drilled,  disciplined,  organized, 
and  officered.  It  is  to-day  an  absolute  impossibility,  for  Great 
Britain  to  put  in  South  Africa  any  considerable  number  of  ad- 
ditional troops  that  deserve  to  be  called  soldiers.  It  is  extremely 
improbable,  that  she  can  add  to  her  forces  in  South  Africa,  at 


121 


any  time  within  a  year,  twenty-five  thousand  troops  capable  of 
active  aggressive  service. 

Even  now,  the  great  British  Empire  is  the  first  of  the  two 
combatants  to  show  signs  of  distress.  In  the  daily  press  this 
morning  appears  the  appeal  for  more  men,  by  Her  Majesty 
Queen  Victoria,  at  present  still  styled  Empress  of  India,  who  is 
"advised  that  it  would  be  possible  to  raise  for  a  year  an  efficient 
force  from  her  old  soldiers  who  have  already  served,  as  officers, 
non-commissioned  officers  or  privates;  and  confident  in  their 
devotion  to  the  country  and  loyalty  to  her  throne,  the  Queen 
appeals  to  them  to  serve  her  once  more  in  place  of  those  who, 
for  a  time,  side  by  side  with  the  peoples  of  her  colonies  are 
nobly  resisting  the  invasion  of  her  South  African  possessions." 

This  "  appeal "  is  the  act  of  the  British  Government. 
THEY  AKE  ALREADY  AT  THE  END  OF  THEIE  RE- 
SOUECES  IN  MEN. 

The  immense  difference,  therefore,  in  population  and  wealth 
between  Great  Britain  and  the  Transvaal  Kepublic  becomes, 
under  all  the  circumstances,  well  nigh  unimportant.  The 
Transvaal  authorities  apparently  have,  for  the  present  needs, 
men  in  abundance.  Apparently,  too,  they  have  an  ample  sup- 
ply of  the  munitions  of  war.  The  question  of  food  supply,  so 
far  as  now  appears,  is  one  of  chief  danger.  But  thus  far,  there 
are  no  indications  of  any  serious  difficulty  on  that  ground. 

We  may  therefore  dismiss  from  our  minds,  for  immediate 
practical  purposes,  the  discrepancy  which  might  seem  at  first 
sight  to  be  almost  appalling,  between  the  resources  of  the  two 
contending  powers  in  men  and  wealth. 

But  here  we  come  on  the  dominating  feature  of  the  entire 
situation, — the  large  possibility  of  other  complications,  and 
other  wars,  unless  the  conquest  of  the  Republics  should  be 
accomplished  almost  immediately.  The  wisest  English  poli- 
ticians are  well  aware  of  their  danger  in  this  respect.  They 
are  well  aware  of  the  danger  in  India. 

The  "  Transvaal  Outlook  "  cannot  limit  its  range  of  vision 
by  the  confines  of  Natal  and  the  South  African  Republics.  It 
must  go  much  further,  must  extend  to  the  eastward,  at  least 
as  far  as  the  frontier  of  India. 

The  danger  in  India  is  two-fold.    It  is  not  limited  to  the 


122 


perils  existing  from  the  mere  spirit  of  hatred  and  revolt  on 
the  part  of  the  native  population.  On  the  northwest  frontier 
there  is  already  reported  the  massing  of  a  large  body  of  Russian 
troops  within  fifty  miles  of  Herat.  What  are  they  there  for? 
ISTo  reasonable  man  can  doubt,  that  it  is  the  present  purpose 
of  Russia,  whatever  may  be  her  pretentions  and  protestations, 
to  take  speedy  advantage  of  British  difficulties  elsewhere,  and 
especially  of  British  defeats  elsewhere,  to  foment  a  rising  in 
India,  and  to  intervene  actively  with  troops  to  assist  any  such 
rising.  So,  again,  we  must  bear  in  mind,  and  we  may  be 
assured  that  British  statesmen  do  bear  in  mind,  the  dangers  in 
India. 

So  vital,  so  essential,  so  fundamental,  is  this  feature  of  the 
situation  in  the  Transvaal,  that  it  is  important  to  lay  before 
my  readers  some  evidence  on  the  real  nature  of  British  rule  in 
India,  the  real  results  it  has  thus  far  accomplished,  and  the 
greatness  of  the  dangers  at  present  there  existing.  The  evi- 
dence comes  from  two  most  competent  sources,  both  British. 
Those  sources  are  Mr.  George  W.  Steevens,  the  British  corres- 
pondent of  the  London  papers  who  died  lately  in  South  Africa, 
and  Lord  Roberts  of  Kandahar. 

Mr.  Steevens  gives  us  the  following  statement  as  to  the  situ- 
ation:* 

"  It  is  only  natural  that  the  tremendous  experience]  of  1857  should  still 
be  something  of  a  nightmare  to  the  Indian  Government.  '  We  are  living 
on  a  volcano.'  '  It  has  happened  once  ;  it  may  again.'  You  hear  such 
phrases  nearly  every  day.  I  have'  even  heard  it  said  thatflif  all  the  ryots 
were  ever  to  rise  in  a  body  British  rule^would  collapse  utterly  and  in  a 
day. 

"There  is  no  danger  of  a  second  mutiny  in  India  unless  the  British 
dominion  should  ever  be  seriously  challenged.  But  if  there  should  ever 
come  a  great  and  doubtful  war  in  the  north — what  then  !  If  Russia  came 
against  us  on  the  frontier  it  is  certain  she  would  also  do  her  utmost  to  stir 
up  risings  behind  us.  Even  so,  in  our  own  provinces  good  officers,  with 
police  and  volunteers,  would  probably  keep  their  districts  together.  The 
critical  point  would  be  the  rajah.  Nearly  all  native  princes  to-day  are 
all  irreproachably  loyal  ;  but  you  cannot  guarantee  a  hereditary  house 
against  a  disloyal  son  in  the  moment  of  supreme  temptation." 

********** 

"India  is  governed  by  natives  of  India.  The  last  word,  doubtless,  is 
with  us — with  the  Secretary  of  State  and  the  Viceroy,  and  Atkins  in  his 


*  Note—"  In  India  "  by  G.  "W.  Steevens,  p.  352,  et  seq. 


123 


gray  flannel  shirt.  But  then  the  last  word  in  government  is  hardly  ever 
said.  The  first  word  and  the  second  and  the  third  are  those  that  make  the 
difference  to  the  subject.  The  minor,  every-day  machinery  of  rule  is  the 
native's.  Nearly  all  the  lesser  magistrates  are  natives,  and  a  large  propor- 
tion of  the  judges.  In  the  executive  part  of  government — revenue  assess- 
ment and  collection,  engineering  and  public  works,  the  medical  services, 
the  forest  department,  the  salt  department — there  are  a  handful  of  white 
men  to  order,  and  a  host  of  brown  ones,  half  supervised,  to  execute.  At 
the  centres  of  Government — the  provincial  capitals,  and  Calcutta  or  Simla 
itself — where  you  would  expect  to  find  British  influence  at  its  strongest, 
the  babu  clerks  in  the  Government  offices  exert  a  veiled  but  paramount 
influence.  And  the  very  heads  of  everything — Lieutenant-Governors,  and 
sometimes  very  Viceroys — uninfluenced  by  clerks,  bow  before  the  prat- 
tling philippics  of  the  native  press.  Theoretically,  India  is  helplessly  dom- 
inated by  Britons  ;  actually,  native  influence  is  all  but  supreme. 

"  You  will  call  these  assertions  preposterous,  and  I  shall  not  be  able  to 
call  leading  officials  of  the  Indian  Government  to  corroborate  them.  The 
cause  of  the  British  in  India  is  not  a  popular  one,  either  there  or  here  ; 
yet  there  is  hardly  a  Briton  of  experience  in  India,  if  I  may  judge  by 
samples,  who  will  not  admit  privately  that  these  assertions  are  mainly 
true.  To  the  stranger  from  England,  it  is  far  the  most  striking  and  dis- 
quieting discovery  that  India  has  to  offer.  The  cry  of  recent  years  has 
been  for  more  Indian  influence  in  India's  Government.  Then  you  find 
Englishmen  admitting  the  existence  of  abuses,  incompetence,  corruption 
in  the  services  they  are  supposed  to  direct,  lamenting  them,  breaking  their 
hearts  over  them,  but  utterly  powerless  to  purge  them  away.  You  find 
men  giving  orders  which  they  all  but  know  will  not  be  executed, 
because  it  is  physically  impossible  to  go  themselves,  and  watch  over  their 
execution.  Higher  up  you  find  men  longing  to  get  work  done  for  India's 
benefit,  but  clogged  and  strangled  by  meshes  of  routine,  which  exist 
solely  to  furnish  salaries  for  more  and  more  brothers  and  nephews  of 
native  clerks.  You  find  a  Lieutenant-Governor  refusing  to  take  measures 
against  plague  solely  for  fear  of  abuse  in  the  native  press.  Then  you 
realize  that  it  is  not  more  native  influence  that  is  wanted  in  India,  but 
less  ;  not  fewer  Britons  in  the  services,  but  more. 

"The  white  man's  say  becomes  daily  less,  the  black  man's  daily  more. 
The  reasons  are  not  on  the  surface,  but,  when  stated,  they  make  things 
clear  enough.  The  first,  perhaps  the  most  potent,  is  the  new  swiftness  of 
communication  between  England  and  India.  You  would  expect  that  to 
increase  English  influence,  but  in  India  you  soon  grow  inured  to  para- 
doxes. The  nearer  India  comes  to  England,  the  less  will  Englishmen  have 
to  do  with  it.  When  Warren  Hastings  went  out  in  1750,  the  voyage  to 
Calcutta  lasted  from  January  till  October.  Hastings,  once  in  India,  had 
to  make  India  his  home,  his  career,  his  life.  It  was  worth  his  while  to 
study  the  ways  of  the  natives  and  to  write  Persian  verses.  At  this  time 
there  were  none  of  the  conveniences — the  ice,  the  railways,  the  hill- 
stations — which  make  life  in  India  tolerable  to  white  women  ;  most  of  the 


124 


Company's  servants  lived  with  native  mistresses  and  some  married  native 
wives.  It  was  not  edifying,  but  it  made  for  comprehension  of  the  East. 
Money  was  plentiful,  Europe  and  retirement  were  far  away  ;  the  Com- 
pany's servants  spent  their  income  in  India  and  lived  in  style.  Old  natives 
will  still  tell  you  of  residents  and  collectors  who  kept  more  elephants  than 
now  men  keep  polo-ponies.  Above  all,  the  white  man  in  the  Company's 
days  was  something  apart  and  mysterious  and  worshipful  in  native  eyes. 
No  man  knew  whence  he  came  or  whither  he  went  ;  no  man  pretended  to 
know  his  ways.    He  was  a  strange  and  superior  being — all  but  a  god. 

' '  Now  London  is  sixteen  days  from  Calcutta.  The  modern  civilian 
takes  three  months'  leave  every  third  year  and  a  year's  furlough  every 
ten  or  so.  He  is  married  to  a  white  wife,  and  his  white  children  are  at 
home  ;  he  looks  forward  to  reuniting  his  family  when  he  gets  his  pension, 
and  then  he  will  be  but  forty — to  letters  or  politics — a  new  career.  For  this 
and  his  periodical  flights  homeward  he  saves  his  money,  so  that  the  native  is 
less  impressed  by  the  white  man's  magnificence.  The  British  merchant  and 
barrister  expect  an  even  shorter  period  of  exile — a  competence  in  five  or 
ten  years,  and  then  the  beginning  of  their  real  work  at  home.  Nowadays 
the  great  Indian  merchant  lives  in  London  ;  in  Bombay  and  Calcutta  are 
only  salaried  partners  and  managing  clerks  ;  Parsis  are  far  richer  and 
more  influential  than  these.  Instead  of  a  man's  life,  India  has  become  an 
apprenticeship,  a  string  of  necessary,  evil  interludes  between  youth,  leave, 
furlough,  and  maturity.  You  might  imagine  a  burglar  so  regarding  the 
intervals  which  the  exigencies  of  his  profession  compel  him  to  spend  in 
Dartmoor. 

"  The  consequences  of  the  new  order  are  inevitable  and  pernicious.  The 
Anglo-Indian  does  not  shirk  his  work  ;  to  say  so  for  a  moment  would  be 
the  grossest  slander.  No  class  of  men  in  the  world  toil  more  heroically, 
more  disinterestedly,  more  disdainfully  of  adverse  conditions.  But  while 
his  zeal  does  not  flag,  his  knowledge  fails  to  keep  pace  with  it.  Partly 
this  is  due  to  the  dislocation  of  his  work  by  frequent  returns  to  England  ; 
partly,  and  more,  to  the  fatal  tendency  of  the  Indian  departments  towards 
red  tape  and  writing.  The  officer  knows  well  enough  that  the  more  time 
he  spends  at  his  writing-table  the  less  efficient  he  will  be  among  the  men 
he  has  to  rule.  He  knows  that  if  ever  our  rule  were  in  danger,  the  man 
who  kept  his  district  together  would  be  the  man  who  knew  his  subordi- 
nates and  whom  his  people  knew  ;  but  he  also  knows  that  his  future  career 
depends  far  more  on  his  reports  than  on  his  personal  influence.  Can  you 
wonder  that  he  devotes  himself  to  what  pays  him  best  ?  He  would  be 
more  than  human  if  he  did  not.  Being  only  human,  he  has  to  pay  for  his 
devotion  to  forms  and  minutes  in  loss  elsewhere.  The  new  generation  of 
Anglo-Indians  is  deplorably  ignorant  of  the  native  languages;  after  a 
dozen  years'  service  the  average  civil  servant  can  hardly  talk  to  a  cultivator 
or  read  a  village  register.  Of  the  life,  character,  and  habits  of  thought 
of  the  peasantry — always  concealed  by  Orientals  from  those  in  authority 
over  them — the  knowledge  groivs  more  and  more  extinct  year  by  year. 
Statistics  accumulate  and  knowledge  decays.  The  longer  we  rule  over  India, 
the  less  we  know  of  it. 


125 


"Summarily,  our  knowedge  of  the  natives  grows  less  and  less,  as  the 
natives'  knowledge  of  us  grows  more  and  more.    *   *  * 

'  The  divinity  that  hedges  a  sahib  is  slowly  breaking  down.  There  are  so 
many  sahibs  nowadays  that  they  have  ceased  to  be  wonderful.  And  they 
are  not  all  like  the  old  sahibs :  there  are  little  sahibs,  country  bred  sahibs, 
hardly  better  than  Eurasians,  globe-trotting  sahibs,  whom  a  child  can  de- 
ceive, and  who  let  you  come  into  their  presence  with  shod  feet.  And  then 
remember  the  other  side — that  the  babu  has  often  been  to  England.  The 
'  Europe-returned,'  as  they  proudly  call  themselves,  are  usually  of  the 
inferior  native  races,  and  are  of  small  account  even  among  them.  Yet 
they  have  been  received  in  London  or  Oxford  or  Cambridge  as  equals 
sometimes,  on  the  strength  of  bold  and  undetected  claims  to  social  impor- 
tance in  India,  almost  as  superiors.  They  have  lost  all  respect  for  the 
European  as  a  master,  and  acquired  no  affection  for  him  as  a  friend. 
Every  young  Hindu  who  returns  from  England  is  a  fresh  stumbling-block 
to  government  in  the  interests  of  the  Indian  people. 

"  For  the  babu  does  not  govern  for  the  people,  whom  he  despises  from  the 
height  of  his  intelligence,  and  whom  it  is  his  inherited  instinct  to  fleece,  but 
for  himself,  his  relatives,  and  his  class.  To  him  mainly — helped  by  British 
pedantry — India  owes  the  impenetrable  buffer  of  files  and  dockets  and 
returns  which  interposes  itself  between  the  white  ruler  and  the  brown 
millions  of  the  ruled.  The  first  impulse  of  the  native  who  gets  an  appoint 
ment  is  to  get  some  of  the  swarm  of  brothers  and  cousins  who  live  in  the 
same  house  with  him  to  fatten  under  his  shadow.  He  cares  nothing  for 
efficient  work — why  should  he  ?  But  he  cares  very  much  for  his  family. 
Instead  of  making  less  work,  he  strives  always  to  make  more.  He  sits  a 
lifetime  in  the  office  and  knows  its  workings  as  do  few  of  his  fleeting 
European  superiors.  Everything — in  the  public  offices,  the  army,  the  rail- 
way offices,  it  is  all  the  same — must  be  copied  out  in  the  triplicate,  in  quad- 
ruplicate, in  quintuplicate.  If  a  new  and  energetic  European  attempts 
to  cut  away  the  hamper,  'We  cannot  do  this,'  he  murmurs,  ' under 
rule  12,345,  section  67,890.'  The  Briton  sighs,  but  life,  he  thinks,  is 
not  long  enough  to  try  to  move  the  limpet  babu.  But  the  babu,  when  he 
likes,  can  easily  make  out  a  case  for  the  addition  of  sub-sections  67,890  a, 

b,  c  z — and  there  is  more  work  for  his  nephews.    '  Your  accounts 

have  come  up  quite  correct, '  wrote  the  leading  clerk  at  Calcutta  to  the 
leading  clerk  in  a  provincial  government;  '  do  not  let  this  occur  again.' 

"  So  the  white  man  in  the  district  sits  at  his  desk  writing  papers  which 
babus  will  docket  and  nobody  will  read ;  and,  outside,  his  underlings  op- 
press the  poor.       *      *  * 

"  Into  this  maze  of  contradiction  to  rule  this  blend  of  good  and  evil, 
steps  Britain.  And  not  content  with  ruling  him — which  is  easy,  for  he 
accepts  any  master  that  comes— we  have  set  ourselves  to  raise  him,  as 
we  put  it.  Which  means  to  uncreate  him,  to  disestablish  what  has  grown 
together  from  the  birth  of  time,  and  to  create  him  anew  in  the  image  of 
men  whom  he  considers  mad.  This  is  surely  the  most  audacious,  the  most 
heroic,  the  most  lunatic  enterprise,  to  which  a  nation  ever  set  its  hand. 


126 


"  How,  now,  have  we  succeeded  !  Let  it  be  said  first  that  we  have  de- 
served success.  If  any  enterprise  in  the  world's  history  has  deserved  success 
it  is  the  British  empire  in  India.  Our  connection  with  the  country  began 
as  most  legitimate  and  mutually  beneficent  commerce.  It  developed 
into  conquest — not  through  any  lust  of  dominion,  but  almost  accidentally, 
and  certainly  against  our  will  ;  it  was  the  inevitable  consequence  of  the 
weakness  and  dissensions  of  the  Indian  races  themselves.  "  *  *  * 
"And  on  this  comes  in  the  hideous,  if  most  inevitable  irony,  that  the 
reward  of  our  work  is  largely  failure,  and  the  thanks  for  our  unselfishness 
mainly  unpopularity.  You  might  almost  imagine  there  ivas  a  curse  on 
British  India,  which  ever  turns  good  endeavours  into  bad  results.  The 
great  gifts  which  we  are  supposed  to  have  given  India  are  justice  and 
eternal  peace — and  each  has  turned  to  her  distress.  The  one  is  driving  her 
peasantry  off  the  land,  the  other  is  preventing  an  effete  race  from  the  reno- 
vation brought  in  by  alien  conquerors. 

"  When  we  say  we  have  given  justice,  we  only  mean  that  we  have  offered 
it — tried  to  force  it  upon  peoples  which  dislike  and  refuse  it.  What  we 
have  really  given  is  a  handful  of  incorruptible  judges,  whose  experience 
enables  them  to  strike  a  rough  balance  between  scales  piled  up  with  per- 
jury on  either  side.  Often  and  often  a  litigant  comes  to  the  European 
judge  and  says,  '  You  were  wrong  to  give  that  case  against  me,  Sahib.  The 
other  side  were  all  lying,  and  we — well,  of  course,  we  lied  too  ;  but  the 
truth  was  such  and  such,  and  we  were  right.  But  of  course  you  could  not 
tell  which  was  lying  most,  and  we  knew  you  did  your  best  to  decide  rightly, 
only  you  were  wrong.'  The  litigant  believes  absolutely  in  the  honesty  of 
the  sahib,  and  accepts  it  as  part  of  his  inexplicable  idiosyncrasy  ;  he  does 
not  seek  to  emulate  it.  As  for  the  great  mass  of  native  judges,  subordi- 
nate and  supreme,  who  do  the  greater  part  of  the  ordinary  business  of  jus  - 
tice,  some  are  incorruptible  ;  there  were  incorruptibles  in  India  before  we 
came.  But  the  mass  of  them,  as  of  the  other  native  officials,  are  just  as 
they  ever  were,  and  with  the  whole  country  leagued  to  screen  them,  it  is 
impossible  that  they  shall  be  otherwise. 

"  The  difference  under  our  rule  is  not  so  much  that  justice  is  done,  as 
that  the  law  is  enforced.  The  rich  man  benefits  under  this ;  for  a  Rajah's 
Government  would  seldom  let  a  rich  man  get  out  of  a  lawsuit  with  a  full 
pocket ;  but  the  poor  man  suffers  in  the  same  proportion.  In  the  old  days 
the  poor  debtor  was  protected  by  the  rapacity  of  judges  and  Government. 
The  usurer  dared  not  go  before  the  Rajah  for  leave  to  attach  the  peasant's 
stock  and  crops  and  land.  'Aha,'  His  Majesty  would  say,  'you  must 
have  been  making  money,  my  friend.  We  must  look  into  this.'  But 
in  a  British  court  the  sacred  contract  must  be  upheld,  and  the  ryot  is 
ruined. 

"The  irony  of  peace  is  as  bitter.  Peace  is  sometimes  a  blessing,  no 
doubt  ;  but,  then,  so  sometimes  is  war.  War  was  the  salt  that  kept  India 
from  decay.  It  caused  horrible  suffering,  presumably,  though  in  India 
not  perhaps  much  more  than  peace  ;  at  least,  it  conspired  with  famine 
and  pestilence  to  keep  the  population  down.    All  three  have  been  greatly 


127 


mitigated  under  our  rule  ;  and  now  a  prodigiously  increasing  multitude  is 
a  dead  weight  on  the  general  prosperity  of  native  India,  and  a  nightmare 
to  her  foreseeing  statesmen.  But  that  is  not  the  only,  nor  the  direst, 
curse  of  peace.  India  is  effete.  It  strikes  you  as  very,  very  old — burned 
out,  sapless,  tired.  Its  people,  for  the  most  part,  are  small,  languid, 
effeminate.  Its  policies,  arts,  industries,  social  systems  stagnate  ;  and  the 
artificial  shackles  of  caste  bind  down  their  native  feebleness  to  a  com- 
pleter sterility.  Now  the  old  wars  periodically  refreshed  this  effeteness 
with  strains  of  more  vigorous  blood.  Most  of  the  greatest  names  of 
Indian  history,  the  wisest  policies,  the  bravest  armies,  the  noblest  art, 
belong  to  races  of  newcomers.  It  seems  that  the  soil  and  climate  of  India 
need  but  three  or  four  generations  to  sap  the  vitality  of  the  most  pow- 
erful breed. 

♦'Now  that  Britain  keeps  the  peace  in  the  plains,  and  guards  the  passes 
of  the  hills,  there  will  come  in  no  invaders  to  renew  the  energies  of 
the  weakened  stocks.  With  each  generation  of  firm  and  just  rule  the  ill 
effects  will  percolate  deeper  and  deeper.  Failing  some  new  process  of 
quickening,  the  weary  races  of  India  must  inevitably  dwindle  and  die  of 
sheer  good  government. 

Whence  is  the  new  fife  to  come  ?  From  us  ?  The  gulf  between  Briton 
and  native  yaivns  no  less  deep  to-day— perhaps  deeper — than  when  the  first 
Englishmen  set  up  their  factory  at  Surat.  Our  very  virtues  have  increased 
the  gap  that  was  in  any  case  inevitable  between  temperaments  so  opposite 
as  Britain's  and  India's.  Justice  India  can  do  without ;  for  peace  she  does 
not  thank  us.  This,  too,  will  grow  worse  and  wonse  with  time,  instead  of 
better.  The  men  who  knew  the  sufferings  of  intestine  war  are  long  since 
dead  ;  their  grandsons,  not  knowing  wherefrom  we  have  delivered  them, 
are  naturally  not  grateful  for  deliverance.  Even  the  best  educated  natives 
are  very  ignorant  of  Indian  history  ;  they  simply  do  not  know  from  what 
we  have  saved  them.  Even  if  they  did,  things  would  be  little  better  ;  for, 
although  it  is  a  silly  fiction  that  no  native  of  India  can  be  grateful,  politi- 
cal and  national  gratitude  is  a  watery  feeling  at  the  best. 

"  What  else  have  we  to  count  on  for  the  regeneration  of  India  ?  Chris- 
tianity ?  It  has  made  few  converts  and  little  enough  improvement  in  the 
few.  Is  it  not.too  exotic  a  religion  to  thrive  in  Indian  soil  ?  Actual  fusion 
of  blood  has  done  as  little.  It  is  usual  to  sneer  at  the  Eurasian  as  com- 
bining the  vices  of  both  parents,  but  this  appears  to  be  a  slander.  In  the 
days  when  generals  married  begums  Eurasians  counted  many  men  of  ability 
and  character  ;  that  you  hear  of  few  now  is  more  likely  due  to  the  fact  that 
the  modern  breed  is  almost  necessarily  of  a  low  type  on  both  sides.  As  it 
is,  Eurasians  fill  a  place  most  creditably  which  nobody  else  could  fill. 
Industrially,  as  overseers,  foremen,  railway  guards,  and  the  like,  they  are 
an  almost  indispensable  link  between  white  and  native.  But  to  expect  them 
to  form  a  link  in  a  deeper  sense,  even  though  a  Viceroy  expresses  the 
hope,  is  over-sanguine.  It  may  be  unjust,  but  there  remains  a  prejudice 
against  them  among  white  and  native  alike. 

"And  after  all,  what  link  could  bind  together  such  opposites  ?  Lan- 


128 


guage  and  education  and  assimilation  of  manners  are  powerless  to  bridge 
so  radical  a  contradiction.  What  close  intercourse  can  you  hope  for, 
when  you  may  not  even  speak  to  your  native  friend's  wife  ?  Native  men 
are  antipathetic  to  European  women  ;  native  women  must  not  be  so  much 
as  seen  by  European  men.  A  clever  and  agreeable  Brahman  told  me  that 
he  would  not  let  even  his  own  brother  see  his  wife.  I  do  know  one 
white  man  who  did  once  see  his  native  friend's  wife.  '  This  is  my  study,' 
said  he  ;  '  that ' — as  a  swathed  figure  shuffled  silently  and  rapidly  across 
the  room  from  door  to  door — '  is  my  wife  ;  that  is  the  presentation  clock 
from  my  pupils  at  the  college.'  And  he  was  an  exceptionally  broad- 
minded  man.  Those  who  know  and  like  the  natives  best  tell  you  that  you 
can  never  speak  with  the  best-known  and  best-liked  of  them  for  any  time 
without  a  constraint  on  both  sides  which  forbids  intimacy.  '  Of  all 
Orientals,' says  the  one  Englishman  who  has  come  nearest  to  knowing 
tbem,  'the  most  antipathetical  companion  to  an  Englishman  is,  I  believe, 
an  East  Indian.  *  *  *  Even  the  experiment  of  associating  with 
them  is  almost  too  hard  to  bear.  *  *  *  I  am  convinced  that  the  natives 
of  India  cannot  respect  a  European  who  mixes  with  them  familiarly.' 
Nature  seems  to  have  raised  an  unscalable  barrier  between  West  and  East. 
It  has  lattices  for  mutual  liking,  for  mutual  respect ;  but  true  community 
of  mind  it  shuts  off  inexorably. 

"  Every  loophole  of  optimism  seems  closed — except  one.  When  all  is 
said  and  done,  we  have  only  been  in  India  a  little  over  a  hundred  years — in 
many  parts  of  it  hardly  fifty.  To  immemorial  India  that  is  like  half  an 
hour  ;  and  when  we  first  went  to  India  we  were,  after  all,  not  very  much 
less  corrupt — whether  there  or  at  home — than  India  is  to-day.  To  move 
the  East  is  a  matter  of  centuries  ;  and  yet  it  moves.  Often  it  seems  that 
to  mean  the  right  thing  only  ends  in  doing  the  wrong  one.  We  have 
made,  and  are  making,  abundant  mistakes ;  in  administration  and 
education  we  seem  to  be  running  further  and  further  off  the  right  lines." 

Lord  Roberts,  too,  gives  us  in  his  "Forty-one  years  in  India" 
in  some  detail,  evidently  carefully  considered,  with  well  weighed 
words,  the  following  diagnosis  of  Indian  conditions: 

"  When  the  Mutiny  broke  out,  the  whole  effective  British  force  in  India 
only  amounted  to  36,000  men,  against  257,000  native  soldiers,  a  fact  which 
was  not  likely  to  be  overlooked  by  those  who  hoped  and  strived  to  gain  to 
their  own  side  this  preponderance  of  numerical  strength,  and  which  was 
calculated  to  inflate  the  minds  of  the  Sepoys  with  a  most  undesirable  sense 
of  independence.  An  army  of  Asiatics,  such  as  we  maintain  in  India,  is  a 
faithful  servant,  but  a  treacherous  master;  powerfully  influenced  by  social 
and  religious  prejudices  with  which  we  are  imperfectly  acquainted,  it 
requires  the  most  careful  handling  ;  above  all,  it  must  never  be  allowed 
to  lose  faith  in  the  prestige  or  supremacy  of  the  governing  race.  When 
mercenaries  feel  that  they  are  indispensable  to  the  maintenance  of  that 
authority  which  they  have  no  patriotic  interest  in  upholding,  they  begin 


129 


to  consider  whether  it  would  not  be  more  to  their  advantage  to  aid  in 
overthrowing  that  authority,  and  if  they  decide  that  it  would  be,  they 
have  little  scruple  in  transferring  their  allegiance  from  the  government 
they  never  loved,  and  have  ceased  to  fear,  to  the  power  more  in  accordance 
with  their  oion  ideas,  and  from  which,  they  are  are  easily  persuaded,  they 
will  obtain  unlimited  benefits. 

"  A  fruitful  cause  of  dissatisfaction  in  our  native  army,  and  one  which 
pressed  more  heavily  upon  it  year  by  year,  as  our  acquisitions  of  territory 
in  northern  India  became  more  extended,  was  the  Sepoy's  liability  to  ser- 
vice in  distant  parts  of  India,  entailing  upon  him  a  life  among  strangers 
differing  from  him  in  religion  and  in  all  their  customs,  and  far  away  from 
his  home,  his  family,  and  his  congenial  surroundings — a  liability  which  he 
had  never  contemplated  except  in  the  event  of  war,  when  extra  pay,  free 
rations  and  the  possibility  of  loot,  would  go  far  to  counterbalance  the  dis 
advantages  of  expatriation.  Service  in  Burma,  which  entailed  crossing 
the  sea,  and,  to  the  Hindu,  consequent  loss  of  caste,  was  especially  distaste- 
ful. So  great  an  objection,  indeed,  had  the  Sepoys  to  this  so-called 
"  foreign  service  ",  and  so  difficult  did  it  become  to  find  troops  to  relieve 
the  regiments,  in  consequence  of  the  bulk  of  the  Bengal  army  not  being 
available  for  service  beyond  the  sea,  that  the  Court  of  Directors  sanctioned 
Lord  Canning's  proposal  that,  after  the  1st  of  September,  1856,  '  no  native 
recruit  shall  be  accepted  who  does  not  at  the  time  of  his  enlistment  under- 
take to  serve  beyond  the  sea  whether  within  the  territories  of  the  Company 
or  beyond  them.'  This  order,  though  absolutely  necessary,  caused  the 
greatest  dissatisfaction  amongst  the  Hindustani  Sepoys,  who  looked  upon 
it  as  one  of  the  measures  introduced  by  the  Sirkar  for  the  forcible,  or 
rather  fraudulent,  conversion  of  all  the  natives  to  Christianity." 

******** 

"  The  India  of  to-day  is  altogether  a  different  country  from  the  India  of 
1857.  Much  has  been  done  since  then  to  improve  the  civil  administration, 
and  to  meet  the  legitimate  demands  of  the  native  races.  India  is  more 
tranquil,  more  prosperous,  and  more  civilized  than  it  was  before  the 
Mutiny,  and  the  discipline,  efliciency,  and  mobility  of  the  native  army  have 
been  greatly  improved.  Much,  however,  still  remains  to  be  done,  to  secure 
the  contentment  of  the  natives  with  our  rule. 

"  Our  position  has  been  materially  strengthened  by  the  provision  of 
main  and  subsidiary  lines  of  communication  by  road  and  railway  ;  by  the 
great  network  of  telegraphs  which  now  intersects  the  country ;  and  by  the 
construction  of  canals.  These  great  ;public  works  have  largely  increased 
the  area  of  land  under  cultivation,  minimized  the  risk  of  famine,  equal- 
ized the  price  of  agricultural  produce,  and  developed  a  large  and  lucrative 
export  trade.  Above  all,  while  our  troops  can  now  be  assembled  easily 
and  rapidly  at  any  centre  of  disturbance,  the  number  of  British  soldiers 
has  been  more  than  doubled  and  the  number  of  native  soldiers  has  been 
materially  reduced.  Moreover,  as  regards  the  native  equally  with  the 
British  army  of  India,  I  believe  that  a  better  feeling  never  existed  through- 
out the  ranks  than  exists  at  present. 


130 


' '  Nevertheless,  there  are  signs  that  the  spirit  of  unrest  and  discontent 
which  sowed  the  seeds  of  the  Mutiny  is  being  revived.  To  some  extent  this 
state  of  things  is  the  natural  result  of  onr  position  in  India,  and  is  so  far 
unavoidable,  but  it  is  also  due  to  old  faults  reappearing — faults  which 
require  to  be  carefully  watched  and  guarded  against,  for  it  is  certain  that, 
however  well  disposed  as  soldiers  the  men  in  our  ranks  may  be,  their 
attitude  will  inevitably  be  influenced  by  the  feelings  of  the  people  gen- 
erally, more  especially  should  their  hostility  be  aroused  by  any  question 
connected  with  religion. 

' '  For  a  considerable  time  after  the  Mutiny  we  became  more  cautious 
and  conciliatory  in  administrative  and  legislative  matters,  more  intent  on 
doing  what  would  keep  the  chiefs  and  rulers  satisfied,  and  the  masses  con- 
tented and  the  country  quiet,  than  on  carrying  out  our  own  ideas.  Grad- 
ually this  wholesome  caution  is  being  disregarded.  The  government  has 
become  more  and  more  centralized,  and  the  departmental  spirit  very 
strong.  Each  department,  in  its  laudable  wish  for  progress  and  advance- 
ment, is  apt  to  push  on  measures  which  are  obnoxious  to  the  natives,  either 
from  their  not  being  properly  understood,  or  from  their  being  opposed  to 
their  traditions  and  habits  of  life,  thus  entailing  the  sacrifice  of  many 
cherished  customs  and  privileges.  Each  department  admits  in  theory  the 
necessity  for  caution,  but  in  practice  presses  for  liberty  of  action  to  further 
its  own  particular  schemes. 

"  Of  late  years,  too,  the  tendency  has  been  to  increase  the  number  of 
departments  and  of  secretariat  offices  under  the  supreme  government,  and 
this  tendency,  while  causing  more  work  to  devolve  on  the  supreme  gov- 
ernment than  it  can  efficiently  perform,  results  in  lessening  the  responsi- 
bility of  provincial  governments  by  interference  in  the  management  of 
local  concerns.  It  is  obvious  that  a  country  like  India,  composed  as  it  is  of 
great  provinces  and  various  races  differing  from  one  another  in  interests, 
customs  and  religions,  each  with  its  own  peculiar  and  distinct  necessities, 
administrative  details  ought  to  be  left  to  the  people  on  the  spot.  The 
government  of  India  would  then  be  free  to  exercise  a  firm  and  impartial 
control  over  the  Empire  and  Imperial  interests,  while  guiding  into  safe 
channels,  without  unduly  restraining,  intelligent  progress. 

In  times  of  peace  the  administration  is  apt  to  fall  too  exclusively  into  the 
hands  of  officials  whose  ability  is  of  the  doctrinaire  type  ;  they  work  hard, 
and  can  give  logical  and  statistical  reasons  for  the  measures  they  propose, 
and  are  thus  able  to  make  them  attractive  to,  and  believed  in  by,  the 
authorities.  But  they  lack  the  more  perfect  knowledge  of  human  nature, 
and  the  deeper  insight  into,  and  greater  sympathy  with,  the  feelings  and 
prejudices  of  Asiatics,  which  those  possessed  in  a  remarkable  degree  who 
proved  by  their  success  that  they  had  mastered  the  problem  of  the  best 
form  of  government  in  India.  I  allude  to  men  like  Thomas  Munro, 
Mountstuart  Elphinstone,  John  Malcolm,  Charles  Metcalfe,  George  Clerk, 
Henry  and  John  Lawrence,  William  Sleeman,  James  Outram,  Herbert 
Edwardes,  John  Nicholson,  and  many  others.  These  administrators,  while 
fully  recognizing  the  need  for  a  gradual  reform,  understood  the  peculiar- 


131 


ities  of  our  position  in  the  East,  the  necessity,  for  extreme  caution  and 
toleratiou,  and  a  '  live  and  let  live '  policy  between  us  and  the  natives. 
The  sound  and  broad  views  of  this  class  of  public  servant  are  not  always 
appreciated  either  in  India  or  England,  and  are  too  often  put  aside  as 
impracticable,  obstructive,  and  old  fashioned. 

"Amongst  the  causes  which  have  produced  discontent  of  late  years,  I 
would  mention  our  forest  laws  and  sanitary  regulations,  our  legislative 
and  fiscal  systems  measures  so  necessary  that  no  one  interested  in  the 
prosperity  of  In  (La  could  cavil  at  their  introduction,  but  which  are  so 
absolutely  foreign  to  native  ideas,  that  it  is  essential  they  should  be  applied 
with  the  utmost  gentleness  and  circumspection. 

"  I  think,  also,  that  the  official  idea  of  converting  the  young  Princes  and 
nobles  of  India  into  English  gentlemen  by  means  of  English  tutors  and 
English  studies  should  be  carried  out  with  great  care  and  caution.  It  has 
not  hitherto  invariably  succeeded  and  the  feeling  in  many  States  is  strongly 
opposed  to  it.  The  danger  of  failure  lies  in  the  wholesome  restraint  of  the 
tutor  being  suddenly  removed  and  in  the  young  Prince  being  left  at  too 
early  an  age  to  select  his  advisers  and  companions.  The  former,  perhaps 
not  unnaturally,  are  interested  in  proving  that  the  training  of  their  young 
ruler  by  his  European  governor  or  tutor  has  not  resulted  in  good  either  to 
himself  or  his  people,  while  the  latter  are  too  often  of  the  lowest  class  of 
European  adventurers. 

"  The  proceedings  aad  regulations  of  the  Forest  Department  desirable  as 
they  may  be  from  a  financial  and  agricultural  point  of  view,  have  provoked 
very  great  irritation  in  many  parts  of  India.  People  who  have  been  ac- 
customed from  time  immemorial  to  pick  up  sticks  and  graze  their  cattle 
on  forest  lands,  cannot  understand  why  they  should  now  be  forbidden  to 
do  so,  nor  can  they  realize  the  necessity  for  preserving  the  trees  from  the 
chance  of  being  destroyed  by  fire,  a  risk  to  which  they  were  frequently 
exposed  from  the  native  custom  of  making  use  of  their  shelter  while  cook- 
ing and  burning  the  undergrowth  to  enrich  the  grazing. 

"  The  action  taken  by  tlie  Government  in  sanitary  matters  has  also 
aroused  much  ill-feeling  aud  apprehension.  Sanitary  precautions  are  en- 
tirely ignored  in  Eastern  countries.  The  great  majority  of  the  people  can 
see  no  good  in  them,  and  no  harm  in  using  the  same  tank  for  drinking 
purposes  and  for  bathing  and  washing  their  clothes.  The  immediate  sur- 
roundings of  their  towns  and  villages  are  most  offensive,  being  used  as  the 
general  receptacles  for  dead  animals  and  all  kinds  of  filth.  Cholera,  fever 
and  other  diseases,  which  carry  off  hundreds  of  thousands  every  year,  are 
looked  upon  as  the  visitation  of  God,  from  which  it  is  impossible,  even 
were  it  not  impious  to  try  to  escape ;  and  the  precautionary  measures  in- 
sisted upon  by  us  in  our  cantonments,  and  at  the  fairs  and  places  of  pil- 
grimage, are  viewed  with  aversion  and  indignation.  Only  those  who  have 
witnessed  the  personal  discomfort  and  fatigue  to  which  natives  of  all  ages 
and  both  sexes  willingly  submit  in  their  struggle  to  reach  some  holy  shrine 
on  the  occasion  of  a  religious  festival  while  dragging  their  weary  limbs  for 
many  hundreds  of  miles  along  a  hot,  dusty  road,  or  being  huddled  for 


132 


hours  together  in  a  cramped  and  stifling  railway  carriage  can  have  any 
idea  of  the  bitter  disappointment  to  the  pilgrims  caused  by  their  being  or- 
dered to  disperse  when  cholera  breaks  out  at  such  gatherings,  without 
being  given  the  opportunity  of  performing  their  vows  or  bathing  in  the 
sacred  waters. 

"Further,  our  legislative  system  is  based  on  western  ideas,  its  object 
being  to  mete  out  equal  justice  to  the  rich  and  poor,  to  the  prince  and 
peasant.  But  our  methods  of  procedure  do  not  commend  themselves  to  the 
Indian  peoples.  Eastern  races  are  accustomed  to  a  paternal  despotism  and 
they  conceive  it  to  be  the  proper  function  of  the  local  representatives  of 
the  supreme  power  to  investigate  and  determine  on  the  spot  the  various 
criminal  and  civil  cases  which  come  under  the  cognizance  of  the  district 
officials.  Legal  technicalities  and  references  to  distant  tribunals  confuse 
and  harass  a  population  which,  with  comparatively  few  exceptions  is 
illiterate,  credulous  and  suspicious  of  underhand  influence.  An  almost  un- 
limited right  of  appeal  from  one  Court  to  another,  in  matters  of  even  tlie 
most  trivial  importance,  not  only  tends  to  impair  the  authority  of  the  local 
magistrate,  but  gives  an  unfair  advantage  to  the  wealthy  litigant  whose 
means  enable  him  to  secure  the  services  of  the  ablest  pleader,  and  to  pur- 
chase the  most  conclusive  evidence  in  support  of  his  claim.  For  it  must  be 
remembered  that  in  India  evidence  on  almost  any  subject  can  be  had  for 
the  buying,  and  the  difficulty,  in  the  administration  of  justice,  of  discrimi- 
nating between  truth  and  falsehood  is  hereby  greatly  increased.  Under 
our  system  a  horde  of  unscrupulous  pleaders  has  sprung  up,  and  these  men 
encourage  useless  litigation  thereby  impoverishing  their  clients,  and  creat- 
ing much  ill-feeling  against  our  laws  and  administration. 

"  Another  point  worthy  of  consideration  is  the  extent  to  which,  under 
the  protection  of  our  legal  system,  the  peasant  proprietors  of  India  are 
being  oppressed  and  ruined  by  village  shop  keepers  and  money  lenders. 
These  men  advance  money  at  a  most  exorbitant  rate  of  interest,  taking  as 
security  the  crops  and  occupancy  rights  of  the  cultivators  of  the  soil.  The 
latter  are  ignorant,  improvident,  and  in  some  matters,  such  as  the  marriage 
ceremonies  of  their  families,  inordinately  extravagant.  The  result  is  that 
a  small  debt  soon  swells  into  a  big  one,  and  eventually  the  aid  of  the  law 
courts  is  invoked  to  oust  the  cultivator  from  a  holding  which,  in  many 
cases,  has  been  in  the  possession  of  his  ancestors  for  hundreds  of  years. 
The  money  lender  has  his  accounts  to  produce,  and  these  can  hardly  be 
disputed,  the  debtor  as  a  rule  being  unable  to  keep  accounts  of  his  own,  or, 
indeed,  to  read  or  write.  Before  the  British  dominion  was  established  in 
India,  the  usurer  no  doubt  existed,  but  his  opportunities  were  fewer,  his 
position  more  precarious  and  his  operations  more  tinder  control  than  they 
are  at  present.  The  money  lender  then  knew  that  his  life  would  not  be 
safe  if  he  exacted  too  high  interest  for  the  loans  with  which  he  accommo- 
dated his  customers,  and  that  if  he  became  too  rich,  some  charge  or  other 
would  be  trumped  up  against  him,  which  would  force  him  to  surrender  a 
large  share  of  his  wealth  to  the  officials  of  the  state  in  which  he  was  living. 
I  do  not  say  that  the  rough-and-ready  methods  of  native  justice  in  dealing 


133 


with  money  lenders  were  excusable  or  tolerable,  but  at  the  same  time,  I 
am  inclined  to  think  that,  in  granting  these  men  every  legal  facility  for 
enforcing  their  demands  and  carrying  on  their  traffic,  we  may  have 
neglected  the  interests  of  the  agriculturists,  and  that  it  might  be  desirable 
to  establish  some  agency  under  the  control  of  government,  which  would 
enable  the  poor  landholders  to  obtain,  at  a  moderate  rate  of  interest 
advances  proportionate  to  the  securities  they  had  to  offer. 

"  Another  danger  to  our  supremacy  in  India  is  the  license  allowed  to 
the  native  press  in  vilifying  the  government  and  its  officials,  and  persist- 
ently misrepresenting  the  motives  and  policy  of  tne  ruling  power.  In  a  free 
country,  where  the  mass  of  the  population  is  well  educated,  independent 
and  self  reliant,  a  free  press  is  a  most  valuable  institution,  representing  as 
it  does,  the  requirements  and  aspirations  of  important  sections  of  the  com- 
munity, and  bringing  to  life  defects  and  abuses  in  the  social  and  political 
system.  In  a  country  such  as  Great  Britain,  which  is  well  advanced  in 
the  art  of  self-government,  intolerant  and  indiscriminate  abuse  of  public 
men  defeats  its  own  object,  and  misstatements  of  matters  of  fact  can  be  at 
once  exposed  and  refuted.  Like  most  of  the  developments  of  civilization 
which  are  worth  anything,  the  English  press  is  a  plant  of  indigenous 
growth,  whereas  in  India  the  native  press  is  an  exotic  which,  under 
existing  conditions,  supplies  no  general  want,  does  nothing  to  refine, 
elevate  or  instruct  the  people,  and  is  used  by  its  supporters  and  promoters 
— an  infinitesimal  part  of  the  population — as  a  means  of  gaining  its  selfish 
ends,  and  of  fostering  sedition,  and  racial  and  religious  animosities. 
There  are,  I  am  afraid,  very  few  native  newspapers  actuated  by  a  friendly 
or  impartial  spirit  towards  the  government  of  India  and  to  Asiatics  it 
seems  incredible  that  we  should  permit  such  hostile  publications  to  be 
scattered  broadcast  over  the  country  unless  the  assertions  were  too  true  to 
be  disputed,  or  unless  we  were  too  weak  to  suppress  them.  We  gain 
neither  credit  nor  gratitude  for  our  tolerant  attitude  toward  the  native 
press — our  forbearance  is  misunderstood,  and  while  the  well-disposed  are 
amazed  at  our  inaction,  the  disaffected  rejoice  at  being  allowed  to  promul- 
gate baseless  insinuations  and  misstatements  which  undermine  our  author- 
ity and  thwart  our  efforts  to  gain  the  good -will  and  confidence  of  the 
native  population. 

"  Yet  another  danger  to  the  permanence  of  our  rule  in  India  lies  in  the 
endeavors  of  well-intentioned  faddists  to  regulate  the  customs  and  institu- 
tions of  Eastern  races  in  accordance  with  their  own  ideas.  The  United 
Kingdom  is  a  highly  civilized  country  and  our  habits  and  convictions 
have  been  gradually  developed  under  the  influences  of  our  religion  and  our 
natural  surroundings.  Fortunately  for  themselves,  the  people  of  Great 
Britain  possess  qualities  which  have  made  them  masters  of  a  vast  and  still- 
expanding  empire,  but  these  qualities  have  their  defects  as  well  as  their 
merits,  and  one  of  the  defects  is  a  certain  insularity  of  thought  or  narrow- 
mindedness — a  slowness  to  recognize  that  institutions  which  are  perfectly 
suitable  and  right  for  us  may  be  quite  unsuited,  if  not  injurious  to  other 
races,  and  that  what  may  not  be  right  for  us  to  do  is  not  necessarily  wrong 


134 


for  people  of  a  different  belief,  and  with  absolutely  different  traditions 
and  customs. 

"Gradually  the  form  of  government  in  the  United  Kingdom  has  become 
representative  and  democratic,  and  it  is  therefore  assumed  by  some  people, 
who  have  little,  if  any,  experience  in  the  East  that  the  government  of 
India  should  be  guided  by  the  utterances  of  self  -appointed  agitators,  who 
pose  as  the  mouthpieces  of  an  oppressed  population.  Some  of  these  men 
are  almost  as  much  aliens  as  ourselves,  while  others  are  representatives  of 
a  class  which,  though  intellectually  advanced,  has  no  influence  amongst 
the  races  in  whom  lies  the  real  strength  of  India.  Municipal  self-govern- 
ment has  been  found  to  answer  well  in  the  United  Kingdom,  and  it  is  held, 
therefore,  that  a  similar  system  must  be  equally  successful  in  India.  We 
in  England  consume  animal  food  and  alcoholic  liquors,  but  have  no  liking 
for  opium.  An  effort  has  accordingly  been  made  to  deprive  our  Asiatic 
fellow-subjects,  who,  as  a  rule,  are  vegetarians,  and  either  total  abstainers 
or  singularly  abstemious  in  the  matter  of  drink,  of  a  small  and  inexpensive 
stimulant,  which  they  find  necessary  to  their  health  and  comfort.  British 
institutions  and  ideas  are  the  embodiment  of  what  long  experience  has 
proved  to  us  to  be  best  for  ourselves ;  but  suddenly  to  establish  these  insti- 
tutions and  enforce  these  ideas  on  a  community  which  is  not  prepared  for 
them,  does  not  want  them,  and  cannot  understand  them,  must  only  lead 
to  suspicion  and  discontent.  The  government  of  India  should,  no  doubt, 
be  progressive  in  its  policy,  and  in  all  things  be  guided  by  the  immutable 
principles  of  right,  truth  and  justice ;  but  these  principles  ought  to  be  ap- 
plied, not  necessarily  as  we  should  apply  them  in  English,  but  with  due 
regard  to  the  social  peculiarities  and  religious  prejudices  of  the  people 
whom  it  ought  to  be  our  aim  to  make  better  and  happier. 

"It  will  be  gathered  from  what  I  have  written  that  our  administration, 
in  my  opinion,  suffers  from  two  main  defects.  First,  it  is  internally  too 
bureaucratic  and  centralizing  in  its  tendencies,  and,  secondly,  it  is  liable 
to  be  forced  by  the  external  pressure  of  well-meaning  but  irresponsible 
politicians  and  philanthropists  to  adopt  measures  which  may  be  disap- 
proved of  by  the  authorities  on  the  spot,  and  opposed  to  the  wishes, 
requirements  and  interests  of  the  people.  It  seems  to  me  that  for  many 
years  to  come  the  best  form  of  government  for  India  will  be  the  intelligent 
and  benevolent  despotism  which  at  present  rules  the  country.  On  a  small 
scale,  and  in  matters  of  secondary  importance,  representative  institutions 
cannot  perhaps  do  much  harm,  though  I  am  afraid  they  will  effect  but 
little  good.  On  a  large  scale,  however,  such  a  system  of  government 
would  be  quite  out  of  place  in  view  of  the  fact  that  ninety-nine  out  of 
every  hundred  of  the  population  are  absolutely  devoid  of  any  idea  of  civil 
responsibility,  and  that  the  various  races  and  religious  sects  possess  no 
bond  of  national  union. 

"In  reply,  then,  to  the  question  "Is  there  any  chance  of  a  mutiny 
occurring  again  ? "  I  would  say  that  the  best  way  of  guarding  against 
such  a  calamity  is : 

"By  never  allowing  the  present  proportion  of  British  to  native  soldiers 


135 


to  be  diminished  or  the  discipline  and  efficiency  of  the  native  army  to 
become  slack. 

"  By  taking  care  that  men  are  selected  for  the  higher  civil  and  military 
posts,  whose  self-reliance,  activity,  and  resolution  are  not  impaired  by  age, 
and  who  possess  a  knowledge  of  the  country  and  the  habits  of  the  peoples. 

"By  recognizing  and  guarding  against  the  dogmatism  of  theorists  and 
the  dangers  of  centralization. 

' '  By  rendering  our  administration  on  the  one  hand  firm  and  strong,  on 
the  other  hand  tolerant  and  sympathetic,  and  last  but  not  least,  by  doing 
all  in  our  power  to  gain  the  confidence  of  the  various  races,  and  by  con- 
vincing them  that  we  have  not  only  the  determination,  but  the  ability  to 
maintain  our  supremacy  in  India  against  all  assailants. 

' '  If  these  cardinal  points  are  never  lost  sight  of,  there  is,  I  believe,  little 
chance  of  any  fresh  outbreak  disturbing  the  stability  of  our  rule  in  India, 
or  neutralizing  our  efforts  to  render  that  country  prosperous,  contented 
and  thoroughly  loyal  to  the  British  Crown." 

But  here  comes  a  most  important  question.  When  was  the 
rule  of  a  subject  race  by  the  younger  sons  of  the  British 
hereditary  oligarchy  ever  ''tolerant  and  sympathetic?"  If  the 
permanence  of  British  rule  in  India  depends  on  Englishmen 
being  "  tolerant  and  sympathetic/'  then  British  rule  in  India  is 
near  its  end. 

Certain  passages  in  this  quotation  from  Lord  Roberts  deserve 
tie  most  serious  consideration.  The  first  point,  which  he  makes 
apparent,  is  the  extreme  danger  arising  from  the  native  soldiers 
unless  they  are  overawed  by  an  adequate  number  of  British 
regular  troops,  and  especially,  unless  they  are  kept  in  subjuga- 
tion by  the  apprehended  certainty  of  British  supremacy.  Let 
us  carefully  note  the  following  most  significant  words  from 
Lord  Roberts: 

"When  mercenaries  feel  that  they  are  indispensable  to  the  maintenance 
of  .that  authority  which  they  have  no  patriotic  interest  in  upholding,  they 
begin  to  consider  whether  it  would  not  be  more  to  their  advantage  to  aid 
in  overthrowing  that  authority  and  if  they  decide  that  it  would  be,  they 
have  little  scruples  in  transferring  their  allegiance  from  the  government 
they  never  loved,  and  have  ceased^'to  fear,  to  the  power  more  in  accord- 
ance with  their  own  ideas  and  from  which  they  are  easiest  persuaded  they 
will  obtain  unlimited  benefits." 

Could  it  be  possible  to  describe  more  correctly  the  situation 
existing  in  India  to-day,  with  reference  to  her  native  army? 
Russian  intrigue,  always  a  most  potent  influence  with  Asiatics, 


136 


will  have  little  difficulty,  in  case  of  British  reverses  in  South 
Africa,  or  in  case  of  a  delay  in  large  British  successes,  in  per- 
suading the  Indian  population,  and  the  Indian  army,  that  "they 
will  obtain  unlimited  benefits"  by  "transferring  their  allegi- 
ance from  the  government  they  never  loved,  and  have  ceased 
to  fear,  to  the  power  more  in  accordance  with  their  own  ideas." 

We  have  heard  of  late  utterances  on  the  part  of  high 
British  officials,  of  something  like  a  threat,  that  they  would  use 
Indian  Sepoys  in  the  South  African  war.  After  reading  the 
foregoing  extract  from  Lord  Boberts,  it  is  easily  apparent,  that 
such  a  thing  is  quite  impossible.  Any  attempt  to  transfer  the 
Sepoys  to  South  Africa  would  probably  be  the  signal  for  im- 
mediate open  revolt.  Even  if  such  an  attempt  should  succeed, 
the  Sepoys  would  be  practically  worthless,  for  service  in  a  dif- 
ferent country,  and  a  different  climate.  Lord  Beaconsfield's 
transfer  of  seven  thousand  Sepoys  at  the  time  of  the  Bussian 
difficulties  was  quite  in  keeping  with  the  character  of  that  most 
sensational  parliamentary  politician.  It  answered  well  enough 
for  the  British  House  of  Commons.  To  the  mind  of  any  soldier, 
it  was  grotesquely  ridiculous.  The  Sepoys,  as  a  military  force, 
have  no  value  to  the  British  Government  outside  of  India;  and 
within  India,  at  the  present  day,  under  present  circumstances, 
they  are  an  element  rather  of  danger  than  of  strength. 

So  it  will  be  well  for  England  to  be  warned.  Many  promi- 
nent Englishmen  have  spoken  of  the  dangers  to  British  prestige, 
and  to  British  supremacy,  which  would  result  from  a  conces- 
sion of  the  independence  of  the  South  African  Republics.  They 
will  do  well  to  consider  the  probability  of  far  greater  dangers, 
from  the  other  course  of  conduct.  A  prudent  man  will  care- 
fully abstain  from  prophesies.  A  wise  statesman,  however, 
will  make  his  most  earnest  effort,  to  take  into  consideration  all 
the  features  of  the  political  and  military  situation,  not  merely 
in  the  House  of  Commons  at  London,  and  in  the  present 
field  of  military  operations  in  Natal,  but  all  over  the  world — 
and  especially  in  India.  He  will  consider,  that  it  is  utterly 
impossible,  to  tell  how  the  South  African  military  operations 
will  end,  unless  they  end  quickly.  He  will  consider,  that  in 
South  Africa  alone,  if  war  could  be  certainly  limited  to  that 
region,  the  war  as  yet  has  scarcely  had  its  beginning. 


137 


To  say  that  this  present  contest  is  one  between  free  institu- 
tions as  represented  by  England,  and  an  ignorant  oligarchy  as 
represented  by  the  Boers,  is  a  gross  misuse  of  language.  The  gov- 
ernment of  the  Transvaal  is  no  doubt  agovernment  by  a  few  men. 
In  that  sense  it  is  an  oligarchy.  In  that  sense,  the  government 
of  every  country  is  an  oligarchy,  whether  its  form  be  monarchic 
or  republican.  The  few  men,  however,  who  now  govern  the 
Transvaal,  are  men  selected  by  the  free  choice  of  the  Transvaal 
people.  The  government  is  thoroughly  republican,  in  the  cor- 
rect sense  of  the  word.  It  secures  the  expression  of  the 
will  and  judgment  of  the  Transvaal  people.  It  is  no 
doubt  the  fact,  that  the  Boers  have  not  been  will- 
ing to  allow  the  rights  of  full  citizenship  to  the  Johan- 
nesburg miners.  The  Transvaal  people  has,  no  doubt, 
been  unwilling  to  be  overborne,  in  the  administration  of 
their  public  affairs,  by  the  denizens  of  a  mining  camp,  who  have 
come  into  their  territory  for  the  mere  purpose  of  exploiting 
mines  of  diamonds  and  of  gold,  with  a  view  to  extracting  wealth 
from  the  bowels  of  the  earth  in  the  shortest  possible  number 
of  years,  and  then  returning  to  their  former  homes  to  enjoy 
their  hastily  gotten  gains.  Those  newcomers  have  no  just 
claim  to  any  voice  in  the  government  of  the  Transvaal  Re- 
public. They  have  never  intended  to  serve  it.  They  have 
never  intended  to  take  upon  themselves  citizens'  burdens.  The 
present  government  of  the  Transvaal  Republic,  headed  by  Presi- 
dent Kruger,  is  the  creation  of  the  people  who  settled  the 
country;  who  own  the  country;  who  are  entitled  to  all  the  bene- 
fits which  can  be  extracted  from  the  soil;  who  tax  the  mines 
heavily,  as  they  ought  to  be  taxed;  and  who  have  rightly  com- 
pelled men  who  have  been  simply  digging  gold,  and  thereby 
depleting  the  mineral  wealth  of  the  country,  to  pay  the  largest 
share  of  the  revenues  of  that  State.  Those  revenues  have  been 
rightly  applied  in  providing  for  the  national  defence.  It  was  a 
certainty,  that  Mr.  Chamberlain's  first  attack  upon  the  independ- 
ence of  the  Transvaal  in  January,  1896,  would  be  followed  by  a 
second,  as  soon  as  he  and  Mr.  Rhodes,  backed  by  the  Roths- 
childs, should  find  a  fitting  opportunity.  President  Kruger 
and  his  associates  were  well  aware  of  this  impending  assault. 
They  would  have  been  false  to  their  trusts,  if  they  had 


138 


not  made  the  fullest  provision  to  meet  it.  They  made 
full  provision  therefor,  with  a  wisdom  and  completeness 
which  must  gain  the  admiration  of  the  entire  civilized 
world.  They  well  deserve  our  approval,  and  sympathy  with 
every  form  of  encouragement  which  we  can  possibly  give 
them,  in  making  their  stand  for  the  cause  of  freedom  and  re- 
publican government,  in  opposition  to  a  combination  between 
European  bankers,  a  stock  speculator,  and  a  venal  politician,  who 
have  now  for  the  second  time  embarked  upon  an  enterprise  of 
robbery  and  murder.  Can  anything  be  more  grotesquely  absurd, 
than  to  say  that  this  combination,  headed  by  Mr.  Joseph  Cham- 
berlain, represents  the  cause  of  freedom  so  far  as  England  is  con- 
cerned? The  success  of  the  British  in  the  present  war  will 
forward  no  real  interest  of  the  British  people.  At  most  it  will 
continue — for  a  time — the  opportunity  for  the  British  heredi- 
tary oligarchy  to  provide  rich  places  and  salaries  for  a  large  num- 
ber of  its  members,  the  salaries  to  be  paid  by  people  whose  inter- 
ests will  not  be  well  served  to  men  of  another  blood  unfamiliar 
with  their  political  methods.  It  is  not  denied,  that  in  India  and 
in  the  British  Colonial  world  there  have  been  many  very  esti- 
mable men,  who  have  with  all  sincerity  endeavored  to  serve  the 
interests  of  the  people  over  whom  they  have  been  placed.  But 
it  is  easy  to  see,  from  the  testimony  of  Lord  Roberts  and  Mr. 
Steevens,  that  British  rule  in  India  has  by  no  means  been  the 
success  which  it  is  generally  supposed  to  be.  My  own  individ- 
ual opinion  is,  that  is  has  been  quite  the  reverse.  Mr.  Lincoln 
said,  that  no  people  could  wisely  govern  any  other  people.  It 
was  a  saying,  the  accuracy  of  which  is  well  established  by  the 
facts  to-day  existing  in  British  India.  If  the  result  of  the 
present  Transvaal  war  should  be  the  end  of  British  rule  in  India, 
it  is  at  least  a  matter  of  great  doubt,  whether  that  result  would 
not  be  better  for  both  India  and  England.  It  is  not  for  the 
highest  interests  of  England,  that  a  large  number  of  her  sons 
should  be  provided  with  rich  salaries  at  the  expense  of  subject 
populations. 

But  the  main  fundamental  fact  of  this  entire  situation,  mili- 
tary and  political,  is  that  this  present  war,  to  which  for  the 
present  the  British  Government  is  a  party,  is  an  act  of  pure 
aggression,  a  war  of  mere  conquest,  waged  on  two  Republics, 


139 

who  are  fighting  for  their  homes,  and  their  right  to  free  demo- 
cratic government.  It  is  a  war,  promoted  and  directed,  by  the 
Eothschilds,  and  their  two  hired  servants,  Mr.  Rhodes  and  Mr. 
Joseph  Chamberlain.  Mr.  Rhodes  is  a  servant  of  the  ordinary 
kind,  bought,  and  paid,  in  money.  Mr.  Chamberlain  is  a  servant 
of  another  kind,  bought,  and  paid,  by  political  influence,  with 
money  at  its  back.  It  is  well  understood  in  London — and  in 
New  York — by  what  means  the  Rothschilds  have  been  able  to 
secure  the  most  powerful  family  influence,  in  the  highest  circles 
of  the  British  hereditary  oligarchy,  and  thereby  enable  them- 
selves to  become  the  dominating  factor — for  the  time — in  the 
action  of  the  British  Government.  Well  informed  men  are 
still  willing  to  believe,  that  the  Marquis  of  Salisbury  and  Mr. 
Balfour  are — thus  far — acting  for  what  they  think,  on  the 
whole,  to  be  the  interests  of  the  British  nation.  But  what  a 
position  for  the  Cecils !  To  be  doing  the  work,  and  serving  the 
bidding,  of  a  stock  speculator  and  a  paid  political  mercenary! 

The  end  of  the  whole  matter  is— THIS  WAR  OF  THE 
ROTHSCHILDS— IS  A  WAR  FOR  GOLD.  In  the  latest 
map  of  the  Republic  that  has  come  to  my  hand  from  London, 
which  is  stated  to  have  had  already  a  sale  of  one  hundred  and 
forty  thousand,  there  is  among  the  "Explanations"  the  designa- 
tion of  "Gold  Fields"  by  a  patch  of  yellow.  Thereupon,  upon  ex- 
amining the  part  of  the  map  which  represents  the  Transvaal,  we 
find  it  thickly  covered  with  patches  of  yellow.  The  Johannes- 
burg gold  district  there  appears  only  as  one  of  many,  and  one  of 
the  less  important. 

Here  we  have  the  veritable  cause  of  this  war,  in  behalf  of 
what  Mr.  J oseph  Chamberlain  now  calls  "  British  para- 
mountcy."    A  few  months  ago  he  called  it  a  war  for  the  civil 

AND  RELIGIOUS  RIGHTS  OF  THE  UlTLANDER! 

But  who  ever  looked  for  the  truth  from  Mr.  Joseph  Chamber- 
lain? 


GOLD!  GOLD!  GOLD! 


4 


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